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INTRODUCTION
A Ithough indicted, tried, and sanctioned as criminal cases, white
collar crime blurs the line between civil and criminal law.' Over
the past two decades, substantial scholarship has focused on the hy-
brid nature of white collar crime.2 Much of this scholarship has sug-
gested that our system of justice has gone too far in blending criminal
and civil law. According to this view, affixing criminal liability to un-
intentional conduct and to technical wrongs, rather than moral
wrongs, harms the efficiency of the market3 and squanders the crimi-
nal law's power as a behavior-modifying force in society.4 This Article
suggests that although our criminal justice system may have gone too
far in blending criminal and civil law, in some respects it has not gone
far enough. By failing to recognize the hybrid criminal/civil nature of
1. See Pamela H. Bucy, White Collar Crime, Cases and Materials 3 (1992) [here-
inafter Bucy, White Collar Crime]; John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Crim-
inal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71
B.U. L. Rev. 193, 198-99 (1991); Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Mid-
dleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 Yale L.J. 1795, 1798 (1992).
2. See, e.g., Alan L. Adlestein, A Corporation's Right to a Jury Trial Under the
Sixth Amendment, 27 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 375, 387 (1994) (commenting on the similar-
ity between the criminal prosecution of a corporation and the governmental regula-
tion of the same corporation by punitive civil damages); Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate
Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 1095,
1099 (1991) (stating that historical and current standards of corporate criminal liabil-
ity encourage blurring of criminal and civil liability) [hereinafter Bucy, Corporate
Ethos].
3. Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in
Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 423, 449 (1963).
4. Bucy, Corporate Ethos, supra note 2, at 1182-84.
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white collar crime and continuing to process these cases through rules
of criminal procedure and established doctrines of evidence, our crim-
inal justice system regularly shortchanges the rights of both the gov-
ernment and defendants.
To explore this issue, this Article examines one type of white collar
crime, health care fraud, by analyzing evidentiary and procedural is-
sues in reported opinions of criminal prosecutions of fraud committed
by health care providers. Part I reviews the 372 cases studied, high-
lighting evidentiary trends that are discussed in Parts II through VII.
Parts II through V focus on four different types of evidence employed
by prosecutors in proving health care fraud. Part II examines expert
witness testimony: how it has evolved in health care fraud prosecu-
tions; how prosecutors use government agents as expert witnesses; and
how expert testimony could be used to a greater extent. Part III fo-
cuses on summary evidence and suggests that white collar criminal
cases call into question accepted dogma about the admissibility of
summary charts. Part III concludes with a suggested alternative anal-
ysis for courts to employ when considering the admissibility of sum-
maries. Part IV examines extrinsic act evidence and how and why
such evidence occupies a significant place in white collar criminal
cases. Part V addresses the backbone of white collar cases, proof by
documents, and focuses on three types of documentary evidence used
extensively in health care fraud prosecutions: patient medical charts,
provider manuals, and computer-generated evidence. Part V also re-
views the hurdles each of these types of documents presents for the
government and defense, and suggests procedural changes that should
be made to better accommodate the unique problems presented by
such evidence. Part VI focuses on searches as one particular method
of obtaining evidence. This section highlights the unique legal issues
white collar crime searches present because of their hybrid civil/crimi-
nal nature by addressing three issues: (1) particularity and over-
breadth in search warrants; (2) use of administrative warrants in
criminal investigations; and (3) private party searches. Part VII fo-
cuses on two privilege issues that permeate all of the evidentiary con-
cerns discussed in this Article: Fifth Amendment and patient-
provider. This section discusses the fact that these privileges exist to a
lesser extent in health care fraud prosecutions than in other white col-
lar criminal cases.
This examination of evidentiary issues leads to the following obser-
vations about health care fraud prosecutions, in particular, and white
collar crime, in general. First, the growing complexity of crimes
presents increasingly difficult evidentiary questions for litigants and
courts. Second, the hybrid civil/criminal nature of white collar crime
requires accommodations in evidentiary and procedural doctrines if
justice is to be served. Third, neither prosecutors nor defense counsel
have been as aggressive as they should be in protecting the rights of
1994]
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their clients from outdated or inapplicable evidentiary doctrines. To
pursue more aggressive evidentiary strategies, both prosecutors and
defense counsel should become more fluent in the nuances of eviden-
tiary jurisprudence. Finally, these first three observations combined
raise the question of whether our system of criminal justice, designed
for simple crimes provable by simple evidence, is the optimal vehicle
for dealing with white collar crime and its inherent complexity. Sug-
gesting that it is not, this Article concludes by recommending specific
changes that should be made by courts and legislatures to better en-
sure that cases involving sophisticated crimes are tried fairly.
I. THE CASES STUDIED
The sample of cases examined for this Article consists of 372 state
and federal criminal prosecutions of health care providers for fraud.
These cases were identified though an extensive computer search.5
Although reported cases are not a complete collection of all cases liti-
gated,6 reviewing reported cases is a helpful method for analyzing evi-
dentiary issues. Reported cases reveal the issues that the courts and
litigants struggle over and demonstrate how courts resolve them.' Re-
ported cases are also the only source available to conduct an in-depth
study of certain types of cases, such as health care fraud prosecutions.
Investigated by multiple state and federal agencies, 8 prosecuted by
5. Pamela H. Bucy, Fraud By Fright: White Collar Crime By Health Care Provid-
ers, 67 N.C. L. Rev. 855, 882 n.204 (1989) [hereinafter Bucy, Fraud By Fright].
6. Id. at 882 n.207. It is unfortunate that the only mechanism readily available to
study prosecutions of health care providers is through reported cases. This is an inad-
equate sample for two reasons. First, courts are reporting fewer and fewer of their
opinions. Prior to 1971 most courts reported most of their opinions. George M.
Weaver, The Precedential Value of Unpublished Judicial Opinions, 39 Mercer L. Rev.
477, 478 (1988). In 1990, by comparison, almost 70% of decisions rendered by the
federal courts of appeals were unpublished. Mitchell F. Dolan & Robert N. Sayler,
Twenty Years of Litigation, A.B.A. Sec. Litig., 20 Litig. 6, 8 (1993). Second, significant
cases are often settled. These two deficiencies in the sample make it difficult to detect
trends, especially in an area changing as rapidly as health care.
7. Cf. Margaret A. Berger, When, If Ever, Does Evidentiary Error Constitute Re-
versible Error?, 25 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 893, 893-95 (1992) (demonstrating the insights
that can be gained from an empirical study of reported cases by working with only a
small sample).
8. The following federal agencies investigate health care fraud: Federal Bureau
of Investigation, Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector
General, Civilian Health and Medical Program for the Uniformed Services
(CHAMPUS), Veterans Administration, Railroad Retirement Board, Office of Per-
sonal Management, Food and Drug Administration, Department of Labor, and Postal
Inspection Service. In addition, 44 states have Medicaid fraud control units, which
are specialized units in each state's attorney general's office. See Bucy, Fraud by
Fright, supra note 5, at 937 n.123; Alan E. Reider & Harvey A. Yampolsky, Identify-
ing and Coping with Health Care Fraud Investigations, 40 Fed. B. News & J. 62, 63-64
(1993).
386 [Vol. 63
HEALTH CARE FRAUD
both federal and state officials9 who rely on many different statutes,'0
and often settled out of court between the parties," health care fraud
prosecutions are not cataloged or collected by any one agency.
The first reported opinion of a prosecution of a health care provider
for fraud was in 1909.12 From 1909 through 1993 there have been 372
reported opinions of prosecutions of health care providers for health
care fraud. My prior study examined the theories of fraud under
which these providers had been prosecuted, concluding that despite
the variety in prosecuting jurisdictions, statutory authorities em-
ployed, and types of providers prosecuted, all prosecutions of provid-
ers for health care fraud focused on eight types of fraud: (1)
Prescription ("Rx") by Fraud; (2) Billing for Services Not Performed;
(3) Misrepresenting the Nature of Services Provided; (4) Automobile
Accident Scams; (5) Quackery; (6) Filing False Cost Reports; (7)
Soliciting, Paying, or Receiving Illegal Remunerations; and (8) Pro-
viding and Billing for Unnecessary Services.13 This Article builds
upon this prior analysis.
In the "Rx by Fraud" cases, providers commit fraud when they ac-
quire a controlled substance by falsely alleging that it is for legitimate
medical purposes, or "when they prescribe a controlled substance that
is not for legitimate medical purposes. 1 4 As shown in chart 1, infra,
this is the most frequently prosecuted type of health care fraud, which
may be due to its prevalence or simply to the fact that it is one of the
easiest types of fraud to prove.1 5
"Billing for Services Not Provided" is also one of the easiest types
of fraud to prove, but only when the services at issue are detectable by
physical examination or are services a patient would recall if actually
rendered.' 6 Examples of services typically billed that did not occur
9. Bucy, Fraud By Fright, supra note 5, at 883 (describing study of reported pros-
ecutions of health care providers that revealed that 63% of all such prosecutions were
by federal authorities and 37% were by state authorities).
10. Id. This same study showed that federal authorities prosecuted health care
providers under 30 different statutes; state authorities used 20 different types of
statutes.
11. Unreported cases account for some of the more significant health care fraud
prosecutions. For example, one of the largest health care fraud prosecutions ever,
National Health Laboratories, settled without a reported opinion. 7 Corporate Crime
Rep. 3 (Jan. 4, 1993).
12. Hibbard v. United States, 172 F. 66 (7th Cir. 1909).
13. Bucy, Fraud By Fright, supra note 5, at 884.
14. Id. at 889.
15. Id. at 893.
16. Id.
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include doctors visits, 7 disbursements of medicines,18 and simple pro-
cedures, 19 such as x-rays.
There are two general types of fraud prosecuted as "Misrepresent-
ing the Nature of the Services Provided."2 Each type highlights a
different aspect of the "fee for service" method of reimbursement.21
"Fee for service" reimbursement pays a health care provider per ser-
vice rendered. Often the fee is based upon the provider's reported
cost in rendering the service.22 Under this method of payment, the
more services performed and/or the greater the cost of the services
that a provider can justify, the more the provider is reimbursed.23
Within this scheme of reimbursement, insurers are compensated for
some but not all services. This practice encourages the fraudulent
provider to render noncompensable services while misrepresenting
the services as compensable.24 Examples of this type of fraud include
a podiatrist who misrepresented to Medicare that he treated patients
for complex and compensable podiatric ailments when he merely
trimmed toenails,2 and a physician who misrepresented that he pro-
vided compensable injections for joint pain but actually supplied non-
compensable injections of routine vitamins or medicines. Under the
"fee for service" method of reimbursement, insurers also compensate
more for some services than others.2 7 This encourages the fraudulent
17. See, e.g., United States v. Hilliard, 752 F.2d 578, 579 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding
that defendant submitted false Medicare claims and demanded payment for office
visits, tests, and services that were not provided); United States v. Mitlo, 714 F.2d 294,
295 (3d Cir.) (involving a defendant charged with making false and fraudulent state-
ments with respect to Medicaid claims and with mail fraud after he overreported the
number of visits made by a particular patient), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 749 F.2d 195, 197 (5th Cir. 1984) (involving
a pharmacist convicted for violations of federally controlled substance laws and for
Medicare fraud by writing fictitious prescriptions never filled and making claims for
reimbursement); United States v. Ziperstein, 601 F.2d 281,285 (7th Cir. 1979) (involv-
ing defendants convicted of dispensing prescriptions at amounts lower than stated on
the prescription form and then billing the state for the full amount), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1031 (1980).
19. Cf. People v. American Medical Ctrs., Ltd., 324 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1982) (demonstrating how prosecution for this type of fraud is successful when
the procedure at issue is intrusive and memorable for the patient, rather than simple),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1009 (1983).
20. Bucy, Fraud by Fright, supra note 5, at 896.
21. Id.
22. For example, institutional providers such as hospitals and nursing homes are
required to file annual reports setting forth their costs in treating patients. The
amount these providers are reimbursed is calculated from these reports. See 42
U.S.C. § 1395g (1992); 42 C.F.R. § 413.20 (a) & (b) (1993). For example, a summary
of the type of costs properly included in nursing home reports is contained at 1 Medi-
care & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 91 35,378, at 10,947-955 (1986).
23. Bucy, Fraud By Fright, supra note 5, at 861.
24. Id. at 896.
25. United States v. Rousseau, 534 F.2d 584, 585 (5th Cir. 1976).
26. United States v. Mekjian, 505 F.2d 1320, 1322-23 (5th Cir. 1975).
27. Bucy, Fraud By Fright, supra note 5, at 896.
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provider who supplies a compensable service to bill for a more lucra-
tive compensable service, 8 Examples of this type of fraud include a
medical laboratory that billed for "manual" blood tests when "auto-
mated" blood tests were performed 9 and a nursing home administra-
tor-owner who misrepresented the level of care given to patients? °
The "Automobile Accident Scam" combines the "Services Not Pro-
vided" and "Misrepresenting the Nature of Services" theories.31 Be-
cause of the large number of these cases and the customized method
employed by defendants to commit the fraud, the "Automobile Acci-
dent Scam" warrants separate treatment.32 Health care providers usu-
ally are only one of the defendants involved in these cases.33 The
frauds proceed in a similar manner: after a legitimate or staged auto-
mobile accident, false medical information is provided to generate
false insurance claims.34
The "Quackery" cases involve misrepresentations of medical cre-
dentials and of the prophylactic or curative value of products or treat-
ment.35 Most of the reported "Quackery" cases involve the latter type
of misrepresentation and "are a testament to the ingenuity and gulli-
bility of human beings."36 Sample "Quackery" prosecutions include
the defendant prosecuted for selling "oxypathors," a device that alleg-
edly enhances the breathing through the "skin and membranes of the
human body," thereby increasing "vital combustion" and circulation.37
Another defendant was convicted on fraud charges for marketing "[a]
wonder treatment" for "restor[ing] flagging vital forces" and
"awaken[ing] [the] glands" of men in their 60s, 70s, and 80s.38
28. Id. at 897.
29. United States v. Precision Medical Labs., Inc., 593 F.2d 434, 438 (2d Cir. 1978).
30. United States v. Huckaby, 698 F.2d 915, 916 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1070 (1983).
31. Bucy, Fraud By Fright, supra note 5, at 899.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 899-900.
34. Id. at 905. For example, in United States v. Perez, 489 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert denied, 417 U.S. 945 (1974), "recruiters" solicited "hitters" whose function was to
drive the "hitter" automobile in each collision in this state-wide fraud. Id. at 55.
Pregnant women were heavily recruited for the target automobiles because they
"could claim pregnancy related injuries which would be both hard to disprove and
easily settleable with the insurance carriers." Id.
35. See Bucy, Fraud By Fright, supra note 5, at 905.
36. Id at 906. For example, the defendant in Moses v. United States, 221 F. 863
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 238 U.S. 629 (1915), was convicted for advertising and selling
"oxypathors," a device that allegedly "begets ... a supplementary breathing through
the skin and membranes of the human body." Id. at 866. The defendants in Baker v.
United States, 115 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 692 (1941), were
convicted for fraudulently representing that they had a treatment that could cure
"piles, rupture, prostate, varicose veins and numerous other diseases and ailments."
Id. at 537.
37. See Moses, 221 F. at 866.
38. See Stunz v. United States, 27 F.2d 575, 576 (8th Cir. 1928).
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"Filing False Cost Reports" scenarios arise because the amount of
reimbursement due some providers, such as nursing homes and hospi-
tals, is based upon their reported costs, which these institutions submit
in annual cost reports. 39 The reported cases reveal that some provid-
ers have committed fraud in several ways when reporting their costs:
"(1) by including expenses not related to patient care; (2) by inflating
expenses that are related to patient care; and (3) by failing to disclose
the related status of business entities with whom the provider is deal-
ing."40 As seen in chart 1, infra, there have been relatively few re-
ported prosecutions for fraudulent cost reporting.41 This may be
because of the difficulty in prosecuting this type of fraud. In these
cases, the accounting issues are complex, the pleading issues are diffi-
cult, and because of the number of people who contribute to the prep-
aration of most cost reports, proving intent to defraud on the part of
any one person is difficult.4 2
"Soliciting, Paying, or Receiving Illegal Remunerations" cases have
all been pursued as statutory violations because specific federal and
state statutes make it a crime to receive, solicit, or pay kickbacks,
bribes, rebates, or any remuneration for referring a patient or placing
or recommending the placing of an order for any service or item.43
The types of payments historically prosecuted as illegal remunerations
include fees paid to physicians by medical laboratories to induce refer-
rals of patient specimens" and payments to nursing home administra-
tors to secure a place for a patient in the nursing home.45 As can be
seen in chart 1, infra,46 this has also been one of the least prosecuted
types of fraud, which is surprising because kickbacks are widely ac-
knowledged to be a pervasive problem, especially within medical lab-
oratories.47 This infrequency of prosecutions may be due to the
39. See Bucy, Fraud By Fright, supra note 5, at 908-09.
40. Id. at 909.
41. See infra chart 1 & appendix I.
42. See Bucy, Fraud by Fright, supra note 5, at 911-14.
43. See id. at 914.
44. See United States v. Lipkis, 770 F.2d 1447, 1449 (9th Cir. 1985).
45. See United States v. Zacher, 586 F.2d 912, 913 (2d Cir. 1978).
46. See infra chart 1 & appendix I.
47. See Kickbacks in Clinical Laboratories: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1982) (testimony of Charles P. Monroe, Assistant Director, Crimi-
nal Investigative Division, FBI). Assistant Director Monroe stated that:
Convicted laboratory owners, who have cooperated with the Government,
advise that they had no desire to get business by paying kickbacks. They
claim that they made the payments only because they felt they were econom-
ically forced to do so. Several convicted lab owners report that the kickback
payment was quite essential in obtaining physicians' accounts, If no kick-
back was paid, the doctor would take his business elsewhere.
Id.; see also Medicare & Medicaid Fraud: Hearing Before Senate Comm. on Finance,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1980) (statement of Oliver B. Revell, Assistant Director, Chief
of Criminal Investigative Division, FBI). Assistant Director Revell stated: "It be-
came immediately apparent [to FBI agents conducting an undercover investigation]
[Vol. 63
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difficulties in applying the statutes and regulations pertaining to this
problem.48
The last type of fraud historically prosecuted, "Proving and Billing
for Unnecessary Services," has rarely been pursued. Providing unnec-
essary or substandard health care services becomes criminal fraud
when, as a prerequisite to payment, a provider knowingly misrepre-
sents that the services rendered were necessary or competently pro-
vided.49 This theory is difficult to prove, and as reported cases reflect,
has been employed only when the services were blatantly and uncon-
trovertedly unnecessary. 0 Examples of its use include the prosecu-
tion of dentists who performed root canals on "badly broken down...
non-restorable" teeth5' and an obstetrician who billed medically indi-
cated and necessary examinations that included "the [rubbing] and
[massaging] in a sexual manner, the vaginal and anal areas, the breasts
and the buttocks of patients. 52
Chart 1 shows the frequency of each of these types of fraud.53
that kickbacks and rebates were a way of life. Virtually every provider of ancillary
services... made offers of rebates and kickbacks.").
48. See Bucy, Fraud by Fright, supra note 5 at 914-20; Michael J. Tichon, Structur-
ing Ventures in a Post Hanlester and Safe Harbors World, 14 Whittier L Rev. 169, 173
(1993).
49. Bucy, Fraud By Fright, supra note 5, at 920.
50. Id. at 931.
51. United States v. Talbott, 460 F. Supp. 253, 264 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd, 590 F.2d 192
(6th Cir. 1978).
52. United States v. Casey, No. 88-48, indictment at 4 (E.D. Mo. March 11, 1988).
53. Case names and cites to accompany chart 1 are provided in appendix 1.
1994]
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Chart 2 demonstrates the chronological distribution of the reported
prosecutions of health care providers.54
54. Case names and cites to accompany chart 2 are provided in appendix II.
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As can be seen from chart 2, there was a dramatic jump in prosecu-
tions in the 1970s. This may be due to several factors. First, beginning
in 1966, with the implementation of Medicare and Medicaid, the gov-
ernment became a medical insurer and thus the financial victim of
fraudulent health care providers.55 Prosecutors have more resources
available than do private insurers to pursue such conduct. Second, the
volume of dollars going to health care has dramatically increased, ris-
ing from less than half of $1 billion in 196656 to $214.7 billion in
1979.17 Third, prosecutors did not begin to focus on many white collar
crimes until the 1970s."s
The explosion in prosecutions of health care providers has affected
an increasing variety of providers. As chart 3 shows, prior to 1970,
55. Medicare is codified in various sections of Title 42 of the United States Code,
primarily in 42 U.S.C. § 1395-1 (1992). Medicaid is also codified in various sections of
Title 42, primarily in 42 U.S.C. § 1396-p (1992).
56. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce. 1 Historical Statistics of the
United States, Colonial Times to 1970, at 73 (1971) (showing that total health care
expenditures in 1966 were $44,974,000).
57. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the
United States 1987, at 84 (1986).
58. See Herbert Edelhertz, Introduction to White-Collar Crime: An Agenda for
Research 1 (Herbert Edelhertz & Thomas D. Overcast eds., 1982); Peter J. Henning,
Testing the Limits of Investigating and Prosecuting White Collar Crime: How Far Will
the Courts Allow Prosecutors To Go?, 54 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 405, 408 (1993).
1994]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
most prosecutions of health care providers concerned physicians or
pharmacies. 9 No reported prosecutions of providers for health care
fraud concerned nursing homes, dentists, podiatrists, medical labora-
tories, psychologists or durable medical equipment or ambulance
companies. The frequency with which other providers have been
prosecuted, however, has increased dramatically since 1970. This ex-
pansion of prosecutions is consistent with the overall growth of health
care professions.6"
59. Cases names and cites to accompany chart 3 are provided in appendix III.
60. New health care providers such as home health agencies, durable medical
equipment companies, ambulatory medical clinics and the individual providers who
staff these entities have all increased recently. Home care (now a $13 billion per year
market) is one of the "fastest-growing" segments of the health care industry. Licens-
ing is not required for home health agencies, such that only about one-third of the
6000-7000 existing companies even belong to the professions trade association, and
the government has few standards for operation of home health agencies. For exam-
ple, until recently, the federal government did not have standard definitions for medi-
cal equipment sold for home use, allowing some companies to make "huge profits" by
"billing for parts of equipment, piece by piece, when the entire package should be
sold and billed together." Robert Pear, Abuse Widespread in Medical Sales for Care
at Home, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1991, at A24.
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The reported health care fraud prosecutions also reveal that ten ma-
jor types of evidence have been used to prove health care fraud. As
shown in chart 4, documents, insiders, experts, and extrinsic act evi-
dence are the four dominant types of evidence used, accounting for
sixty percent of all evidence employed."'
61. Case names and cites to accompany chart 4 are provided in appendix IV.
" Ater 1970
"] Before 1970
_NTn=
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Types and Frequency of Evidence Used in Reported
Prosecutions of Health Care Providers
20 30 40
Number of Cases
- CHART 4 -
As chart 5 shows, there are chronological trends in the types of evi-
dence used by prosecutors in reported prosecutions of health care
providers. For example, medical experts and evidence from under-
cover operations were used more in pre-1970 prosecutions. On the
other hand, neither computer evidence nor billing experts were used
before 1970.
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Few of the health care fraud convictions were reversed on appeal:
seventy-one percent of pretrial motions62 and seventy-three percent of
the post-conviction appeals were resolved in favor of the govern-
ment.63 Of the reported opinions in which evidence was suppressed
or a conviction was reversed, twenty-five percent were suppressed or
reversed because of improper evidentiary rulings by the lower court. 6
As chart 6 reveals, by far the most common evidentiary error was im-
proper admission of extrinsic act evidence.65
62. Case names and cites are provided in appendix V.
63. Id.
64. Id
65. Case names and cites to accompany chart 6 are provided in appendix VI.
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II. EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY
Expert testimony, employed in twenty-one percent of the reported
cases,66 has been an essential part of health care prosecutions. 67 This
section discusses the evolving nature of this testimony, the complica-
tions that arise when a government agent also testifies as an expert,
and whether proponents of expert testimony in white collar criminal
cases, usually the government, optimally utilize the aids available
under evidentiary codes for presenting expert testimony. This section
concludes by suggesting that white collar criminal cases, as shown by
reported health care fraud prosecutions, are propelling expert testi-
mony in two new directions: more frequent use of legal experts who
explain applicable laws and regulations to fact finders, and more fre-
quent use of members of the government's investigating team as ex-
pert witnesses.
A. Evolving Types of Experts: Billing Experts
Although expansive use of expert testimony suggests that this type
of evidence should be allowed, courts should take care to protect the
rights of defendants, such as by offering a voir dire of these witnesses
away from the jurors. This section suggests that prosecutors, or plain-
tiffs proving civil health care fraud, should make greater use of modus
operandi expert testimony because it is an effective way of communi-
cating the economic motive behind the fraud alleged.
66. See supra chart 4 & infra appendix IV.
67. Bucy, Fraud By Fright, supra note 5, at 890-92, 898, 907, 922-23.
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1. Use of Billing Experts in Health Care Fraud Prosecutions
Throughout the twentieth century, as the types of crimes for which
health care providers have been prosecuted have changed, so have the
types of expert and expert testimony offered. For most of the twenti-
eth century, providers have been prosecuted on "Rx By Fraud '  or
"Quackery" theories of fraud.69 In both of these types of cases, medi-
cal experts were necessary witnesses. In the "Rx By Fraud" cases,
these experts testified about the medically indicated bases for pre-
scribing controlled substances, the scope of a professionally appropri-
ate examination preceding any such prescriptions, and acceptable
dosages and frequencies of such prescriptions.70 In the "Quackery"
cases, experts testified about the viability, or lack thereof, of defend-
ants' curative claims.71
Approximately twenty years ago, the type of offenses for which
health care providers were prosecuted began to change. Currently,
providers are prosecuted most aggressively for billing and reimburse-
ment frauds. Sixty-three percent of reported health care fraud prose-
cutions since 1970 concerned billing frauds, whereas only fourteen
percent of the reported prosecutions prior to 1970 concerned such
frauds.72 Even the "Rx By Fraud" cases have taken on a billing fraud
68. In 31% (117) of the reported health care fraud prosecutions, providers have
been prosecuted for improper issuance of prescriptions for controlled substances
("Rx By Fraud"). See supra chart 1 & infra appendix I.
69. In just over nine percent (34) of the reported health care fraud prosecutions,
providers have been prosecuted for making false claims about their healing abilities
("Quackery"). Id.
70. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 511 F.2d 1062, 1072-73 (7th Cir.) (involving
expert testifying as to customary medical procedures for prescribing drugs), cert. de-
nied, 423 U.S. 1031 (1975); United States v. Bartee, 479 F.2d 484, 488 (10th Cir. 1973)
(involving experts testifying as to legitimacy of prescribing controlled substances). As
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit noted, "Expert testimony
with respect to recognized medical standards and methods of treating patients, such as
those for whom the prescriptions were furnished, [will be] admissible because of its
bearing upon the intent and purpose with which the prescriptions were issued."
Strader v. United States, 72 F.2d 589, 592 (10th Cir. 1934).
71. See, e.g., United States v. Andreadis, 366 F.2d 423, 433 (2d Cir. 1966) (using
expert testifying as to widespread belief of drug's effectiveness), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1001 (1967); Baker v. United States, 115 F.2d 533, 539 (8th Cir. 1940) (using experts to
describe proper method of treatment for cancer), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 692 (1941);
Barnhill v. United States, 96 F.2d 116, 119-20 (10th Cir. 1938) (using physicians testi-
fying as to curative effects of defendant's medicine for tuberculosis).
72. Since 1970, 63% of the reported prosecutions of health care providers for
health care fraud have focused on billing frauds. Of the 278 reported prosecutions of
health care providers since 1970, 175 have focused on billing frauds: 65 for billing for
services not provided; 39 for billing for a more expensive service than what was actu-
ally provided; 22 for filing false cost reports; 34 for billing for fictitious or unnecessary
services rendered in staged or fictitious accidents and; 15 for billing for unnecessary
services while falsely representing that such services were necessary. Of the 94 re-
ported prosecutions of health care providers prior to 1970, 13 focused on billing
frauds: two for billing for services not provided; three for billing for a more expensive
service than was actually provided; none for filing false cost reports; four for billing
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component. Today the provider who formerly profited simply by
"selling" prescriptions for controlled substances may well require the
"patients" who want these prescriptions to submit to medical tests and
procedures, thereby allowing the provider to profit by billing insurers
for services rendered.73
The type of expert now employed in reported health care fraud
prosecutions reflects these changes. Today, the expert in a health care
fraud prosecution is likely to be a billing expert. In twenty-seven per-
cent of all reported health care fraud prosecutions where expert testi-
mony was used, the expert was a billing expert.74 This trend has
become even more dramatic since 1970: in forty-two percent of all of
the post-1970 reported health care fraud prosecutions wherein expert
testimony was used, the expert was a billing expert." Billing experts
are health care professionals of a new genre. They are not health care
providers skilled in the practice of medicine, but bureaucrats in public
or private health insurance specializing in the meaning and application
of billing procedures.
Sheriff v. Spagnola7 6 demonstrates the significance of billing experts
in health care prosecutions.77 Spagnola was the owner of a speech
therapy clinic. Along with the bookkeeper of the clinic, Spagnola was
indicted on fifty-seven counts of obtaining money under false pre-
tenses by over-billing Medicaid for speech therapy rendered on some
of the clinic's patients.78 The lower court dismissed all charges finding
that the evidence submitted to the grand jury failed to show probable
cause.79 The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in
for unnecessary or fictitious services rendered in staged or fictitious accidents; and,
four for billing for unnecessary services while falsely representing that such services
were necessary. See supra chart 1& infra appendix I.
73. See, e.g., United States v. Mahar, 801 F.2d 1477, 1490 (6th Cir. 1986) (affirming
finding that defendant required patient to submit to medically unnecessary testing
procedures to obtain controlled substances).
74. Expert testimony has been used in 66 of the reported health care prosecutions.
In 18 of these cases, the expert was a billing expert; in 48 of these cases the expert was
some type of medical expert. See supra chart 4 & infra appendix IV.
75. Since 1972, there have been 42 reported opinions of health care fraud prosecu-
tions where expert testimony was used. In 18 of these cases, the expert was a billing
expert; in 24 of the cases the expert was a medical expert. See id.
76. 706 P.2d 840 (Nev. 1985).
77. Other cases where billing experts were employed include: United States v.
Siddiqi, 959 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Hooshmand, 931 F.2d 725 (11th
Cir. 1991); United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1217 (1985); United States v. Collins, 596 F.2d 166 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Zacher, 586 F.2d 912 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Radetsky, 535 F.2d 556 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 820 (1976), overruled by 921 F.2d 994 (10th Cir. 1990);
People v. Einstein, 435 N.E.2d 1257 (II1. App. Ct. 1982); State v. Cargille, 507 So. 2d
1254, (La. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Ruud, 259 N.W.2d 567 (Minn. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 996 (1978); People v. Weinberg, 586 N.Y.S.2d 132 (App. Div. 1992); People
v. Montesano, 446 N.Y.S.2d 813 (App. Div. 1982).
78. Spagnola, 706 P.2d at 841.
79. Id. at 841-42.
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part.80 Key to the reversal was the clarity of the billing requirements.
Over objections by the defendant and citing the testimony of the gov-
ernment's expert on billing, the Nevada Supreme Court ruled that the
regulations were not ambiguous and adequately put the defendant on
notice that his billing practices were wrong.8'
The billing expert in Spagnola testified before the grand jury about
the "proper" method of billing travel expenses incurred in reaching a
patient's home or nursing home. This expert also compared the bill-
ing practices of other speech clinics in Nevada to those of the defend-
ant's clinic, testifying that the defendant's clinic was alone in its
interpretation of the relevant regulations. 83 This type of "peer group
comparison" can provide a helpful check on expert testimony, and
thus help defendants. 4 In Spagnola, however, such evidence helped
the government because comparing Spagnola's billing pattern to that
of other speech therapy clinics helped undercut Spagnola's defense
that the billing regulations were ambiguous.
There may be occasions when peer group comparisons help the de-
fense by undercutting the government's expert. In particular, evi-
dence that peer providers of a defendant have followed various
interpretations of relevant regulations could buttress a defendant's
claim that the regulations are confusing. For example, in United States
v. Siddiqi85 an oncologist, was convicted on charges of mail fraud,
theft of government property, and false claims stemming from bills he
submitted to Medicare for chemotherapy that was administered to his
patients.8 6 At issue was whether these patients were under Siddiqi's
"supervision" at the time of this therapy. Siddiqi argued that they
were, even though he was out of town when the chemotherapy was
actually rendered, asserting that he sent his patients to the hospital for
outpatient chemotherapy treatment, selected their treatment and dos-
age, monitored their progress through chart review, and arranged for
another physician to cover the patients if the need arose when he was
out of town.' Siddiqi presented expert and lay testimony that there
was "widespread confusion" among Siddiqi's peers regarding proper
billing practices and that his interpretation of "supervision" was
shared by others.'
80. Id. at 845.
81. Id. at 842-43.
82. Id at 842.
83. Id. at 843.
84. Fraud By Fright, supra note 5, at 880.
85. 959 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1992).
86. Id. at 1169-70.
87. Id. at 1170.
88. Id. at 1171. The Second Circuit remanded this case to the lower court to make
preliminary findings regarding the admissibility of allegedly new evidence that Siddiqi
located after trial, which may have been relevant to his good faith in interpreting the
billing regulations as he did. Id. at 1174.
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Currently, defendants are unlikely to obtain access to peer group
comparative evidence through ordinary methods of discovery. The
discovery provisions in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, for
example, do not require the government to provide such discovery. 9
Even the expanded discovery now required for expert witnesses re-
quires a party only to disclose the basis of the expert's testimony. 90
Because peer group comparison data may not be readily available or
because it may be unfavorable, it may not be a "basis" for the govern-
ment expert's opinion and thus not included in provided discovery.
Therefore, defendants should subpoena this data, and courts should
enforce defense efforts to acquire peer group comparisons from the
insurers able to provide such information. Because it could be diffi-
cult for defendants to ascertain whether such evidence exists, defend-
ants should be allowed the use of limited interrogatories or
depositions so as to flesh out sufficient information for subpoenaing
purposes.
2. Propriety of Using Billing Experts Under Current
Evidentiary Codes
Because most health care fraud prosecutions now allege some sort
of billing irregularity and because of the complexity, volume, and
sometimes inconsistency of applicable billing requirements, billing ex-
perts will be needed by both sides in health care fraud prosecutions.
The billing regulations governing health care reimbursement are volu-
minous and complex,91 and most providers must comply with several
different sets of regulations for each insurance program covering pa-
tients treated by a provider. This is complicated further because each
insurer has its own codes for each procedure performed, different
amounts to charge for each procedure, and different requirements as
89. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16.
90. Effective December 1, 1993 the following amendment to Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 16 went into effect:
At the defendant's request, the government shall disclose to the defendant a
written summary of testimony the government intends to use under Rules
702, 703 or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence during its case in chief at
trial. This summary must describe the witnesses' opinions, the bases and the
reasons therefor, and the witnesses' qualifications.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E).
The following amendment, providing for reciprocal discovery, also went into effect:
If the defendant requests disclosure under subdivision (a)(1)(E) of this rule
and the government complies, the defendant, at the government's request,
must disclose to the government a written summary of testimony the defend-
ant intends to use under Rules 702, 703 and 705 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence as evidence at trial. This summary must describe the opinions of
the witnesses, the bases and reasons therefor, and the witnesses'
qualifications.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(b)(1)(C).
91. Fraud by Fright, supra note 5, at 877 & n.174.
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to how the procedure should be performed. 9 The government will
need billing experts to guide fact finders through these various appli-
cable regulations. Defendants will need billing experts in their effort
to show the inapplicability of, or at least confusion about, such
regulations.93
Testimony by billing experts interpreting complex regulations is
consistent with the emphasis in current evidentiary codes on greater
admissibility of expert witness testimony.9 Such testimony readily fits
the "helpfulness" standard for admissibility: it becomes admissible
92. For example, in State v. Romero, 574 So. 2d 330 (La. 1990), the defendants,
both physicians, were recruited by a Louisiana hospital to locate and treat Medicaid
patients in Louisiana. They were convicted several years later of making false claims
to the Louisiana Medicaid program. Although there was other evidence of intent that
led the appellate court to affirm some of the counts of both defendants, the evidence
regarding the billing codes is typical of the problems with the codes. Louisiana prov-
iders billing Medicaid for treatment of Medicaid patients were to consult the "Pro-
vider Manual" to file their claims for reimbursement. The state agency charged with
administering the Medicaid program prepared this manual. It contained "hundreds of
diagnosis codes." Id. at 332 n.4. "For example, there are eleven gradations of 'office
visit' . . . with five levels of service for new patients and six for established patients."
Id.
The Medicaid state agency contracted with a private insurer to print and distribute
the "Provider Manuals." The evidence showed that the Louisiana Medicaid manual
was frequently changed or updated (seven times in one of the years for which the
defendants were charged). Id. at 341 n.9. Also, the "Provider Manuals" were some-
times not distributed and providers had to wait months for one, or use outdated
manuals or manuals from other jurisdictions. Id. at 340-41.
The provider manual used by the Romeros incorporated by reference other manu-
als, for example, the Current Procedural Terminology (CPT), published by the Amer-
ican Medical Association. Yet, as shown in the Romero case, "Not all of the codes
listed in the CPT books have been adopted by the Medicaid system and the provider
manuals do not indicate which CPT codes are used in Medicaid, but provide only a
broad description of what is covered." Id. at 332. Sometimes the CPT conflicts with
the Medicaid manual. See id. at 338.
In addition, see United States v. Hooshmand, 931 F.2d 725 (11th Cir. 1991), where
the conviction of a physician for billing irregularities was affirmed. The court dis-
cussed the fact that reimbursement for Medicare services rendered in Florida is gov-
erned by a "Carrier Manual" published by Blue Cross. This carrier manual derived its
terms and codes from the CPT and the Florida Relative Value Studies (FRVS). I. at
729-30. The defense (unsuccessful in this case) centered on the confusion and ambi-
guity in these billing codes. Id. at 731.
93. Defendants in the following cases presented a "confusion" defense: United
States v. Peterson, 488 F.2d 645, 649-51 (5th Cir.) (reversing the conviction of defend-
ant, a physician, because of confusion over billing requirements), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 828 (1974); People v. Berke, 603 N.E.2d 737, 739-41 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (acquit-
ting defendant of many of the counts against him after explaining his misunderstand-
ing of billing requirements); People v. Alizadeh, 452 N.Y.S.2d 425, 432-33 (App. Div.
1982) (reserving conviction of defendant in part because of this defense); Common-
wealth v. Stein, 546 A.2d 36, 38-40 (Pa. 1988) (dismissing Medicaid fraud charges
brought against defendant because the relevant billing regulations were found to be
unconstitutionally vague), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1046 (1989).
94. For an excellent overview of the Federal Rules of Evidence and how they en-
courage greater admissibility of expert testimony, see Margaret A. Berger, United
States v. Scop: The Common Law Approach to an Expert's Opinion About a Wit-
ness's Credibility Still Does Not Work, 55 Brook. L. Rev. 559 (1989). As the advisory
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because it "will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue." 95
Limited use of experts to explain complex regulations has long been
approved in white collar criminal cases. In United States v. Unrtth,96
for example, where four defendants were convicted of check kiting
and misappropriation of bank funds, an FDIC bank examiner was per-
mitted to explain to the jury a regulation pertaining to bank board
approval for loans.97 In United States v. Bilzerian,98 a securities law
expert was permitted to provide the jury with "general background on
federal securities regulation and the filing requirements" for a specific
schedule, as well as "clarify any ambiguity in the instructions" on the
schedule. 99
Bilzerian also highlights the problem in allowing billing experts to
testify. By interpreting the meaning and application of relevant regu-
lations guiding a party's behavior, such experts run the risk of invad-
ing the province of the trial judge by instructing the jury on the law
applicable to the facts before it.1°° It is possible for courts, however,
to guide these experts' testimony carefully so as to avoid, or at least
limit, this danger. In Bilzerian, for example, the court restricted the
government expert's testimony to general background and excluded
the defense's proffered expert altogether because his testimony would
constitute "an ultimate legal conclusion based upon the facts of the
case."''
1
Numerous cases speak of the danger of allowing expert witnesses to
give opinions on the meaning of specific laws at issue in a case. 02
United States v. Benson'013 is typical. The Seventh Circuit reversed
Benson's conviction for income tax evasion after finding that the testi-
mony of the government's expert invaded the jury's province. 1°4 The
expert witness was an IRS agent who had explained general tax law
concepts as well as the requirement for filing income tax returns
before opining that specific payments received by the defendant were
committee noted, "The use of [expert] testimony has greatly increased since enact-
ment of the Federal Rules of Evidence." 137 F.R.D. 53, 156 (1991).
95. Fed. R. Evid. 702.
96. 855 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 974 (1988).
97. Id. at 1375-76.
98. 926 F.2d 1285 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 63 (1991).
99. Id. at 1294-95.
100. Id. at 1294.
101. Id. at 1295.
102. See, e.g., Molecular Technology Corp. v. Valentine, 925 F.2d 910, 919 (6th Cir.
1991) (reversing judgment because trial court "repeatedly allowed plaintiffs' expert to
testify as to the requirements of federal securities disclosure laws"); United States v.
Zipkin, 729 F.2d 384, 387 (6th Cir. 1984) (reversing judgment because trial court per-
mitted a bankruptcy judge to testify as an expert witness about a question of bank-
ruptcy law).
103. 941 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1991), amended, 957 F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1992).
104. Id. at 601.
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gross income.10 5 The court held that this witness was "no more quali-
fied than the jury" to draw inferences from the evidence.? 6 Similarly,
the Eighth Circuit found error in a civil fraud case because the expert
witness "went too far" when he instructed the jury on the meaning of
a Securities and Exchange Commission regulation.10 7
If instructing a jury on the meaning of provisions is going too far,
then billing experts in health care fraud prosecutions may also have
gone too far. As noted in Spagnola, the expert testified about the
"proper method of billing Medicaid for travel expenses."'tm In both
State v. Romero'0 9 and State v. Cargille,"10 the experts testified that the
applicable billing requirements disallowed the billing practices for
which the defendants were on trial."' In State v. Rtud,112 the govern-
ment expert was allowed to testify about the general background of a
regulation regarding cost reporting requirements for nursing homes as
well as state his opinion about whether the specific expenses at issue
in the trial complied with this regulation." 3
This Article suggests that the use of billing experts in health care
fraud prosecutions is one instance where the accepted dogma about
the proper scope of expert testimony does not fit in the context of
white collar crimes. Recognizing that it is a court's duty to instruct
fact finders about the law," 4 this Article suggests that for three rea-
sons, experts on applicable laws and regulations should be allowed to
testify about the meaning and applicability of these laws and regula-
tions in white collar criminal cases. First, as the health care fraud
prosecutions demonstrate, regulations applicable to the conduct at is-
sue often are confusing. There is room for legitimate difference in
opinion as to how these laws and regulations should be or have been
interpreted. Testimony by and examination of expert witnesses may
be the only viable way to flesh out these disagreements. The fact that
such differences of opinion exist may transform this apparent issue of
law into a mixed issue of fact and law as fact finders struggle to apply
law to the facts before them." 5 Second, the right of confrontation
105. Id. at 603-04.
106. Id. at 604.
107. Police Retirement Sys. v. Midwest Inv. Advisory Serv., Inc., 940 F.2d. 351, 357
(8th Cir. 1991).
108. Sherriff v. Spagnola, 706 P.2d 840, 842 (Nev. 1985).
109. 574 So. 2d 330 (La. 1990).
110. 507 So. 2d 1254 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
111. Romero, 574 So. 2d at 338; Cargille, 507 So. 2d at 1258-59.
112. 259 N.W.2d 567 (Minn. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978).
113. Id. at 574.
114. See, e.g., United States v. Zipkin, 729 F.2d 384, 387 (6th Cir. 1984) ("It was not
proper for the witness to testify as to a legal conclusion; it is the sole function of the
trial judge to instruct the jury on the law."); Marx & Co. v. Diners' Club, Inc., 550
F.2d 505. 509-10 (2d Cir.) ("It is not for witnesses to instruct the jury as to applicable
principles of law, but for the judge."), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977).
115. See Note, Expert Legal Testimony, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 797, 798-803 (1984). This
Note argues for greater admissibility of expert legal testimony for the following three
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guaranteed to criminal defendants by the Sixth Amendment 16 makes
it fairer, if not constitutionally required, for defendants in criminal
cases to examine witnesses about the meaning of applicable regula-
tions rather than simply to litigate the issue in a jury instruction con-
ference. Third, given the complexity of billing regulations, it may be
unfair to deprive the parties of the pedagogical opportunity billing ex-
perts provide. In some cases, it may not be possible for either party to
litigate the fraud issues with the clarity needed in criminal cases with-
out producing a witness who can explain billing regulations and how
they apply to the facts of the case. Although expansive use of experts
on the law is desirable, there is a potential danger in allowing a wit-
ness to explain the law to the jury, namely, that the court may disagree
with the witness's explanation. To guard against this, courts in white
collar criminal cases should voir dire such experts out of the hearing of
the jury.
B. Government Agents as Expert Witnesses
Courts routinely allow government agents who have helped investi-
gate a case to testify as to facts they have observed during their inves-
tigations.' 1 7 In the reported health care fraud prosecutions, case
agents testify with some regularity as expert witnesses. In over ten
percent of the health care prosecutions where expert testimony was
presented, the expert witness was an agent who had assisted in the
investigation. 118 An examination of these prosecutions suggests that:
reasons: (1) it is hard to separate questions of fact and law; (2) some courts admit
such testimony anyway; and (3) such testimony can be helpful in some cases, and it is
an exaggeration to suggest that judges are the experts on the law. This Note points to
the following potential problems with expert legal testimony: (1) parties retain only
experts who agree with them; (2) the trial becomes a "battle of the experts;" and (3)
the judges role is usurped. Id. at 808-11. This Note also suggests implementation of
the following procedural safeguards to overcome these potential problems: (1) court
appoifitment of experts; (2) court instructions on relevant law during the presentation
of the evidence rather than just at the end; (3) prescreening of expert testimony by a
court; and (4) permitting only expert testimony that complements the court's view of
the law. Id. at 811-14.
116. U.S. Const. amend. VI provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right.., to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... "
117. See, e.g., Martin v. Wainwright, 770 F.2d 918, 922-23 (11th Cir. 1985) (allowing
detectives to testify to incriminating statements made by defendant), modified, 781
F.2d 185 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 909 (1986); United States v. Andrews, 765
F.2d 1491, 1500-01 (11th Cir. 1985) (permitting testimony of agent who acted in un-
dercover capacity about his encounters with the defendant), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1064 (1986); State v. Elstad, 658 P.2d 552, 553 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) (officers testifying
to incriminating statements made by defendant), rev'd, 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
118. See, e.g., United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800, 816-17 (11th Cir. 1984) (special
agent from Department of Health and Human Services), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1217
(1985); Nigro v. United States, 117 F.2d 624, 631 (8th Cir. 1941) (narcotic agent);
People v. Lawrence, 18 Cal. Rptr. 196, 203-04 (Ct. App. 1961) (Bureau of Narcotic
Enforcement agent); People v. Einstein, 435 N.E.2d 1257, 1259-60 (111. App. Ct. 1982)
(special agent for Illinois Department of Law Enforcement); State v. Cargille, 507 So.
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(1) a case agent testifying as an expert witness also often testifies as to
facts, and this dual role may enhance his stature both as a fact witness
and as an expert witness; (2) case agents serving this dual role are
"land mine" witnesses for defendants; and (3) the notion of "case
agent" should be broadened for white collar criminal cases when as-
sessing the prejudice presented by case agent expert witnesses.
1. Hybrid Fact/Opinion Testimony
State v. Ruud" 9 and State v. Cargille1" illustrate the dual role
played by government agents who testify as experts. In Ruud, in
which a nursing home and its owners were convicted for filing false
cost reports with Medicaid, an audit supervisor testified as to the facts,
including the particulars of the field audit that was conducted of the
nursing home and the auditors' attempts to get explanations from the
defendants.'' This witness was also qualified as an expert and gave
his opinion about certain expenses charged to Medicaid and at issue in
the criminal prosecution. For example, he opined that the "linens"
listed on the nursing home cost report included a girdle, a handbag, a
sweater, and slacks."
Such blending of fact and opinion testimony also occurred in
Cargille, in which the defendant, a physician, was convicted of Medi-
caid fraud."2 An Assistant Division Director of Medicaid testified as
to facts, which included statements made by the defendant. Accord-
ing to this witness's testimony, the "defendant was well aware of the
bar, but ... objected to the recoupment policy of the program. 12 4
This witness was also qualified as an expert witness and testified as to
the proper billing procedure for office visits and the capacity and pro-
cedures of Medicaid computers.' 5
The auditing expert in Ruud and the Assistant Division Director of
Medicaid in Cargille testified about both facts and opinion. Such
blending would seem to enhance both of their roles. As fact wit-
nesses, they have more credibility because they are viewed as experts,
even though in both of these cases their expertise (billing procedures)
did not extend to the facts about which they testified (conversations
2d 1254, 1258 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (investigator for Louisiana Department of Justice,
Medicaid Fraud Control Unit); State v. Ruud, 259 N.W.2d 567, 574 (Minn. 1977) (au-
dit director of the audit division of the Department of Welfare), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
996 (1978); People v. Montesano, 446 N.Y.S.2d 813, 814 (App. Div. 1982) (auditor
from Medicaid Fraud Unit).
119. 259 N.W.2d 567 (Minn. 1977), cerL denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978).
120. 507 So. 2d 1254 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
121. Ruud, 259 N.W.2d at 574.
122. Id. The appellate court found that the defendants failed to raise an objection
to the agent's testimony at trial, and thus "may not raise it now." Id. at 575.
123. 507 So. 2d at 1256.
124. Id. at 1258.
125. Id.
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with the defendants). As expert witnesses, they would have more im-
pact because they have specific facts to offer the jury regarding the
immediate issues before the jury (the defendant's state of mind).
2. "Land Mine" Experts
Use of case agents as expert witnesses may create "land mines" for
defense counsel who must cross-examine these experts. 126 As individ-
uals who have been involved, even tangentially, in the preparation of
the case against the defendant, these witnesses may have access to
unfavorable information about defendants that would not come into
evidence if the cross-examiner had not unknowingly opened the door.
When a case agent's testimony has been restricted to the concrete
facts that the agent allegedly observed, the chance of a cross-examiner
treading into a "dangerous" area is less probable than when the case
agent has testified to something as open-ended as opinion.
Not only is an opinion more abstract and thus subject to more wide
ranging cross-examination, but opinion testimony also opens the door
for admission of hearsay. By its terms, Federal Rule of Evidence
(FRE) 703 permits admission of hearsay solely because it forms the
basis for the expert's opinion. 2 7 Although criticized by some com-
126. Phylis Skloot Bamberger, The Dangerous Expert Witness, 52 Brook. L. Rev.
855, 858 (1986). Cf. United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 138 (2d Cir.) (reversing
conviction where government's investigatory agent testifying as an expert witness al-
legedly based his testimony "solely on the testimony and documentary evidence intro-
duced at trial"), rev'd in part on reh'g, 856 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1988). According to the
Second Circuit:
We believe it to be virtually impossible for an investigator so deeply involved
in a case to put aside previous judgments regarding the credibility of wit-
nesses and to render de novo judgments on their credibility after listening to
the trial . . . . [S]uch testimony by an investigator and opinions based
thereon are clearly prejudicial when offered to a jury.
Id. at 143. See also Berger, The Common Law Approach, supra note 94, at 569-82
(providing an excellent analysis of the difficulties presented when case agents testify
as expert witnesses).
127. FRE 703 provides: "The facts or data in the particular case upon which an
expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the
expert." Fed. R. Evid. 703 (emphasis added).
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mentators and courts,128 some courts admit hearsay contained in ex-
pert opinion.129
United States v. Affleck 3° demonstrates the willingness of some
courts to admit inadmissible hearsay. Affleck was convicted of securi-
ties fraud. A government accountant, qualified as an expert, testified
as to the financial status of the defendant's company and whether any
misrepresentations were made to investors. In preparation for his tes-
timony, this accountant examined records and interviewed a number
of people, including other accountants who had worked for the de-
fendant's company, former employees, and the trustee in bankruptcy.
During his testimony, this expert witness related "what he had been
told by those whom he had interviewed."13' Admission of this hear-
say was permitted because such conversations "are of the type reason-
ably relied on by other experts in the accounting field in a case such as
this."' 32
Lewis v. Rego 3 3 provides another example of a court willing to ad-
mit hearsay damaging to the defendant because it formed part of the
basis of an expert's opinion. This products liability suit arose out of
the explosion of a propane cylinder. Judgment in favor of the defend-
ants was reversed on appeal on the grounds that the trial court im-
properly limited the expert's testimony of hearsay, which formed the
basis of the expert's opinion."' Specifically, the expert was not al-
lowed to testify as to the content of a report prepared by another ex-
pert nor as to the conversation between the testifying expert and the
128. See, e.g., Scop, 846 F.2d at 138-43 (concluding that expert witness may not
assess personal credibility of witness's testimony); United States v. Young, 745 F.2d
733, 765 (2d Cir. 1984) (Newman, J., concurring) (questioning expert's opinion that
ambiguous conduct constituted a crime), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985); Berger,
supra note 94, at 575-82 (discussing investigative agents as expert witnesses); Ronald
L. Carlson, Collision Course in Expert Testimony: Limitations on Affirmative Intro-
duction of Underlying Data, 36 U. Fla. L. Rev. 234, 242-51 (1984) (stating that even
"indirect" admission of hearsay evidence harms defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights); Ronald L. Carlson, Experts as Hearsay Conduits: Confrontation Abuses in
Opinion Testimony, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 859 (1992) (commenting that the operation of
the federal rules against hearsay evidence is harmed by expert witnesses who act as
"conduits" for hearsay).
129. See, e.g., Lewis v. Rego Co., 757 F.2d 66, 74 (3d Cir. 1985) (allowing metallur-
gist-expert to testify about his conversation with another metallurgist because this
type of conversation "was the kind of material on which experts in the field base their
opinions"); Stevens v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 634 F. Supp. 137, 142 (E.D. Pa.) (permit-
ting expert in aeronautical medicine to give expert opinion that deceased pilot was
under a great deal of stress, which "might well have hampered his performance as a
pilot," even though part of the basis for the expert's opinion was information he
learned from interviewing the deceased pilot's associates, friends, co-workers, and
professors), aff'd, 806 F.2d 254 (3d Cir. 1986).
130. 776 F.2d 1451 (10th Cir. 1985).
131. Id. at 1456.
132. Id. at 1457.
133. 757 F.2d. 66 (3d Cir. 1985).
134. Id. at 73.
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report's author regarding the report.135 In ruling that limiting the ad-
missibility of this hearsay was error, the Third Circuit held that the
expert could testify about this hearsay because both the report and the
conversation were "the kind of material on which experts in the field
base their opinions.' '1 36
Whether they serve as a vehicle for admission of hearsay or simply
because they have access to more information about a defendant than
do most expert witnesses, case agents who testify as expert witnesses
present unusual difficulties for defendants. The following example in-
dicates how this might be so when a government agent testifies as an
expert witness in a health care fraud prosecution. Assume a physician
is being prosecuted for billing for services not provided. A govern-
ment agent testifies as to the amount of the defendant's billings that
are allowable under applicable regulations. This witness testifies that
his opinion about the legitimacy of the billings is derived from review-
ing the defendant's records and from interviews with patients and em-
ployees of the defendant. If defense counsel wants to explore this
witness's thoroughness in conducting these interviews or the sub-
stance of what was said, she risks accidently eliciting damaging infor-
mation about her client. For example, the cross examination may
reveal incidents of substance abuse, or cruelty or callousness to pa-
tients or colleagues. An expert who has been part of the investigating
team is more likely to know such "land mine" information and reveal
it upon cross-examination.
3. Expanding the Notion of "Case Agent"
The reported health care fraud cases demonstrate why the concept
of "case agent" should be expanded to "case team" in white collar
criminal cases. In cases involving governmental regulation and reim-
bursement programs, many individuals within the law enforcement
and regulatory bureaucracy contribute to the prosecution of a case. 137
Some of these individuals are trained in law enforcement investigative
techniques, while others are civil administrative investigators who sup-
ply accounting or other specialized expertise during an investigation.
The expertise that these investigators bring to the investigation and
trial preparation is the same expertise that qualifies them as expert
witnesses. Thus, in these cases, a group of law enforcement agents
and civil investigators fulfills the function served by a lone case agent
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Kenneth Mann, Procedure Rules and Information Control, in White Collar
Crime Reconsidered 332, 345 (Kip Schlegel & David Weisburd eds., 1992) (discussing
new investigatory powers given to administrative agencies and civil divisions of state
and federal enforcement agencies); Diane Vaughan, Controlling Unlawful Organiza-
tional Behavior: Social Structure and Corporate Misconduct 20-38 (1983) (reviewing
the number and role of organizations actively participating in a Medicaid fraud perpe-
trated by an Ohio Revco drug store).
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in most crimes. Moreover, it is not unusual for all of the members of
an investigating team to gain access to unfavorable information about
defendants during an investigation.
4. Conclusion
There are advantages for the prosecution and disadvantages for the
defense of using case agents as expert witnesses: enhanced credibility
of the experts, the possibility that evidence unfavorable to the defense
will be admitted through cross examination of the expert, and the pos-
sible chilling of cross examination of the expert for fear of eliciting
"land mine" testimony. Yet, expert witness testimony by agents who
worked with the prosecution team is needed. The government cannot
and should not investigate complex cases without expert assistance.
Moreover, the government should not be deprived of its most in-
formed experts as witnesses at trial simply because they assisted in the
investigation. These competing considerations can be accommodated
if courts allow defense counsel to conduct voir dire, outside the jury's
hearing, of government experts who played any role, even advisory,
during the government investigation or trial preparation. Such voir
dire should focus on: exposing the potential for "land mine" testi-
mony by delving into the expert's role in the investigation and/or pros-
ecution team, the expert's access to any evidence relating to
uncharged illegal or questionable conduct by the defendant, and the
expert's access to the defendant during the pretrial stages of the case.
C. Modus Operandi "M. 0." Testimony
For years, law enforcement officials have testified as experts about
the modus operandi (M.O.) of the alleged criminal activity in drug or
gambling cases, explaining how seemingly innocuous behavior or con-
versation is, in fact, criminal activity or discussion of it.'M M.O. ex-
pert testimony has also been permitted in fraud cases. For example, in
United States v. McCollum,'3 9 where the defendant was convicted on
charges of mail fraud and use of a fictitious name, the court permitted
expert testimony regarding the "typical structure of mail fraud
schemes," noting that such expert testimony "could help the jury to
understand the operation of the scheme and to assess [the defend-
ant's] claim of noninvolvement."' "0 In United States v. Johnson,4 ' a
government agent was allowed to testify as an expert about fraudulent
securities schemes. The court noted that "[s]uch evidence helps the
jury to understand complex criminal activities, and alerts it to the pos-
138. Edward J. Imwinkelreid & Ephraim Margolin, The Case for the Admissibility
of Defense Testimony About Customary Political Practices in Official Corruption Pros-
ecutions, 29 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1, 17-21 (1991).
139. 802 F.2d 344 (9th Cir. 1986).
140. Id. at 346.
141. 735 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1984).
1994]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
sibility that combinations of seemingly innocuous events may indicate
criminal behavior."'142
The reported health care fraud prosecutions reveal an effort by the
government to use M.O. expert testimony in only one case. This ef-
fort preceded modern evidentiary codes and was unsuccessful. In
Nigro v. United States,143 the defendant, a physician, was convicted on
charges of conspiring and selling controlled substances.14 4 Evidence
at trial showed that in two years, Nigro issued more than 500 prescrip-
tions of morphine sulfate, a controlled substance, to an addict and 485
such prescriptions to the addict's wife. A narcotics agent testified that
over a seven-month time period he observed people entering and
leaving the defendant's office. According to this witness, these indi-
viduals would begin congregating outside of the defendant's office at
about 7:45 a.m. and 8:30 a.m., then "they would all make a rush for the
elevator and go upstairs, and then come down with their prescriptions
and go to the drugstores with them." 145 These people were very
"badly emaciated, very nervous, very fidgety."' 46 The Eighth Circuit
reversed Nigro's narcotics conviction, holding that this M.O. testi-
mony was "extremely prejudicial.' 1 47  Under modern evidentiary
codes, with their favorable view of expert testimony, this testimony
probably would be allowed if the agent is qualified as an expert and
provides reasons for reaching his opinion.
M.O. testimony could be helpful to prosecutors and civil plaintiffs
attempting to prove health care fraud. As our health care system has
become larger and more complex,1 48 it is helpful to understand the
relevant billing and reimbursement mechanisms so as to see the mo-
142. Id. at 1202.
143. 117 F.2d 624 (8th Cir. 1941).
144. Nigro's conspiracy conviction was reversed by the Eighth Circuit on a techni-
cality. The court found the evidence insufficient to convict Nigro's sole alleged co-
conspirator, and because prevailing law failed to recognize a conspiracy of one per-
son, Nigro's conspiracy conviction was set aside "however guilty his own state of mind
may have been." Id. at 629.
145. Id. at 631.
146. Id. at 632.
147. Id.
148. For a recent recounting of pertinent statistics, see Paul Starr, The Logic of
Health Care Reform (1992). In 1970, health care spending consumed 7.3% of the
GNP; by 1991 it consumed 13.2%. Id. at 16. "Since 1980, health care has consumed
an additional 1% of GNP every 35 months." Id. at 16-17. Today, not only is there a
glut of physicians who are specialists, but new types of providers are also proliferat-
ing, changing the character of the health care profession from a "traditional, low-key
professional ethos to a more entrepreneurial, marketing orientation, aimed in part at
stimulating new demands." Id. at 17. Currently, there are over 1000 payers that pro-
cess four billion claims a year to pay hundreds of thousands of providers using differ-
ent payment methods and billing regulations. United States General Accounting
Office, Health Insurance: Vulnerable Payers Lose Billions to Fraud and Abuse 13-14
(1992).
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tive for the alleged fraud.149 The "Rx By Fraud" cases demonstrate
the need for such understanding. In this common type of health care
fraud, providers dispense medically unnecessary prescriptions for con-
trolled substances."' To the uninitiated, this activity may appear sim-
ply as a medically unsound way for a provider to make money, or
perhaps even as a way to be kind: the act of a provider who believes
addicts and society are better off if addicts have access to clean, less-
toxic drugs than are available on the street. This picture changes,
however, if a health care expert explains the M.O. in a corresponding
"fee for service" reimbursement system: the prescription given by the
"sympathetic" provider is payment to the addicts for access to their
bodies. Once these addicts are inside the clinic the quid pro quo takes
place. To get the prescription she desires, the addict must allow clinic
personnel to conduct diagnostic tests and outpatient procedures.' 5 1
Thus, in return for dispensing medically unnecessary prescriptions to
addicts, the provider gets to perform and bill insurers thousands of
dollars for services rendered.
M.O. testimony may become even more helpful to prosecutors and
plaintiffs as health reform takes hold and reimbursement mechanisms
become more varied. For example, the M.O. just described would not
make sense if patients are covered by a "capitation" method of reim-
bursement. With "capitation," payment providers are paid a set
amount to render all necessary services to covered patients.1 - 2 The
provider who renders more than necessary services to patients cov-
ered by capitation agreements loses money.1 53 If health care reform
149. See generally Pamela H. Bucy, Health Care Reform and Fraud By Health Care
Providers, 38 Vill. L. Rev. 1003 (1993) (discussing the relationship between fraud and
reimbursement mechanisms) [hereinafter Bucy, Health Care Reform and Fraud].
150. See, e.g., United States v. Larson, 507 F.2d 385, 389 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding
that defendant, a licensed physician, issued drug prescriptions without legitimate
medical purposes); United States v. Jobe, 487 F.2d 268, 269 (10th Cir. 1973) (uphold-
ing conviction of physician charged with distributing controlled substances after a
short interview and without conducting a physical examination), cert. denied. 416 U.S.
955 (1974).
151. United States v. Mahar, 801 F.2d 1477 (6th Cir. 1986) demonstrates this scena-
rio. Shannon Mahar and various relatives owned and operated Inner-City Medical
Services. Mahar and others were convicted of "unlawfully selling controlled sub-
stances and unlawfully issuing and selling prescriptions for controlled substances, all
outside the usual course of medical practice and for no legitimate medical purpose."
Id. at 1480-81. "Patients" seeking such prescriptions were required to submit "proof
of medical insurance and/or Medicaid coverage and submit to medically unnecessary
and unwarranted testing procedures in order to obtain controlled substances." Id. at
1481. These procedures included: pulmonary function studies, electrocardiograms,
urinalysis, X-rays, tuberculosis tests, and cultures. Id. As one defendant explained to
a "patient," "[i]f you want Talwins you better be X-rayed." Id. at 1484.
152. Barry R. Furrow, The Ethics of Cost-Containment: Bureaucratic Medicine and
the Doctor as Patient-Advocate, 3 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 187, 190
(1988) ("The capitation principle means that payment is determined in advance for
each subscriber to [an] HMO, and the HMO will lose money if its costs per patient
exceed the amount ... collected.").
153. See id.
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expands capitation payment, discerning the pattern of fraud commit-
ted by the "Rx by Fraud" provider could become difficult. To the
uninformed observer, the prescribing pattern of the fraudulent pro-
vider may become less suspicious because this provider is no longer
conducting numerous tests and procedures on every patient. This
more discriminating treatment pattern could buttress a defense that
the provider orders tests only when necessary for the patients' health,
not as a way to line his own pockets. If, however, a health care expert
explains the M.O., such as when the provider's treatment and pre-
scription pattern tracks the reimbursement method of the patient at
issue such that prescriptions for controlled substances are given and
extensive diagnostic tests and procedures are performed only on "fee
for service" patients, the fraudulent nature of the provider's conduct
becomes more apparent, not less.
D. Conclusion
As the reported health care fraud prosecutions have shown, the ex-
pert testimony employed and employable in white collar criminal
cases challenges accepted dogma about the proper scope of expert tes-
timony. This testimony raises the following questions: (1) Should ex-
pert testimony interpreting and applying complex laws and rules be
allowed? (2) Should agents assisting in the investigation be permitted
to testify as expert witnesses? (3) If so, should these agents testify as
both expert and fact witnesses? and (4) Should extensive M.O. testi-
mony be allowed? Current evidentiary codes, with their emphasis on
expanding the limits of expert testimony, would seem to allow these
developments. Yet, it may be necessary to employ some safeguards.
To prevent usurpation of their role as instructors of the law, courts
should restrict as much as possible an expert's opinion to general
background information about relevant laws and application of these
laws in the abstract. Because of the complexity of- many of the trans-
actions and applicable laws in white collar criminal cases, courts
should recognize that expert testimony about specific transactions is
necessary in such cases if the fact finders are to have a clear under-
standing of the facts. Although voir dire of every expert witness by
the trial court prior to allowing an expert witness to testify is not prac-
tical, such voir dire should take place when the expert witness is pro-
viding an interpretation of laws and regulations or when the expert
served as part of the investigation or prosecution team. Lastly, prose-
cutors and defense counsel should seek comparative data reflecting
how peer providers of the defendant interpreted and applied relevant
rules of law. Such comparisons can provide a check on an expert's
opinion, buttressing either the government's or the defendant's case.
Under current rules of criminal discovery, however, it is unlikely that
defendants routinely would receive such data during discovery. To en-
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able defendants to seek effective subpoenas for such data, a limited
right to employ interrogatories should be granted to defendants.
III. SUMMARIES
White collar criminal cases, with their hybrid civil/criminal na-
ture,154 call into question established doctrines regarding the use of
summaries and charts. Although some summaries are admissible as
evidence and others are not, the health care prosecutions suggest that
the courts often fail to make any distinction.
A. "FRE 1006" Summaries Vis d Vis "Pedagogical" Summaries
Federal courts consistently categorize summaries offered by liti-
gants as one of two types: Federal Rule of Evidence ("FRE") "1006"
summaries or "pedagogical" summaries. 155 The former are referred
to in FRE 1006, which provides that "[t]he contents of voluminous
[records] which cannot conveniently be examined in court may be
presented in the form of a chart, summary or calculation."1 56 If the
records being summarized are made available to the other parties, or
produced in court, it is not necessary that these records be admitted
into evidence.' 57 Twenty-two states have identical or similar rules.158
154. See Bucy, White Collar Crime, supra note 1, at 3; see also Coffee, supra note 1,
at 201-21 (discussing the disappearance of any clearly definable line between civil and
criminal law); Mann, supra note 137, at 332-51 (discussing the procedural aspects of
the use of punitive civil sanctions in punishing white collar crime).
155. United States v. Possick, 849 F.2d 332, 339-40 (8th Cir. 1988); Pierce v. Ram-
sey Winch Co., 753 F.2d 416, 431 (5th Cir. 1985); cf White Indus., Inc. v. Cessna
Aircraft Co., 611 F. Supp. 1049, 1069-70 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (although noting the dis-
tinction between "1006" summaries and pedagogical summaries, the court also noted
that "some of the summaries in this case partake the nature of both [pedagogical and
1006 summaries]").
156. Fed. R. Evid. 1006.
157. Most courts require only that the underlying records be "capable" of admis-
sion into evidence. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Auto Supply Co., 661 F.2d 1171, 1175
(8th Cir. 1981) (noting that a summary of data drawn from data that is inadmissible
must be excluded); United States v. Johnson, 594 F.2d 1253, 1257 n.6 (9th Cir. 1979)
(concluding that "the proponent of a summary must demonstrate the admissibility of
the underlying writings or records summarized, as a condition precedent to introduc-
tion of the summary into evidence under Rule 1006"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 964
(1979). The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, appears
to require actual admission of the underlying records. In United States v. Conlin, 551
F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 831 (1977), the court found error in the
use of a summary chart by an IRS Agent because the chart went beyond competent
evidence already before the jury. Id. at 538. Finding the error to be harmless, how-
ever, the court did not reverse the conviction. Id. at 539.
158. The following states have adopted rules identical or similar to FRE 1006:
Alaska, Alaska R. Evid. 1006; Arizona, Ariz. R. Evid. 1006; Arkansas, Ark. R. Evid.
1006; Colorado, Colo. R. Evid. 1006; Delaware, Del. Uniform R. Evid. 1006; Hawaii,
Haw. R. Evid. 1006; Maine, Me. R. Evid. 1006; Michigan, Mich. R. Evid. 1006; Minne-
sota, Minn. R. Evid. 1006; Montana, Mont. R. Evid. 1006; Nebraska, Neb. R. Evid.
1006; Nevada, Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 52.275 (Michie 1986); New Mexico, N.M. R.
Evid. 1006; Ohio, Ohio R. Evid. 1006; Oklahoma, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit., 12 § 3006
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According to commentators and courts, unlike a "FRE 1006" sum-
mary, a "pedagogical" summary is not evidence, "but only the propo-
nent's organization of the evidence presented."' 15 9 A "pedagogical"
summary is based on testimony or documents already admitted into
evidence, and "should not be allowed into the jury room without the
consent of all parties.' 60
Thus, because admissibility of the summary depends on whether it
is a "FRE 1006" summary or a "pedagogical" summary, the distinc-
tion between the two becomes significant. The problem is that in most
white collar crime prosecutions, it is not possible to distinguish be-
tween "FRE 1006" summaries and "pedagogical" summaries. In
these cases "FRE 1006" summaries are also pedagogical tools. This
Article suggests that in white collar criminal cases, the effort to distin-
guish "FRE 1006" summaries from "pedagogical" summaries should
be abandoned and the admissibility of all summaries should be gov-
erned by three rules of evidence: FRE 1006, 611(a) 61 and 403.162
B. Use of Summaries in Health Care Fraud Prosecutions
The prosecutions show that while analyzing and approving the use
of summaries under FRE 1006, courts treat these summaries as "peda-
gogical" summaries in three significant ways. First, although FRE
1006 anticipates use of a summary in lieu of admission of voluminous
underlying records, 163 many of the summaries actually approved as
(West. 1978); Oregon, Or. Evid. Code 1006; South Dakota, S.D. Codified Laws Ann.
§ 19-18-6 (1978); Vermont, Vt. R. Evid. 1006; Washington, Wash. R. Evid. 1006; Wis-
consin, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 910.06 (West 1974); Wyoming, Wyo. R. Evid. 1006.
Florida's rule is similar except that it requires timely notice of such evidence. Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 90.956 (West 1976).
159. 5 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence I 1006[07]
(1994) [hereinafter Weinstein's Evidence].
160. Id.
161. Federal Rule of Evidence 611(a) provides: "The court shall exercise reason-
able control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evi-
dence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the
ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect
witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment." Fed. R. Evid. 611(a).
162. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of un-
due delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Fed. R.
Evid. 403.
163. 5 Weinstein's Evidence, supra note 159, [ 1006[01]; see also Nichols v. Upjohn
Co., 610 F.2d 293, 293-94 (5th Cir. 1980) (allowing defendant's witness to summarize
contents of investigative reports contained in 94,000 page application filed with FDA;
witness also allowed to summarize complaints received; underlying records were not
introduced but were made available to plaintiff for examination); United States v.
Clements, 588 F.2d 1030, 1039 (5th Cir.) (permitting government's expert to testify to
calculations of gross revenues based on tapes of 3000 telephone calls which had not
been introduced in evidence but were available), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 982, and cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 936 (1979).
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"FRE 1006" summaries in fact summarize evidence that has already
been admitted. This was true in 100% of the health care fraud cases
where courts admitted summaries pursuant to FRE 1006.1' In crimi-
nal cases especially, admission of underlying records may be a poor
litmus test for categorizing summaries. It is prudent, if not constitu-
tionally required by the Sixth Amendment's right of confrontation in
criminal cases, that all evidence against a defendant be admitted.
The second way courts blended "FRE 1006" summaries and "peda-
gogical" summaries in the reported health care fraud prosecutions was
in the rationale they gave for allowing use of the summary. In each
case, the courts referred to the summary as a "FRE 1006" summary,
but supplied the admitting rationale for pedagogical tools. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's explanation is
typical: "Examination of the [underlying records] would have been
burdensome and time consuming without the aid of summaries." 165
The third way courts blended the two types of summaries in the
reported health care prosecutions is in their rulings on admissibility.
Although established doctrine holds that "FRE 1006" summaries are
admissible and "pedagogical" summaries are not, in approximately
fifty percent of the reported health care fraud prosecutions discussing
this issue, the courts did not admit into evidence the summaries they
otherwise described as "FRE 1006" summaries. 166 In these cases, the
164. United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 657 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 1660 (1994); United States v. Duncan, 919 F.2d 981, 988 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. de-
nied, 500 U.S. 926 (1991); United States v. Campbell, 845 F.2d 1374, 1381 (6th Cir.),
cerL denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988); United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800, 816 (11th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1217 (1985); State v. Marshall, 606 P.2d 278, 280 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1980). The opinions in the subsequent two cases do not directly state that
the charts were based on evidence in the record but imply that they were. In United
States v. Behrens, 689 F.2d 154, 157, 161 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1088 (1982),
the court referred to the "evidence" upon which the chart was based and detailed
what this evidence was. Id. at 157, 161. In United States v. Seelig, 622 F.2d 207, 214-
15 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980), two charts were admitted in the trial
below. The appellate court held that admission of one chart was proper. Id. at 214.
This chart was based on exhibits admitted into evidence. Id. The appellate court held
that admission of the second chart was in error because of poor foundation for the
comparison of pharmacies detailed in the chart. Id. at 215. The court also noted that
"[tihe underlying records on which [this chart was] based were not exhibits nor were
they made available to appellants." Id. This comment further implied that the exhib-
its on which the prior chart were based were admitted.
165. Duncan, 919 F.2d at 988.
166. The summary chart was not admitted into evidence in Duncan, 919 F.2d at
988, or in Seelig, 622 F.2d at 215. Although not completely clear, it appears that the
summary charts were not admitted in Campbell, 845 F.2d at 1381. The court refers to
the "limiting" instruction given. Id. If this reference is to the usual instructions given
to a jury regarding summary charts, see infra note 167, then this chart was not admit-
ted into evidence. Summary charts were held to be properly admitted into evidence
in Console, 13 F.3d at 657, Gold, 743 F.2d at 816, and Marshall, 606 P.2d at 280.
Behrens, 689 F.2d at 154, however, does not state whether the summary chart was
admitted into evidence.
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juries were specifically instructed that the summary was not evidence
and was not admissible. 67
United States v. Duncan16 exemplifies this blending of "FRE 1006"
and "pedagogical" summaries. Duncan and his wife were indicted as
co-conspirators in a scheme to defraud insurance companies for
feigned injuries acquired in staged automobile accidents.169 An FBI
Agent was permitted to "summarize... voluminous insurance com-
pany records," which had already been introduced into evidence. 170
The Fifth Circuit upheld the agent's testimony and his use of charts,
citing both the rationale of "FRE 1006" and "pedagogical" summa-
ries. First, "FRE 1006" summaries were allowed because "[tihe un-
derlying records were indisputably voluminous, consisting of hundreds
of exhibits. Examination of the individual records would have been
burdensome and time-consuming without the aid of summaries.' 17 1
Second, the court commented on the rationale for pedagogical tools:
"Furthermore, the prosecutor used the summaries in part to show the
recurring pattern of hospital admissions among a large group of con-
spirators. We cannot rationally expect an average jury to ... create
sophisticated flow charts to reveal patterns that provide important in-
ferences about the defendants' guilt."'1 72
Lastly, although FRE 1006 would allow admission of the summary
charts as well as the summary testimony, despite the fact that the
Duncan court specifically approved of the testimony and use of charts
under FRE 1006, it noted with approval the jury instruction that
"these charts are not evidence."' 73
Blending "FRE 1006" summaries and pedagogical devices is not
unique to health care fraud prosecutions. Four of the health care
fraud prosecutions cite United States v. Scales174 as support for the use
167. For example, the jury in Duncan was instructed as follows:
Ladies and gentlemen, these charts are not evidence. They are data compi-
lations which [the agent] says he has summarized from the evidence already
admitted into the record. If you find that these summaries do not comport
with the evidence admitted, you are instructed to disregard any summary
that is not supported by the evidence admitted into the record.
919 F.2d at 988.
168. Id. at 981.
169. Id. at 984-85.
170. Id. at 988.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. The treatment of the summary chart in United States v. Campbell, 845
F.2d 1374, 1374 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988), for example, is similar.
The court gave a pedagogical rationale for allowing use of the chart: "Without the
chart ... [the] technical information [it summarized] ... may not have been readily
understandable." Id. at 1381. Moreover, in Campbell, the summary chart summa-
rized evidence already introduced. Id.
174. 594 F.2d 558 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 946 (1979).
[Vol. 63
HEALTH CARE FRAUD
of the summaries at issue.'7 5 Judge Weinstein cited Scales as an exam-
ple of courts improperly interpreting FRE 1006 to apply to "pedagogi-
cal" summaries. 7 6  In Scales, the defendant was convicted of
unlawfully converting to his own use assets of the union and conspir-
ing to do so.'77 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit affirmed the government's use of a series of charts.178 One
chart summarized the indictment. 1' 9 Other charts referred to a count
or overt act charged in the indictment and summarized documentary
proof relating to it and already admitted into evidence."s In ruling
that this use of charts was proper under FRE 1006, the court gave a
pedagogical rationale. It noted that the "summary of the indictment
clearly was intended to aid the jury in organizing the proof" and that
without the charts, "comprehension of the exhibits would have been
difficult."''
Are all the courts that have blended the characteristics of "FRE
1006" summaries with pedagogical tools wrong? On the contrary, the
courts that have blended the characteristics of "FRE 1006" summaries
and "pedagogical" summaries are struggling with the fact that at least
in white collar criminal cases, the distinction between "FRE 1006"
summaries and "pedagogical" summaries is artificial. The prosecutor
in a white collar criminal case, more than in any other criminal case, is
a teacher. The prosecutor must educate the fact finders about busi-
nesses or transactions they may have never known of, dealt with, or
understood. The prosecutor must organize voluminous bits of evi-
dence that inevitably come to the fact finder in a jumbled and disori-
enting manner. The prosecutor who cannot accomplish this cannot
prove facts beyond a reasonable doubt. If a jury cannot understand a
case, they cannot and should not convict. Yet, this pedagogical role
requires pedagogical tools. Although courts are correct in recognizing
the pedagogical characteristics of summaries used in white collar crim-
inal cases, they are incorrect in limiting the use of such summaries
because they have pedagogical characteristics.
175. The cases referring to Scales are: Duncan, 919 F.2d at 988; Campbell, 845 F.2d
at 1381; United States v. Behrens, 689 F.2d 154, 161 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1088 (1982); United States v. Seelig, 622 F.2d 207, 214 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
869 (1980). Although United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800, 816 (11th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1217 (1985), does not explicitly cite to Scales, it relies on United
States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 870 (1978), as support
for admission of the summary chart, and Scales relies on Evans. Scales, 594 F.2d at
562.
176. 5 Weinstein's Evidence, supra note 159, 1006[07] n.4. Weinstein and Berger
also identify Evans as improperly interpreting FRE 1006 to apply to "pedagogical"
summaries. Id.
177. Scales, 594 F.2d at 560.
178. Id. at 561-65.
179. Id at 561.
180. Id.
181. Id at 562.
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This is not to say there are no problems in admitting summaries, of
whatever kind. Summaries may encourage jurors to substitute an
evaluation of the credibility of the summary or its authenticating wit-
ness for the credibility of the underlying witness(es) or exhibits(s).
Also, summaries may overemphasize some testimony or some exhib-
its. In addition, jurors may tend to treat summaries as additional evi-
dence or corroborative of other evidence. Lastly, authentication of
summaries may allow their proponent the equivalent of an additional
closing argument through the summary.182 Interestingly, these dan-
gers arise most clearly when the records being summarized have al-
ready been introduced into evidence: a situation apparently not
envisioned by FRE 1006, but uniformly occurring in the reported
health care fraud prosecutions where summaries were used.
To accommodate the interests of all parties, admissibility and use of
summaries in white collar criminal cases should be governed by FRE
1006, which permits admission of summaries if other evidentiary rules
are met; FRE 403, which prohibits admission of evidence if its oppo-
nent proves that its prejudicial impact "substantially outweighs" its
probative value;18 3 and, FRE 611(a), which requires a court to ensure
that evidence is presented effectively "for the ascertainment of truth,"
and to "avoid needless consumption of time.""
Five important factors should be used to analyze summaries, and
should take into account the concerns underlying FRE 403 and FRE
611(a). First, are the summaries based upon evidence that has been
admitted? If not, is the defendant's right to confront his accusers be-
ing compromised? Second, are the summaries fair, non-biased and
non-prejudicial reflections of testimony and exhibits? Third, are the
summaries helpful to the fact finder in organizing or understanding
evidence that is difficult to organize or understand without the sum-
maries? Fourth, does the probative value of the summaries outweigh
their prejudicial impact? In evaluating this question, courts should be
sensitive both to the dangers of summaries-buttressing credibility or
overemphasizing some evidence-and to the government's special
need for summaries in complex cases. Fifth, should special attention
be given to "pedagogical" summaries that are authenticated and
presented by an expert witness, especially a case agent testifying as an
expert witness?
The last factor is particularly important. First, the credentials of
the expert may enhance the existing dangers of summary evidence.
Second, the expert's credibility on issues within his expertise may be
amplified simply because the expert is supplying a grateful jury with a
182. See United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1226 (1984); United States v. Conlin, 551 F.2d 534, 538-39 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 831 (1977).
183. FRE 403 is set forth in full supra note 162.
184. FRE 611(a) is set out in full supra note 161.
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complete and coherent summary of the case. All of the dangers for
the defense presented by government agents as experts are possi-
ble,185 of course, if the expert is a case agent or part of the case
"team."'18 6 United States v. Gold"s exemplifies a combination of sum-
mary and expert evidence. Gold, an optometrist, along with his eye
clinic and several of the clinic's employees, was convicted on multiple
fraud charges stemming from false claims submitted to Medicare.lss
Their convictions were affirmed on appeal.18 9 One of the issues on
appeal concerned a summary chart introduced by the government
pursuant to FRE 1006. The forty-page chart contained fifteen col-
umns of information. The first thirteen columns summarized testi-
mony and exhibits already admitted. The last two columns consisted
of the opinion of the witness authenticating the chart. This witness
served as part of the case investigating team and was qualified as an
expert on medicare coverage. 190
The fact that summary evidence presented by an expert who also
served as a case agent presents triple potential for prejudice does not
mean that such testimony should never be allowed. Efficiency and
coherence may be well served by such a witness. There are, however,
several steps that can be taken to alleviate the potential for prejudice.
The most dramatic step is requiring the proponent of the "summary-
expert-case agent" witness to divide the functions of summarizing evi-
dence and providing expert opinion testimony between two witnesses.
A less dramatic step is giving jury instructions that carefully delineate
the multiple roles of this witness and clarify the weight to be accorded
the various aspects of her testimony.
C. Conclusion
White collar criminal cases, as demonstrated by the reported health
care fraud prosecutions, often include summaries as evidence. These
summaries bear indicia of "FRE 1006" summaries: they are designed
to summarize voluminous information that is inconvenient to review
in court. They also bear indicia of "pedagogical" summaries: they are
designed to help fact finders organize the evidence that has been ad-
mitted. When courts exclude summaries from evidence because they
are "pedagogical summaries," they ignore the dual character of sum-
maries. Rather than holding fast to a rule that pedagogical tools are
never admissible into evidence, courts should determine the admissi-
bility of summaries in a manner that recognizes their multiple pur-
185. See supra text accompanying notes 117-34.
186. See supra part II.B.3.
187. 743 F.2d 800 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1217 (1985).
188. Id. at 805-120.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 816.
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poses, the dangers they present to defendants, and the important
function they serve to plaintiffs.
IV. EXTRINSIC ACT EVIDENCE
The most often cited rule of evidence,19' FRE 404(b),"9 addresses
the difficult question of whether a jury should hear bad acts a party or
witness may have done other than those alleged in the case before it.
FRE 404(b) forbids use of evidence of "other crimes, wrongs, or acts
... to prove the character of a person in order to show that he or she
acted in conformity therewith."'1 93 Such evidence is admissible, how-
ever, to show "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowl-
edge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident."' 194 All fifty states
have adopted a FRE 404(b) analog.195 Federal and state courts inter-
pret these extrinsic act evidence rules broadly, moving one commenta-
tor to suggest that an "imaginative prosecutor" can get any extrinsic
evidence admitted.'96 Extrinsic act evidence can divert a trial into col-
lateral issues; waste the time of the court, jury, and litigants; catch one
party by surprise; and, make it humanly impossible to judge a party's
liability or guilt solely on issues in the trial.' 97 On the other hand,
proof of conduct by the defendant similar to that at issue in trial can
be highly relevant and illuminating of the truth.' 98
Because of the type of defense often used in white collar criminal
cases, these cases are prime candidates for use of extrinsic act evi-
191. Edward J. Imwinkelreid, The Need to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b):
The Threat to the Future of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 30 Vill. L. Rev. 1465, 1467
(1985) [hereinafter Amending 404(b)].
192. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the char-
acter of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportu-
nity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident. Provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a
criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during
trial if the court excuses pretrial notice or good cause shown, of the general
nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See 2 Weinstein's Evidence, supra note 159, T 404[21] for a detailed discussion
of how the rules in the states compare to FRE 404(b).
196. Richard B. Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Character of Specific
Acts Evidence, 66 Iowa L. Rev. 777, 799 (1981); Glen Weissenberger, Making Sense of
Extrinsic Act Evidence: Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), 70 Iowa L. Rev. 579, 579
(1985) ("[Aln inventive prosecutor will almost always succeed in devising a theory
that will support the admissibility of the accused's extrinsic antisocial act.").
197. Kuhns, supra note 196, at 810; M.C. Slough & J. William Knightly, Other Vices,
Other Crimes, 41 Iowa L. Rev. 325, 349-50 (1956).
198. See Weissenberger, supra note 196, at 581; H. Richard Uviller, Evidence of
Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 845, 882 (1982).
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dence. The reported health care fraud prosecutions exemplify this
point. Extrinsic act evidence, introduced by the government in over
eleven percent of the reported health care fraud prosecutions,, 99 is the
fifth most used type of evidence.2 m°
Not only is extrinsic act evidence highly relevant in white collar
criminal cases, it is also widely available. Because the conduct at issue
in white collar crime often is subject to heavy regulation, 20 ' there are
multiple civil and administrative actions that track the criminal
case. 2 The preparation, litigation, and resolution of these parallel
cases can yield documented details of extrinsic act evidence. Both
United States v. Blanton2 °3 and United States v. Lennartz2°1 exemplify
the use of extrinsic act evidence that originated from the monitoring
efforts of regulatory agencies. In Blanton, the routine monitoring of
purchases of methaqualone followed by an agency field audit ulti-
mately led to the indictment and conviction of a physician for distrib-
uting controlled substances through improper prescription
practices?3°5 At Blanton's trial, the government introduced a variety
of extrinsic act evidence gathered in these earlier administrative audits
and investigations, such as Blanton's unorthodox "research" on mari-
juana and his supplying a narcotic to his wife who died of an over-
dose.20 6 In Lennartz, the defendant, a commercial ambulance service
operator, was convicted on six counts of fraud arising from claims sub-
mitted to Indiana's Medicaid program. 0 7 Extrinsic act evidence ob-
tained in audits of the defendant's prior businesses was admitted.2 s
Investigators who had conducted these audits testified about the bill-
ing irregularities they had investigated in these prior businesses and
the discussions they had had with the defendant or his colleagues .2 09
This evidence was admitted pursuant to Rule 404(b) to demonstrate
that the defendant "had knowledge of proper and improper Medicaid
billing practices. '"210
199. See supra chart 4 & infra appendix IV.
200. As shown supra in chart 4, extrinsic act evidence is the fifth most common type
of evidence used in health care fraud prosecutions after insider information, docu-
ments, medical experts and undercover agent information.
201. White Collar Crime: Hearing Before the Senate CoMM. on the Judiciary, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 29 (1986); Hazel Croall, White Collar Crime, Criminal Justice
and Criminology 78-84 (1992); Herbert Edelhertz & Charles Rogovin, A National
Strategy For Containing White-Collar Crime 4 (1980).
202. Fraud By Fright, supra note 5, at 871-74 (discussing civil and administrative
actions that track criminal cases, specifically highlighting those available to pursue the
fraudulent health care provider).
203. 730 F.2d 1425 (11th Cir. 1984).
204. 948 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1991).
205. Blanton, 730 F.2d at 1427.
206. Id at 1432.
207. Lennartz, 948 F.2d at 364.
208. Id. at 366-67.
209. Id. at 368.
210. Id.
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In addition to the helpfulness of extrinsic act evidence to the prose-
cutor and the government's easy access to such evidence, other obser-
vations about the extrinsic act evidence used in the reported health
care fraud prosecutions can be made. First, the most common ground
for admission of such evidence is its relevance in proving intent. Sec-
ond, improper admission of extrinsic act evidence is the most fre-
quently cited evidentiary error necessitating reversal. Third, the
extrinsic act evidence admitted has been of questionable similarity to
the charged conduct. Fourth, the proponent of extrinsic act evidence
has been accorded considerable leeway in diverting the trial from the
charged conduct. Fifth, the few courts that have addressed the burden
of proof issue place the burden on the proponent of extrinsic act evi-
dence to show that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial
impact.
This survey of the use of extrinsic act evidence acknowledges the
necessary role of extrinsic act evidence in health care fraud prosecu-
tions in particular and in white collar criminal cases in general. Be-
cause of its substantial dangers and its especially high level of usage in
white collar criminal cases, however, this Article suggests steps that
should be taken by legislatures and courts to neutralize the potential
for unfairness in the admission of extrinsic act evidence.
A. Grounds For Admission
The health care fraud prosecutions are consistent with most extrin-
sic act cases in admitting such evidence as relevant to intent.211 In the
health care fraud prosecutions, like many white collar criminal cases, a
defendant's conduct often is documented unequivocally in a paper
trail, leaving intent as one of the few viable defenses. 212 Variations on
this defense include: the defendant was unaware that his associates
were engaged in such conduct;21 3 the defendant did not intend to en-
gage in such conduct;214 or the defendant was unaware that his or her
conduct violated the law.21 5 These "lack of intent" defenses become
211. See 2 Weinstein's Evidence, supra note 159, 404[12].
212. Bucy, White Collar Crime, supra note 1, at 186.
213. See, e.g., People v. Alizadeh, 452 N.Y.S.2d 425, 430-31 (App. Div. 1982) (re-
versing defendant's conviction, in part, because the billing in question was done by
one of the defendant's employees and that he did not instruct his employees how to
bill and relied on his employees who were authorized to sign his name to claim
forms).
214. See, e.g., United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508, 511-12 (7th Cir.) (involving
defendant purchasing agent of Zenith Corporation who argued that he did not intend
to exercise favoritism to Zenith's supplier of stereo cabinets), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
827 (1973).
215. See, e.g., United States v. Gray, 790 F.2d 1290, 1295 (6th Cir. 1986) (affirming
conviction of defendant for mail fraud, despite his argument that his conduct did not
constitute mail fraud), rev'd sub nom. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 361
(1987) (dismissing the mail fraud charges for which defendant was convicted, finding
the conduct did not constitute mail fraud).
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especially viable when the conduct at issue concerns complex and
heavily regulated transactions.
Once a "lack of intent" defense is invoked, proof of similar prior
conduct by the defendant to prove intent becomes particularly rele-
vant. 6 Courts apparently consider the difficulty in proving cases
when considering the admissibility of extrinsic act evidence. As one
court noted in weighing the probative value and prejudicial impact of
extrinsic act evidence and ruling in favor of admission: "The proba-
tive value was great: the government had little evidence on intent,
which made this evidence near essential ....,2 7
B. Reversals
There were more reversals for trial courts' admission of extrinsic act
evidence in the reported health care fraud prosecutions than for any
other evidentiary ruling by lower courts.2 18 In some of the cases, the
reversal was due to sloppiness on the part of the proponent of the
evidence in laying a proper foundation. State v. Jacobs219 demon-
strates this. Jacobs, a physician, was convicted of obtaining percodan,
a narcotic, "by means of deceit and subterfuge."' " The evidence
showed that Jacobs wrote a prescription for percodan for one of his
patients, then purchased the drug back from her after she acquired it.
The extrinsic act evidence consisted of testimony that this same pa-
tient had earlier refused a similar request from the defendant."2 The
appellate court found that this extrinsic act evidence was improperly
admitted because the prosecutor failed to introduce the earlier pre-
scription into evidence or show that it was a narcotic or even a pre-
scription drug.222
In other cases, appellate courts have held that the extrinsic act evi-
dence was simply too prejudicial.' The opinion of the Eighth Circuit
216. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 845 F.2d 1374, 1380 (6th Cir.) (finding that
extrinsic act evidence was properly admitted because the defendant's "primary de-
fense was that he had acted in good faith, and both knowledge and intent are ele-
ments of [the] offenses [with which the defendant was charged]"), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 908 (1988).
217. United States v. Jackson, 761 F.2d 1541, 1543 (11th Cir. 1985).
218. See supra chart 6 & infra appendix VI.
219. 503 P.2d 826 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972).
220. Id. at 827.
221. Id. at 828.
222. Id. at 828-29.
223. See, e.g., Lambert v. United States, 101 F.2d 960, 964 (5th Cir. 1939) (finding
prejudice in the introduction of "evidence of similar acts committed at or about the
same time with the fraudulent purpose... [that] was without relevance to the change
for which [the defendant] was on trial."); People v. Alizadeh, 452 N.Y.S.2d 425, 433-
35 (App. Div. 1982) (finding reversible error where trial court had allowed prosecu-
tor, during cross examination, to ask the defendant numerous questions, which had
the cumulative effect of prejudice to the defendant); cf MacLafferty v.United States,
77 F.2d 715, 719-20 (9th Cir. 1935) (reversing conviction because jury instructions
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in Neill v. United States224 is typical. In Neill, the government offered
into evidence hearsay testimony from addicts who allegedly purchased
controlled substances from the defendant, a physician. The govern-
ment presented this testimony to demonstrate why it used undercover
techniques to investigate the defendant.2" The court held that such
evidence was unwarranted because entrapment was never offered as a
defense and was sufficiently prejudicial to require a reversal. 26
C. Prior Convictions as Extrinsic Acts
Although FRE 404(b) and most state codifications of extrinsic act
evidence rules contemplate admission of "other crimes" as well as
"wrongs or acts," no prior convictions were admitted as extrinsic act
evidence in the reported health care fraud prosecutions. By compari-
son, the extrinsic act evidence in many street crimes consists of prior
convictions. 2 7 The difference may be due to higher recidivism among
street criminals than white collar criminals, leaving street criminals
with more prior convictions available. 228 Conversely, white collar
criminals may be as recidivistic as other criminals, just more fortunate
that fewer of their prior violations of the law are detected and
prosecuted.
D. Similarity of Extrinsic Acts and Charged Conduct
One of the criteria courts focus on in deciding whether to admit
extrinsic act evidence is how similar such acts are to the charged con-
duct.2 2 9 In many of the health care fraud prosecutions, the extrinsic
included evidence of other crimes that was not admissible, except where the prosecu-
tion was proving specific intent).
224. 225 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1955).
225. Id. at 176.
226. Id. at 180.
227. See, e.g., United States v. Rubio-Estrada, 857 F.2d 845, 846-49 (1st Cir. 1988)
(holding that evidence of defendant's prior conviction for possessing cocaine with in-
tent to distribute was properly admitted at trial on the same charges); United States v.
Hutchins, 818 F.2d 322, 328-29 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that evidence of defendant's
prior conviction of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute was held properly
admitted in trial on charges of conspiracy and attempting to possess marijuana with
intent to distribute), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1041 (1988); United States v. Naylor, 705
F.2d 110, 111-12 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that evidence of defendant's prior convic-
tions for attempted theft of a motor vehicle was properly admitted in his trial on
charges of interstate transportation of a stolen motor vehicle).
228. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal
Justice Statistics 569, 667 (1992); see also Joseph T. Wells, Six Common Myths About
Fraud, J. Acct., Feb. 1990, at 82, 88 (stating that "[d]ata suggest that white-collar of-
fenders have the lowest rate of recidivism of all criminals").
229. See, e.g., United States v. Mills, 895 F.2d 897, 907 (2d Cir.) (noting that Federal
Rule of Evidence 404(b) allows evidence of similar acts to prove a "signature crime"),
cert. denied, 495 U.S. 951 (1990); United States v. Lewis, 837 F.2d 415, 419 (9th Cir.)
(stating that evidence of prior acts is admissible to prove intent when "the prior act is
similar and close enough in time to be relevant"), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 923 (1988);
United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 909-14 n.15 (5th Cir. 1978) (stating that
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act evidence was quite similar to the charged conduct, often consisting
of the same type of falsifications as are alleged in the indictment, just
with other patients.230
In some cases, however, the similarity was not as great. In United
States v. Blanton, 3' for example, where the defendant, a physician,
was convicted for distributing methaqualone to patients through
fraudulent prescriptions, 2 extrinsic act evidence of the defendant's
forced resignation from two hospitals and the defendant's unorthodox
research with marijuana was admitted.3 3 In State v. Chenette,2-"
where the defendant, a physician, was convicted for filing false Medi-
caid claims," 5 testimony from patients about the poor quality of care
they received from the defendant was held to be properly admitted
under Vermont Rule of Evidence 404(b).3 6 In United States v.
Hooshmand,37 where the defendant, a physician, was convicted for
improper electromyography ("EMG") billings,"8 evidence that the
defendant instructed employees to bill his private tennis lessons as
EMG services was held to be properly admitted pursuant to FRE
404(b).3 9 State v. Carr"4° presents an especially questionable dissimi-
larity between the extrinsic act evidence and the charged conduct.
Carr, a physician, was convicted for trafficking and distributing con-
trolled substances through fraudulent prescriptions. 24' The govern-
ment was allowed to introduce evidence of the defendant's intimate
sexual contacts with two of his patients and the drug habits and deaths
"where the evidence sought to be introduced is an extrinsic offense, its relevance is a
function of its similarity to the offense charged"), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979); see
also 2 Weinstein's Evidence, supra note 159, 1 404112] (stating that "[c]ourts often
stress the similarity of the charged and uncharged acts, and sometimes go so far as to
say that in order to be probative the offense must be similar to the charged act in the
sense that the essential physical elements of the two crimes must be alike" and dis-
cussing how the degree of similarity required seems to vary, depending on the type of
case at issue).
230. See, e.g., United States v. Sherer, 653 F.2d 334, 338 (8th Cir.) (finding that
extrinsic act evidence included billings identical to those in the indictment, but for
different months), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1034 (1981); State v. Romero, 574 So. 2d 330,
336 (La. 1990) (finding that extrinsic act evidence included evidence of billing impro-
prieties similar to the Medicaid billings included in the indictment but concerned non-
Medicaid patients); State v. Young, 406 S.E.2d 758, 776-77 (W. Va. 1991) (finding that
extrinsic act evidence included prescriptions of controlled substance similar to those
in the indictment but for different patients).
231. 730 F.2d 1425 (11th Cir. 1984).
232. Id. at 1427.
233. Id. at 1432.
234. 560 A.2d 365 (Vt. 1989).
235. Id. at 367.
236. Id. at 372.
237. 931 F.2d. 725 (11th Cir. 1991).
238. Id. at 730.
239. Id. at 736.
240. 626 P.2d 292 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 625 P.2d 1186 (N.M.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 853 (1981), overruled by 879 P.2d 92 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).
241. Id. at 295.
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of these patients.242 Over a strenuous dissent,243 this evidence was
held to be properly admissible as relevant to the defendant's intent:
"[This evidence] tended to show that defendant's actions were not
taken for a legitimate medical purpose and thus his intent was to act
outside the course of his professional practice. 244
Related to the issue of similarity between the extrinsic act evidence
and charged conduct is the extent to which a trial is diverted by the
extrinsic act evidence. In many of the health care fraud prosecutions,
the proponent of the extrinsic act evidence was allowed considerable
leeway in presenting this evidence. In Carr, ten witnesses testified
about the extrinsic act evidence.245 In United States v. Jackson,246 de-
tailed extrinsic act evidence was presented by an FBI agent who had
posed as a patient of the defendant's in a fraud scheme unrelated to
the scheme for which the defendant was on trial.2 47 In addition to the
agent's testimony, a tape recording surreptitiously made of the trans-
action by the government was also introduced into evidence.248 In
other cases, four,24 9 three,20 and two2' witnesses were allowed to tes-
tify about the extrinsic act evidence.
The amount of diversion permitted in presenting the extrinsic act
evidence in the reported health care fraud prosecutions is rarely seen
in trials of street crimes. Usually, in trials of street crimes the extrinsic
act evidence is simple, consisting of testimony from one witness or
simply the introduction of a prior conviction. z 2 In white collar crimi-
nal cases the extrinsic acts, like the charged conduct, more often con-
242. Id. at 303-04; id. at 308-09 (Lopez, J. dissenting).
243. Id. at 306-10 (Lopez, J. dissenting).
244. Id. at 304.
245. Id. at 304.
246. 761 F.2d 1541 (11th Cir. 1985).
247. Id. at 1543 n.1.
248. Id.
249. United States v. Lennartz, 948 F.2d, 363, 366-67 (7th Cir. 1991) (four witnesses
testifying regarding the defendant's past Medicaid billing abuses as a subtext for
showing the defendant was aware of Medicaid regulations, and thus, acted intention-
ally in violating the regulations).
250. United States v. Chenette, 560 A.2d 365, 371-72 (Vt. 1989) (three witnesses
testifying about instances of fraud for which no charges had been brought and various
patients testified that they were dissatisfied with the defendant's medical care and
would not go to him after an initial visit).
251. United States v. Campbell, 845 F.2d 1374, 1380 (6th Cir.) (two witnesses testi-
fying that their treatments were not performed and not necessary, respectively, in a
Medicare fraud case), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988).
252. See, e.g., United States v. Mehrmanesh, 689 F.2d 822, 830-33 (9th Cir. 1982).
The court admitted three types of extrinsic act evidence, two of which are provable
with little or no diversion from proof regarding the charged offenses: (1) a prior con-
viction for smuggling hashish; (2) seizure of drugs and drug use paraphernalia from a
search of defendant's residence wherein evidence of the charged offense was also
found. Although the court did not go into detail, the third type of extrinsic act evi-
dence, defendant's "numerous sales of heroin before and after his arrest," may have
required testimony by witnesses additional to those needed to prove the charged of-
fenses. Id.
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sist of complex financial transactions. In United States v. Lennartz, 3
for example, where the extrinsic act evidence consisted of events oc-
curring in prior audits, a Medicaid auditor and investigator testified
about the scope, findings, results, and conversations relating to the
prior audits.254 In United States v. Campbell,255 former patients of the
defendant testified about the treatment they received from the de-
fendant and their conversations with him. 56 In State v. Chenette7-2
three former patients of the defendant testified and their related med-
ical records and Medicaid claims were introduced2 ss
E. Probative Value Versus Prejudicial Impact
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 specifies that otherwise relevant evi-
dence may be excluded if its probative value is "substantially out-
weighed" by its prejudicial impact.259 Following the "inclusionary"
emphasis in the federal evidentiary code, this rule places the burden
of persuading courts that evidence should be excluded on the oppo-
nent of such evidence.26° Since 1988, however, it has been clear that a
Rule 403 analysis is to be conducted prior to admitting any evidence
pursuant to Rule 404(b). 261 Although the language of the federal
rules places the burden of proving that the prejudicial impact substan-
tially outweighs the probative value of evidence on the opponent of
evidence, 6 federal courts have switched the burdens when the evi-
dence is of extrinsic acts.263 Most of the courts delivering opinions in
the health care fraud cases did not address the issue of which party
bears the burden of proof on the Rule 403 analysis regarding extrinsic
act evidence, but the few that did similarly placed the burden on the
proponent of the extrinsic act evidence.2 1 This is the appropriate al-
location of this burden.
253. 948 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1991).
254. Id. at 366-67.
255. 845 F.2d 1374 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988).
256. Id at 1377-81.
257. 560 A.2d 365 (Vt. 1989).
258. Id at 371-72.
259. See supra note 162 for text of Fed. R. Evid. 403.
260. Amending 404(b), supra note 191, at 1467.
261. In 1988, the Supreme Court held that a Rule 403 assessment of whether proba-
tive value is outweighed by prejudicial impact should precede introduction of 404(b)
extrinsic act evidence. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691 (1988).
262. Amending 404(b), supra note 191, at 1471-84.
263. See, e.g., United States v. Mehrmanesh, 689 F.2d 822, 830 (9th Cir. 1982)
("Once its relevancy is shown, the [extrinsic act] evidence is admissible only after the
Government demonstrates to the trial court that, on balance, its probative value is not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant.").
264. See United States v. Hooshmand, 931 F.2d 725, 736 (11th Cir. 1991); see also
United States v. Neely, 980 F.2d 1074, 1079 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that evidence that
defendant was involved in another insurance fraud scheme was properly admitted
because the government provided clear and convincing evidence to prove all elements
of the crime charged); State v. McDermitt, 406 So. 2d 195,200 (La. 1981) (stating that
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Professor Imwinkelreid has argued that with extrinsic act evidence,
the proponent of such evidence should bear the burden of proving
that the probative value outweighs the prejudicial impact of such evi-
dence.265 Imwinkelreid offers three reasons for his suggestion. First,
he warns of the danger of such evidence in that jurors may tend to
think "once a crook, always a crook." '26 6 Second, he cites the fact that
Rule 609, which allows use of prior convictions to impeach witnesses,
imposes the Rule 403 burden on the proponent. In this respect, Im-
winkelreid argues that imposing the Rule 403 burden on proponents
of extrinsic act evidence, which does not necessarily include a prior
conviction, is even more necessary than it is with Rule 609 prior con-
victions. He suggests that juries may judge extrinsic act evidence
more harshly because the defendant has not yet been punished for it
through a prior conviction.267 Finally, Imwinkelreid suggests that
courts are imposing this burden on the proponent of extrinsic act evi-
dence anyway, thereby reverting to the common law, which undercuts
the authority of the Federal Rules of Evidence.268
In white collar criminal cases, there are additional reasons for im-
posing the Rule 403 burden on the proponent of extrinsic act evi-
dence. First, as noted, in these cases the extrinsic act evidence is less
likely to be misconduct that has resulted in a conviction.269 Thus, this
extrinsic act evidence has never been subjected to the rigorous "be-
yond a reasonable doubt" burden of proof. Instead, pursuant to Rule
404(b), such extrinsic acts must be proven simply by a preponderance
of the evidence. Second, the courts tend to allow a fair amount of
diversion to present the extrinsic act evidence;2 7 0 an advantage for the
proponent that can be "evened-up" by also requiring the proponent to
shoulder the Rule 403 burden of proof. Third, the broad use of expert
and summary testimony in white collar criminal cases271 may elevate
the significance of extrinsic act evidence if such evidence is integrated
with the charged conduct to yield the expert's opinion or contribute to
the summary. 272 State v. Young2 73 demonstrates this. Young, a den-
the "[pirerequisite to the admissibility of [extrinsic act] evidence is a showing by the
state that the evidence ... is not merely repetitive and cumulative ... and that it
serves the actual purpose for which it is offered"). The court in United States v.
Sherer, 653 F.2d 334 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1034 (1981), also appears to
place this burden on the proponent of such evidence: "Before the [extrinsic act] evi-
dence can be admitted, however, it must be shown that an issue on which other-crime
evidence may be received is raised, the proffered evidence is relevant to that issue, the
evidence is clear and convincing, and the probative worth outweighs the probable
prejudicial impact." Id. at 338-39.
265. Amending 404(b), supra note 191, at 1487-91.
266. Id. at 1488.
267. Id. at 1490.
268. Id. at 1491-92.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 227-28.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 229-59.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 68-190.
272. See supra text accompanying notes 117-34.
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tist, was convicted of "felonious constructive delivery" of controlled
substances as a result of prescriptions he issued that were not for legit-
imate dental purposes.2" Extrinsic act evidence was admitted regard-
ing improper prescriptions for controlled substances dispensed by the
defendant to patients other than those named in the charges.27 5 The
government's expert witness considered this extrinsic act evidence as
well as the evidence regarding the charges in reaching his opinion that
the defendant "was engaged primarily in a 'prescription writing' busi-
ness." '276 Finally, the reason that the Rule 403 burden should be im-
posed upon the proponent of such evidence is that imposing it will not
be unreasonable or difficult. As the reported health care fraud cases
reveal, the government is the proponent of extrinsic act evidence most
of the time.277 Through its regulatory machinery, the government has
access to extrinsic act evidence and the information necessary to lay a
proper foundation for such evidence.
F. Conchsion
This section has reviewed the treatment of extrinsic act evidence in
reported health care fraud prosecutions, finding that such evidence is
admitted most often as relevant to intent; admission of such evidence
results in more reversals than any other evidentiary ruling; courts do
not require close similarity between extrinsic act evidence and
charged conduct; courts permit a fair amount of diversion from
charged conduct to present the extrinsic act evidence; and the few
courts addressing the Rule 403 burden impose it on the proponent of
the extrinsic act evidence. Given the nature of health care fraud and
in light of other evidentiary issues examined herein, this Article also
suggests that extrinsic act evidence is readily available in white collar
criminal cases because of the myriad of regulatory agencies that moni-
tor health care providers and collect such evidence in the course of
their routine supervision of these providers. Also, the extensive use of
summary witnesses in health care fraud prosecutions and white collar
criminal cases in general increase the significance of extrinsic act evi-
dence as it is repeated and integrated by the summary witness.
Despite the dangers posed by extrinsic act evidence, such evidence
is especially needed in white collar criminal cases where intent is often
the only issue in dispute. Extrinsic act evidence is uniquely capable of
273. 406 S.E.2d 758 (W. Va. 1991).
274. Id. at 762-63.
275. Id. at 776-77.
276. Id. at 777.
277. See appendix IV for a listing of reported health care prosecutions where the
court's opinion reveals that extrinsic act evidence was introduced. The government
was the proponent of this evidence in all but one of these cases. See United States v.
Neely, 980 F.2d 1074, 1074 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding no abuse of discretion for allowing
evidence of an insurance fraud scheme in which defendants participated). In Neely,
the court restricted defense efforts to use extrinsic act evidence. Id. at 1080.
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shedding legitimate insight on the intent issue. Steps should be taken,
however, to neutralize the dangers posed by extrinsic act evidence
while preserving its availability. These steps include: placing the bur-
den on the proponent of such evidence to demonstrate that the preju-
dicial impact of such evidence does not "substantially outweigh" its
probative impact;278 offering proof of extrinsic evidence in camera;279
limiting the details of extrinsic act evidence;280 and using limiting in-
structions.28 In assessing which of these options, alone or together,
will overcome the special problems posed by extrinsic act evidence in
health care fraud or other white collar crime cases, courts should con-
sider recent empirical data indicating that prior bad act evidence is
highly influential to jurors,282 while limiting instructions are not.283
V. DOCUMENTS
Three types of documents form part of the evidence in almost every
health care fraud prosecution: patient medical charts, manuals issued
by insurers explaining what services are reimbursable, and claim and
billing data which may be computer-generated. The reported cases
reflect that patient medical charts usually are obtained from defend-
278. See supra text accompanying notes 260-77.
279. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 761 F.2d 1541, 1543 (11th Cir. 1985) (com-
menting that the trial court took a "thorough proffer" of the extrinsic act evidence
outside the presence of the jury prior to permitting its admission).
280. See, e.g., Neely, 980 F.2d at 1081 (noting that the trial court limited admission
of extrinsic act evidence to general facts about the prior acts).
281. See, e.g., United States v. Lennartz, 948 F.2d 363, 367 (7th Cir. 1991) (allowing
evidence concerning prior uncharged illegal conduct similar to that for which the de-
fendant was being tried); Jackson, 761 F.2d at 1544 (noting that trial judge gave cau-
tionary instruction before admitting extrinsic act evidence).
282. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) (generally excluding use of evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts to prove character of a person in order to show conformity); Abraham
P. Ordover, Balancing the Presumptions of Guilt and Innocence: Rules 404(b), 608(b)
and 609(a), 38 Emory L.J. 135, 139-40 (1989); Patricia M. Wald, Guilty Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt: A Norm Gives Way to the Numbers, 1993 U. Chi. Legal F. 101,
115. Cf. Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instruc-
tions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 Law & Hum.
Behav. 37, 43 (1985) (discussing the results of empirical studies they conducted to
measure the effect of a defendant's prior record on mock jurors' assessments of credi-
bility and guilt, finding that although "[r]atings of the defendant's credibility did not
vary as a function of prior record," conviction rates did vary "with the highest convic-
tion rate occurring when the prior conviction was the same as the present charge and
the lowest conviction rate occurring in the no-prior-conviction condition").
283. See Sarah Tanford & Michele Cox, Decision Processes in Civil Cases: The Im-
pact of Impeachment Evidence on Liability and Credibility Judgements, 2 Soc. Behav.
165, 180 (1987) (commenting that limiting instructions may increase prejudicial nature
of evidence); Sharon Wolf & David. A. Montgomery, Effects of Inadmissible Evidence
and Level of Judicial Admonishment to Disregard on the Judgments of Mock Jurors, 7
J. Applied Soc. Psych. 205, 216-18 (1977) (finding that limiting instructions actually
increase biasing effect of evidence).
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ants by searches' or by grand jury subpoena,' while claim forms, 2 6
manuals, and other billing instructions' usually are obtained from
governmental agencies or insurers. Over nine percent (thirty-six) of
the reported health care fraud prosecutions refer to the documents
admitted at trial.' Of these about one-third (fourteen) include some
discussion about the documents admitted.2 9 This section examines
these cases and addresses the following issues: (1) the hearsay within
hearsay contained in patient medical files and the right of confronta-
tion and reliability problems this hearsay poses; (2) authentication dif-
ficulties, primarily in attempted use of insurers' manuals; and (3)
nuances presented by computer-generated evidence.
Several observations can be made about the use of documents in
the health care prosecutions. First, the prosecution, as proponent of
the documents in all of the reported cases studied herein, experienced
a high rate of success on appeal regarding the admission of its docu-
ments. The appellate courts affirmed the prosecution's use of docu-
284. See, e.g., United States v. Abrams, 615 F.2d 541, 542 (1st Cir. 1980) (patients'
medical records seized from physician's office with search warrant); People v. Blas-
quez, 211 Cal. Rptr. 335, 336-37 (Ct. App. 1985) (patients' records seized from psy-
chotherapists' office with search warrant); State v. DeSmidt, 454 N.W.2d 780, 783
(Wis. 1990) (patients' dental records seized with search warrant), cert. dismissed, 498
U.S. 1043 (1991).
285. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 710 F. Supp. 999, 1001 (D.N.J.) (involv-
ing grand jury subpoena issued to psychologist for billing and treatment records of
one patient), aff'd, 879 F.2d 861 (3d Cir.1989); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 441
A.2d 525, 527 (R.I. 1982) (involving grand jury subpoena issued to physician for pa-
tient medical records).
286. See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 749 F.2d 195, 196-98 (5th Cir. 1984) (al-
lowing claims submitted by the defendant presented into evidence by employees at
the Texas Department of Human Resources); United States v. Alexander, 748 F.2d
185, 188 (4th Cir. 1984) (claims submitted by the defendant and analysis of the claims
were supplied by Blue Cross/Blue Shield), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1985).
287. United States v. Mekjian, 505 F.2d 1320, 1323 (5th Cir. 1975) (discussing por-
tions of Medicare manual introduced by employee of the Social Security Administra-
tion which maintained copies of Medicare manuals and all revisions to it); State v.
Romero, 574 So. 2d 330, 340-41 (La. 1990) (Watson, J., dissenting) (involving carrier
manual and supplementing reimbursement guidelines obtained from the defendants
pursuant to a search warrant).
288. See supra chart 4 & infra appendix IV.
289. See United States v. Hooshmand, 931 F.2d 725, 736 (11th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Duncan, 919 F.2d 981, 985-86 (5th Cir. 1990), cerl. denied, 500 U.S. 926
(1991); Alexander, 748 F.2d at 191; United States v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847, 850-53
(1st Cir. 1982); United States v. Vecchiarello, 536 F.2d 420, 423-24 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
United States v. Radetsky, 535 F.2d 556, 568 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 820
(1976), overruled by 921 F.2d 994 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Rosenberg, 515
F.2d 190, 199-200 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1031 (1975); United States v. Mek-
jian, 505 F.2d 1320, 1326 (5th Cir. 1975); Heller v. United States, 104 F.2d 446, 448
(4th Cir. 1939); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 710 F. Supp. 999, 1001-02 (D.N.J.), aff'd,
879 F.2d 861 (3d Cir. 1989); People v. Slocum, 125 Cal. Rptr. 442, 448 (Ct. App. 1975),
cert denied, 426 U.S. 924 (1976); State v. Romero, 574 So. 2d 330, 334 (La. 1990);
State v. Hermsdorf, 605 A.2d 1045, 1047-48 (N.H. 1992); People v. Alizadeh, 452
N.Y.S.2d 425, 427 (App. Div. 1982). Note that In re Grand Jury Subpoena is not
included in the statistics. See supra note 6.
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ments in 100% of the cases where the admission of documents was
challenged on appeal.2 90 Second, fruitful but little-used avenues exist
to challenge the admission of some types of documents typically used
by the prosecution in health care fraud prosecutions. Third, the
problems both prosecution and defense encounter with documents re-
veal, once again, that white collar criminal cases pose unique eviden-
tiary problems.
A. Patient Medical Files: Hearsay Within Hearsay
Patient medical charts contain entries recorded by many people, in-
cluding memorialization of oral statements by the patient, the pa-
tient's relatives, or others. Most patient medical charts are admitted
as records of a regularly conducted business. In fact, the advisory
notes to FRE 803(6) identify patient medical records as a prime exam-
ple of appropriate use of this hearsay exception.291 For two reasons,
however, patient medical files offered into evidence in prosecutions of
health care providers as records of regularly conducted activity, and
thus as an exception to the hearsay rule, should be scrutinized care-
fully. When admitted in such cases, these files may not bear the same
indicia of reliability as when offered in cases concerning the medical
diagnosis or treatment of a patient. In addition, in some health care
fraud prosecutions, the nature of the fraud should render suspect
many of the entries deemed reliable in other contexts.
The standard rationale for admitting patient medical records de-
spite the hearsay they contain is that such records are presumptively
reliable because it is in the interest of everyone who contributes to
them that they be accurate; otherwise, a correct diagnosis or appropri-
ate treatment may not be possible.29 Yet, in most health care fraud
prosecutions, the diagnosis of the patient and many of the specifics of
the patient's treatment are not an issue. Rather, in the health care
fraud prosecutions, patient medical charts typically are admitted to
show billing irregularities, such as when the defendant billed for serv-
ices never performed or billed for a more expensive service than was
290. See supra chart 6 & infra appendix VI. Undoubtedly, some of this success is
due more to the standard of review on appeal for evidentiary decisions of the trial
court than the actual merits of the proponent's position. As the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted: "Appellants who challenged evidentiary
rulings of the district court are like rich men who wish to enter the kingdom; their
prospects compare with those of camels who wish to pass through the eye of the
needle." United States v. Whalen, 940 F.2d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir. 1991) (quoting
United States v. Gleicier, 923 F.2d 496, 503 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied 112 S. Ct. 54
(1991)), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 403 (1991).
291. The medical report will be admitted unless it was not prepared in the regular
course of business, or if there are reasons to suspect its accuracy. Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)
advisory committee's note, reprinted in 4 Weinstein's Evidence, supra note 159, at
803-49.
292. 4 Weinstein's Evidence, supra note 159, 803(6)[06].
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actually performed.293 In the first instance, the relevant evidence
from the patient medical files is an omission: the failure of the file to
reflect a service. In the second situation, the relevant evidence con-
sists of descriptions of the services or procedures allegedly performed.
While obviously preferable, accurate recording of every service or
procedure performed on a patient may not be crucial to proper diag-
nosis and treatment.
Two of the reported health care fraud prosecutions, State v. Ro-
mero294 and People v. Alizadeh,295 demonstrate the reliability
problems associated with patient files in fraud prosecutions of health
care providers. The Romeros were physicians convicted on various
fraud charges resulting from their Medicaid billings.296 Their convic-
tions were dismissed in part because of the inaccuracy of patient medi-
cal files admitted into evidence.297 Records from a nursing home were
admitted to support the prosecution's argument that not all of the
Medicaid patient visits billed by the defendants were performed.298
The government argued that absence of entries of specific visits estab-
lished that the defendants did not make these visits.299 The appellate
court found that the patient charts contained "glaring deficiencies"
and "striking shortcomings."3" It found influential testimony by the
nurses who were to record information in patients' fies that the files
were incomplete records of all services performed on patients.3 1 Be-
cause of these deficiencies in the patient files, the court found the evi-
dence insufficient on some counts and ordered them dismissed.
293. In every health care prosecution in which the reported court opinion discussed
the use of patient charts as evidence, the charts were introduced by the government to
help prove the billing irregularities charged.
294. 574 So. 2d 330 (La. 1990).
295. 452 N.Y.S.2d 425 (App. Div. 1982).
296. Romero, 574 So. 2d at 332.
297. Id at 334-36.
298. Id. at 334.
299. Id at 333.
300. Id. at 334.
301. Id. The court explained that:
The most critical deficiency in this documentation is evident in the manner
by which the patient files were compiled. Under cross-examination, [the
custodian of these documents] acknowledged that she routinely removed pa-
tient charts to her office and occasionally took them home overnight so that
they might be "thinned." By this she meant that pages of nurses notes, pro-
gress notes, physician order sheets, and doctors' orders sheets were regularly
culled from patient charts when those charts became too thick. The docu-
ments were removed and placed in separate files which the state failed to
present at trial.
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In People v. Alizadeh, °2 a physician specializing in obstetrics was
convicted for defrauding the Medicaid program.30 3 The government
introduced patient medical files to show that the defendant billed
Medicaid for services not performed .3 0 The appellate court found
that because of the volume of patients handled at the defendant's
clinic and the number of people who recorded information in patient
files, "the substantial possibility is presented that there was a mix-up
in the handling of the files" and that "erroneous" information was
recorded in the patient's file regarding the procedures at issue. 30 5 The
court set aside the defendant's conviction.
The type of fraud perpetrated also may result in inaccurate patient
medical files. For example, in the "Rx by Fraud" prosecutions where
providers "sell" prescriptions for controlled substances, 0 6 the medical
files of these "patients" may well reflect false symptoms and medical
histories so as to justify the prescriptions.30 7 In the prosecutions for
"Automobile Accident Scams" where the accident victims are co-con-
spirators in the fraud,30 8 patient medical files may well reflect false
symptoms, false test results and false diagnoses all in an effort to jus-
tify the billings to insurers.30 9 In the "Billing for Unnecessary Serv-
ices" frauds where providers perform unnecessary medical services
but falsely bill insurers for the services as necessary,310 medical files
may contain false information. In patient dumping cases,31' where
hospitals seek to minimize physical conditions so as to discharge an
uninsured or Medicaid patient, the patient's medical files may reflect
inaccurate information to justify the discharge. Even the new types of
302. 452 N.Y.S.2d 425 (App. Div. 1982).
303. Id. at 426-27, 431 (convicting defendant on one count of grand larceny in the
third degree, and 163 counts of offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree,
all arising from his billings to Medicaid for services never performed).
304. Id. at 427, 432.
305. Id. at 429.
306. Bucy, Fraud By Fright, supra note 5, at 889-93.
307. For example, in United States v. Mahar, 801 F.2d 1477 (6th Cir. 1986), "pa-
tients" at the defendant's medical clinic who were seeking prescriptions for controlled
substances described symptoms as "pain and nerves," "diet," "weight loss and pain,"
"a back problem," "cold problem," and "pain." Id. at 1482-83. One undercover of-
ficer visiting the defendant's clinic as a "patient" told the medical assistant he had a
"back problem." The officer was told "the doctor would not buy a back problem."
Id. The officer then said he was having a "pain in the heel of his foot and that his
neck hurt." Id. This complaint was deemed sufficient. Id. at 1483.
308. Bucy, Fraud By Fright, supra note 5, at 899-905.
309. See United States v. Duncan, 919 F.2d 981, 984-85 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
500 U.S. 926 (1991).
310. Bucy, Fraud By Fright, supra note 5, at 920-32.
311. See Karen I. Treiger, Note, Preventing Patient Dumping: Sharpening the CO-
BRA's Fangs, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1186, 1186-87 (1986) (explaining that patient dump-
ing is a phenomenon which occurs when a hospital sends a patient away because the
patient is unable to pay); see also The Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of
1986 (COBRA) § 9121, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd (West Supp. 1992) (requiring hospitals
to provide emergency medical treatment to individuals).
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fraud likely to develop with health care reform, such as the failure to
provide necessary services while seeking reimbursement by falsely
representing that all necessary services were provided,312 will be easier
to commit and conceal with false entries in patient medical files.
For these reasons, although patient medical files generally qualify as
records of a regularly conducted activity and thereby overcome a
hearsay objection, patient files should be considered on a case-by-case
basis when offered in health care fraud prosecutions.
B. Provider Manuals: Authentication
One of the more important types of documents used in health care
fraud prosecutions is the "Provider Manual." Both the Medicare and
Medicaid programs contract with private insurance companies to ser-
vice providers and patients participating in these programs. 313 "Pro-
vider Manuals" are prepared by these selected organizations in
conjunction with health care financing agencies or state govern-
ments,314 and detail the procedures for providers to obtain reimburse-
ment for services rendered to qualifying patients.31 5 They are
voluminous, amended often and supplemented by correspondence
from insurers and state and federal agencies.316 Provider manuals
may also incorporate billing codes from other sources that may con-
flict with the manual.317 Supposedly, all of these sources of reim-
bursement data are supplied to participating providers.31 8
312. Bucy, Health Care Reform and Fraud, supra note 147, at 1005.
313. Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine 375 (1982).
314. See 5 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH), at 30,201 (1993) (listing latest revi-
sions to Medicare provider manuals). As one court explained, "Although written by
the Department of Health and Human Resources, the fiscal intermediary has the re-
sponsibility to print and distribute provider manuals, as well as updates and revi-
sions." State v. Romero, 574 So. 2d 330, 332 n.5 (La. 1990).
315. 2 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 1 5841-8113 (1990).
316. See, e.g., United States v. Mekjian, 505 F.2d 1320, 1323 (5th Cir. 1975) (ruling
that a provider manual was inadmissible because there was no testimony as to its
currency); Romero, 574 So. 2d at 341 n.9 (Watson, J., dissenting) (admitting the pro-
vider manual that had been revised at least 13 times: seven times in 1984, four times
in 1986, and two times in 1987 (the years at issue)).
317. Romero, 574 So. 2d at 332, 338. The provider manual for the Louisiana Medi-
caid program directed physicians to use certain codes found in the Current Procedural
Terminology (CPT) books printed by the American Medical Association. "Not all of
the codes listed in the CPT books have been adopted by the Medicaid system and the
provider'manuals do not indicate which CPT codes are used in Medicaid, but provide
only a broad description of what is covered." Id. at 332. Sometimes there are con-
flicts in the billing codes in the provider manual and the CPT. d at 341 (Watson, J.,
dissenting).
318. See, e.g., United States v. Mekjian, 505 F.2d 1320, 1323 (5th Cir. 1975) (govern-
ment introduced evidence of a Medicare manual on coverage issued to carriers in
order to show that appellant was aware of changes in coverage and billing proce-
dures); Romero, 574 So. 2d at 341 (provider manual was frequently updated or
changed creating distribution problems).
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The volume, complexity and ever-changing nature of these manuals
and their supplementing correspondence present at least two hurdles
for prosecutors-and two potential boons for defendants. The first is
authenticating the manual, such as proving which reimbursement
guidelines are applicable to the issues in the case at bar. In United
States v. Mekjian,31 9 for example, the Medicare Manual was ruled
inadmissible by the trial court because "there was no testimony as to
the currency of the manual at the time in issue. 320
The second hurdle presented for the government by provider manu-
als does not involve authentication, but proof of intent. Highlighting
the ambiguity, complexity and inconsistency in carrier manuals, de-
fendants may persuade fact finders that if they billed incorrectly, they
did so unintentionally because they were confused by confusing billing
requirements.3 2'
C. Computer-Generated Evidence
Computer-generated evidence is becoming more common in health
care fraud criminal prosecutions. Since 1972, over five percent of the
reported decisions reflect that such evidence has been admitted.322
Before 1972, there were no reported uses of computer-generated evi-
dence. 323 This trend toward greater use of computer-generated evi-
dence in health care fraud prosecutions is consistent with the trend in
complex civil trials. 324 Courts have struggled with computer-gener-
ated evidence and many experts have questioned whether rules of evi-
dence developed prior to the explosion of computer technology are
adequate for computer evidence.32 As the reported health care fraud
prosecutions demonstrate, this concern should be even greater when
the computer-generated evidence is used in a criminal case.
319. 505 F.2d 1320.
320. Id. at 1323.
321. This defense was attempted unsuccessfully in Romero, 574 So. 2d at 338-39,
340-42 (Watson, J., dissenting).
322. See supra chart 4 and infra appendix IV.
323. Id.
324. Mark A. Johnson, Comment, Computer Printouts as Evidence: Stricter Foun-
dation or Presumption of Reliability, 75 Marq. L. Rev. 439, 439 n.1 (1992).
325. See, e.g., Rudolph J. Peritz, Computer Data and Reliability: A Call for Authen-
tication of Business Records Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev.
956, 959-620 (1986) (arguing in favor of imposing the stricter qualification suggested
in the Manual for Complex Litigation for qualifying computer-generated evidence);
James A. Sprowl, Evaluating the Credibility of Computer-Generated Evidence, 52 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev. 547, 566 (1976) (outlining the steps litigants and courts should employ
prior to the introduction and computer-generated evidence).
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1. Authentication of Computer-Generated Evidence
The proponent of any evidence must demonstrate that it is what it
purports to be.326 Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b)(9) specifies that
the proponent of computer-generated evidence should produce evi-
dence "describing the process or system used to produce the evi-
dence" and "showing that the process produces an accurate result."3' 2
There are three major stages at which error can be introduced into
computer-generated evidence: inputting the data in the computer,
processing the data by the computer, and evaluating the data gener-
ated by the computer.328 The proponent of computer-generated evi-
dence should demonstrate the accuracy of such evidence at all
stages.
329
Commentators and courts disagree about the level of proof needed
to authenticate computer-generated data. Many of the older cases re-
quired rigorous proof of accuracy.330 Although criticized,33' many
modern courts have relaxed authenticating standards for computer-
generated evidence.332 According to one commentator, "Courts seem
to treat computerized records as if they were self-authenticating. ' 333
The health care fraud cases reflect this relaxed approach toward au-
thentication requirements for computer-generated evidence. In only
two of the thirteen reported health care fraud prosecutions discussing
computer-generated evidence did the issue of authentication arise at
all.334 Both of the courts bucked the trend toward relaxing authenti-
cation standards and required rigorous compliance with authentica-
tion requirements. In United States v. Russo,3 3 5 the government, as
proponent of the evidence, introduced detailed testimony by individu-
326. Fed. R. Evid. 901(a) provides: "The requirement of authentication or identifi-
cation as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims."
327. Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(9).
328. Colin Tapper, Evidence From Computers, 8 Ga. L. Rev. 562, 566-67 (1974).
329. Id.
330. See, e.g., United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109, 1125 (8th Cir.) (discussing
protracted dialogue concerning the foundation for reception of computer evidence),
cert denied, 434 U.S. 940 (1977); Transport Indemnity Co. v. Seib, 132 N.W.2d 871,
873-76 (Neb. 1965) (authentication testimony stretched across 141 pages of the trial
record); see also Johnson, supra note 324, at 448 (describing accuracy problems with
computer printouts).
331. Peritz, supra note 325, at 978-84.
332. See, e.g., United States v. Vela, 673 F.2d 86, 90 (5th Cir. 1982) (testifying wit-
ness only needed to vouch for the general reliability of billing process); Perma Re-
search & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111, 125 (2d Cir.) (noting that routinely
prepared records are often admitted as evidence because their regular use in the busi-
ness of a company ensures a high degree of accuracy), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 987
(1976); see also Johnson, supra note 324, at 450 ("Modern courts generally employ
liberal standards when assessing the admissibility of computer-generated evidence.").
333. Peritz, supra note 325, at 981-82.
334. United States v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1157 (1974); State v. Vogelsong, 612 N.E.2d 462 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
335. 480 F.2d 1228.
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als familiar with all stages of the data generated by the computer. The
testimony of these witnesses detailed the procedures for checking
claims data before it was put into the computer, the calculations per-
formed on the data by the computer, the subsequent uses made of
these calculations, and the steps throughout all stages to verify accu-
racy.336 The Russo court found sufficient indicia of accuracy and held
that the computer-generated evidence was properly admitted.337 Ad-
hering to the same requirements, the court in State v. Vogelsong338
found inadequate indicia of reliability when data initially was put into
the computer and ruled that the computer-generated evidence was er-
roneously admitted by the trial court.
339
Despite the general trend toward relaxing authentication require-
ments for computer-generated evidence, the better approach is to re-
quire the more rigorous analysis shown in Russo 340 and Vogelsong.34,
Errors can easily occur at all three stages of creating computer evi-
dence.3 42 Data is coded into the computer by hand. Inattention or
even one slip of a finger when typing can introduce mistakes in the
initial imputting stage. Especially when the data consists of numbers,
the usual methods for checking accuracy of material typed into a com-
puter will not work.343 Mistakes can also occur at the second stage,
when the imputted data is calculated, re-ordered or reorganized by
the computer. Errors at this stage could arise from "viruses" which
infect even the most reliable software, or "hackers" who circumvent a
computer's security system and create inaccuracies in data.344 Finally,
336. Id. at 1233-36.
337. Id. at 1239-41. James Sprowl criticizes Russo's holding that the peer group
comparison was properly admitted. Sprowl's analysis is excellent guidance for coun-
sel seeking to exclude computer-generated peer group comparisons. Sprowl, supra
note 325, at 563-65.
338. 612 N.E.2d 462, 464-66 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (requiring the government, as
proponent of the evidence, to authenticate the computer records and demonstrate
that they were not hearsay).
339. Id. The court found that the testimony by the authenticating witness was not
specific enough to verify the accuracy of the data or the method of input, and that the
government failed in its attempt to qualify the computer records as a "public record"
exception to the hearsay rule. Id.
340. 480 F.2d 1228.
341. 612 N.E.2d 462.
342. See generally Sprowl, supra note 325, at 562-66 (providing an excellent discus-
sion of errors that may occur in computer-generated evidence, especially when used
to create summaries).
343. For example, the "spell check" function in word processing programs will not
detect arithmetic or numerical inputting errors.
344. Martha Stansell-Gamm & Scott Chamey, Introducing Electronic Evidence, in
A.B.A. Nat'l Inst., Health Care Fraud, at 6-7 (1994). Stansell-Gamm and Chamey
noted that:
Computers process data in many different ways by running programs, which
can be commercially or privately written. Any of these programs can con-
tain logical errors, called "bugs," which could significantly affect the accu-
racy of the computer process. And even if there is no error in the code, a
technician may run the program in a way that creates a false result. For
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errors can occur in the final stage when the computer-generated data
is interpreted. Proponents of computer-generated evidence should be
required to show that adequate steps were taken to prevent and detect
errors at all three stages. A full presentation of such evidence or a
stipulation to it by the parties will ensure that the opponent of the
evidence, the jury and the court are aware of the strength or weakness
of such evidence." 5
Some commentators oppose requiring "extensive" foundation prior
to admission of computer-generated evidence. 46 To the extent these
commentators underestimate the potential for errors in computer-
generated evidence, they are wrong. To the extent they disapprove of
requiring more than is already required in current authentication evi-
dentiary requirements, they are correct. Authentication evidence in
addition to the requirements in FRE 902 is not necessary to ensure
reliability of computer-generated evidence. Enforcement of the man-
date of FRE 901 and 902 that the proponent of computer-generated
evidence, like the proponent of any evidence, show that the evidence
is what it purports to be, is sufficient to guard against inaccuracy of
computer-generated evidence.
More than cross examination at trial of an authenticating witness
may be necessary, however, to fully explore potential inadequacies in
computer-generated evidence. The opponent of such evidence, how-
ever skilled, may not be able to conduct a thorough cross examination
simply from the discovery made available under current criminal pro-
cedure rules. Although Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 re-
quires, for example, production and physical examination of the
exhibits (perhaps even of the computer), 347 this may not be adequate
preparation for the opponent of such evidence. The 1993 amendment
example, a particular computer search program may be "case sensitive,"
which means that the upper-and lower-case versions of any given letter
are not interchangeable. If an author working in WordPerfect (a popular
word-processing program), searches a document for the word "Evidence,"
the computer will not find the word "evidence," because the letter "e" was
not capitalized.
Id.
345. It appears that courts' failure to require full authentication for computer-gen-
erated evidence more likely is due to courts' and litigants' relative inexperience with
computer-generated data rather than a well reasoned decision not to require such
evidence. As one commentator has noted, the "few reported decisions on computer[-
generated evidence] contain superficial and inconsistent analyses." Johnson, supra
note 324, at 444.
346. See Mark A. Dombroff, Dombroff on Unfair Tactics, § 14.37, at 510 (2d ed.
1984); 5 Weinstein's Evidence, supra note 159, 1001(4)[07].
347. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(C) provides that:
Upon request of the defendant the government shall permit the defendant to
inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, photographs,
tangible objects, buildings or places, or copies or portions thereof, which are
within the possession, custody or control of the government, and which are
material to the preparation of the defendant's defense or are intended for
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to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, requiring a party using ex-
pert testimony to disclose "the bases and reasons" of the testimony,348
offers little improvement for two reasons: (1) the custodian may not
be an "expert" within this amendment; and (2) a written report is no
substitute for oral inquiry of the custodian and physical examination
of the computer facilities.
The above steps, singly or together, will be adequate in some cases
to give the opponent of computer-generated evidence a true opportu-
nity to inquire into the accuracy of the evidence. In some cases, how-
ever, they will be inadequate. Depositions or interrogatories, used
widely in civil litigation,349 are almost nonexistent in criminal cases.
Interrogatories are never allowed. Depositions are allowed only in
"exceptional circumstances. '350 These prohibitions make sense given
the relatively straightforward nature of most criminal cases, the poten-
tial for danger to witnesses or on-going investigations in many crimi-
nal cases, and the confrontation requirement of the Sixth
Amendment.3 5 1 As the reported health care fraud prosecutions sug-
gest, however, white collar criminal cases break the mold. Use of
computer-generated evidence is a prime example of this. In a criminal
case where computer-generated evidence raises substantial questions
of authentication, the court should consider allowing the opponent of
such evidence to depose the witness who will be serving as the authen-
ticating witness of the computer evidence. In addition to fully equip-
ping the opponent of such evidence to conduct a full examination,
such a step should streamline in-court presentation of such evidence
and increase the likelihood of time-saving stipulations by all parties as
to some or all of the authentication issues. Moreover, a case-by-case
use by the government as evidence in chief at the trial, or were obtained
from or belong to the defendant.
Id.
348. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E).
349. Depositions may be taken as a matter of right by notice and without permis-
sion of the court in civil cases. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a).
350. Fed. R. Crim. P. 15(a) provides that:
Whenever due to exceptional circumstances of the case it is the interest of
justice that the testimony of a prospective witness of a party be taken and
preserved for use at trial, the court may upon motion of such party and no-
tice to the parties order that testimony of such witness be taken by deposi-
tion ....
Id.
The district court has wide discretion to determine when "exceptional circum-
stances" exist, subject to abuse of discretion review by appellate courts. United States
v. Allie, 978 F.2d 1401, 1405 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1662 (1993); see,
e.g., United States v. Campbell, 845 F.2d 1374 (6th Cir.) (stating that it is well estab-
lished that "the infirmity of an elderly witness which prevents him or her from travel-
ing is an 'exceptional circumstance' which justifies the use of deposition at trial")
(citation omitted), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988).
351. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ... be confronted with the witnesses against
him .. " U.S. Const. amend. VI.
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granting of defendants' right to depositions or interrogatories will al-
low courts to monitor the danger such disclosure presents to witnesses
or investigations.
2. Computer-Generated Evidence as Hearsay?
The reported health care fraud prosecutions reveal three ways pro-
ponents of computer-generated evidence have overcome or attempted
to overcome a hearsay objection: (1) introducing such evidence as a
statement of the defendant and thus not as hearsay pursuant to FRE
801 (2)(A);352 (2) introducing such evidence as records of a regularly
conducted activity pursuant to FRE 803(6);13 and (3) introducing
such evidence as a public record exception pursuant to FRE 803(8). 3-'
a. Statement of a Defendant
The courts treated the computer-generated evidence as a statement
of the defendant in only two of the reported health care fraud prose-
352. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) provides that:
A statement is not hearsay if... [t]he. statement is offered against a party
and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a representa-
tive capacity or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested an adop-
tion or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the
party to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the
party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency
or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a state-
ment by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of
the conspiracy.
I&
353. Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) provides that:
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts,
events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or
from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the
course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular
practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record,
or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other
qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or circum-
stances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business"
as used in this paragraph includes business, institution, association, profes-
sion, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for
profit.
Id.
354. Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) provides:
Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public
offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or
(B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters
there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters
observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in
civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases,
factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority
granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances in-
dicate lack of trustworthiness.
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cutions. People v. Perry355 is especially exemplary of this approach.
Perry and other podiatrists were indicted for billing Medicaid for
orthotic custom-made appliances when they were actually supplying
cheaper, non-custom-made appliances. 6 The trial court dismissed
the indictment upon defendants' pretrial motion, finding that "there
was insufficient competent evidence" before the grand jury to estab-
lish a prima facie case.357 Specifically, the trial court found that the
government failed to establish an adequate foundation for admission
of computer printouts of defendants' Medicaid claims.358 The appel-
late court reversed, finding that the government adequately overcame
the hearsay objection by qualifying the computer printouts as business
records under New York's evidence rules359 and as admissions of the
defendant. According to the court, "[T]he claims submitted by de-
fendants constituted admissions when submitted to the billing service
",360
Similarly, in United States v. Sanders,361 the court summarily dis-
missed the defendant's argument that billing information generated
by computer on behalf of Sanders' pharmacy was hearsay. The court
noted that: "The records at issue here were based on claims forms
submitted by Sanders or his agents, and were not hearsay because the
claims qualify as admissions under FRE 801(d)(2)(C). ' 362
b. Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity
In almost half of the reported health care fraud prosecutions
wherein computer-generated evidence was offered, the court admitted
such evidence as records of a regularly conducted activity.363 Records
may be admitted as a hearsay exception under FRE 803(6) if the fol-
lowing is shown:
- the data compilation was made at or near the time by, or from
information transmitted by, a person with knowledge;
- the data compilation is kept in the course of a regularly con-
ducted business activity;
- it must be the regular practice of that business activity to make
the data compilation;
355. 605 N.Y.S.2d 790 (App. Div. 1993).
356. Id. at 792.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 793.
359. Id. at 794.
360. Id.
361. 749 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1984).
362. Id. at 198.
363. Although 9 of the 14 reported health care fraud prosecutions where computer-
generated evidence was introduced analyzed the evidentiary issues, only four of these
cases analyzed and admitted such evidence as records of a regularly conducted activ-
ity. See Sanders, 749 F.2d at 198; United States v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228, 1239 (6th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1157 (1974); People v. Weinberg, 586 N.Y.S.2d 132,
134 (App. Div. 1992); State v. Chenette, 560 A.2d 365, 371 (Vt. 1989).
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- all of the above is shown by the testimony of the custodian or
other qualified witness; provided
- both the source of the information and the method and circum-
stances of its preparation indicate trustworthiness. 364
FRE 803(7) further provides that if the source of information appears
to be trustworthy, the absence of a matter in a data compilation quali-
fying under 803(6) may be used "to prove the nonoccurrence or non-
existence of the matter. 365
Although not all computer-generated evidence will qualify as busi-
ness records because it may not be produced by a "regularly
conducted activity," the type of computer evidence introduced in re-
ported health care fraud prosecutions and likely to be used in future
prosecutions should qualify. In the reported prosecutions, the com-
puter evidence introduced consisted of data obtained or generated by
insurers or their designees and concerned claims for health care serv-
ices. 366 These insurers created and maintained this data so as to con-
duct their daily duties of paying claims to providers.
United States v. Sanders367 typifies the analysis of computer-gener-
ated evidence as a record of a regularly conducted activity. Sanders, a
pharmacist, was convicted of Medicaid fraud and drug and tax of-
fenses.368 His sole challenge on appeal was that computer printouts
were improperly admitted as business records. These printouts
showed medical claims that had been received from Sanders, and
processed and paid by the Texas Department of Human Resources
(TDHR).3 6 9 Two witnesses testified about these records. The first
witness reviewed the procedures for transferring to magnetic tape in-
formation about Medicaid claims supplied by the defendant. His testi-
mony detailed the methods used to ensure that the information was
transposed accurately. The second witness reviewed the procedures
for entering the data from the magnetic tape into the computers at the
TDHR, the computations performed on this data, and the uses made
of it by the TDHR.37 ° The defendant argued that the computer
printouts were improperly admitted as business records because they
were prepared for litigation instead of "at or near the time" of the
364. Fed. R. Evid. 803(6).
365. Fed. R. Evid. 803(7).
366. For example, in Russo, computer evidence was generated from claim forms
("Doctor Service Reports"), each of which contained the following information: (1)
the provider's code number and name, (2) the name, address, identification number,
and other statistical data of the subscriber (who may be different from that of the
patient, i.e., the subscriber may be the patient's employer), and (3) diagnosis of the
patient, date of service, and description of the service rendered to patient. The pro-
vider completes the third category of information using the billing codes provided by
the insurers to describe the service rendered. 480 F.2d at 1232.
367. 749 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1984).
368. Id. at 196.
369. Id
370. Id. at 198.
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events recorded.37' The Sanders court rejected this argument, reason-
ing that "[tlhe printouts themselves may have been made in prepara-
tion for litigation, but the data contained in the printouts was not so
prepared. 372
This view regarding the contemporaneity of computer printouts is
the only realistic position. As the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit has noted: "It would restrict the admissibility of
computerized records too severely to hold that the computer product,
as well as the input upon which it is based, must be produced at or
within a reasonable time after each act or transaction to which it
relates., 3
73
In one respect, however, it appears that the Sanders court would
unduly restrict the qualification of computer printouts as business
records. In dicta, this court stated that it would not allow printouts to
qualify as business records if the computer selectively compiled only
some of the relevant information stored.374 In such an instance, ac-
cording to the Sanders court, the printouts would become summaries
and ineligible to qualify as records of regularly conducted activity. 375
The extent to which selective retrieval of data stored in a computer
affects admissibility of computer-generated data is an issue likely to
arise in more health care fraud prosecutions because it is one of the
major ways computer-generated evidence is employed in these prose-
cutions. These prosecutions indicate that computer-generated evi-
dence is used in two ways: to calculate the amount of monetary loss
attributable to the defendant 376 and to compare billing practices of the
defendant to peer providers.377 Peer group comparisons are created
371. Id. Defendants in other reported health care fraud prosecutions raised this
same argument. See United States v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228, 1240 (6th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1157 (1974); People v. Weinberg, 586 N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (App. Div.
1992).
372. Sanders, 749 F.2d at 198.
373. Russo, 480 F.2d at 1240.
374. Sanders, 749 F.2d at 199.
375. Id. The court rejected the defendant's argument that the computer-generated
evidence became summaries, disagreeing with the defendant's view of the facts. The
court found that the computer printout was not a "selective compilation of random
pieces of data stored in [the computers] but was instead a complete list of all informa-
tion ... relating to [the defendant's] claims." Id. Because the printout included all
such information, the court found that the printout did not transform from "business
records into summary evidence." Id. at 199. This brief deference seems to imply that
computer prints are either seen as business records or summary evidence.
376. Cases where computer-generated evidence was introduced as the calculation
of monetary loss attributable to the defendant include: People v. Weinberg, 586
N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (App. Div. 1992); State v. Vogelsong, 612 N.E.2d 462, 464 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1992).
377. Cases where computer-generated evidence was introduced to compare the de-
fendant to peer providers and to permit inferences regarding guilt or knowledge in-
clude: United States v. Johnson, 634 F.2d 735, 736 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 907 (1981); United States v. Seelig, 622 F.2d 207, 214-15 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 869 (1980); United States v. Halper, 590 F.2d 422, 426 (2d Cir. 1978); United
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by selectively retrieving some of the data stored in a computer. Only
providers similar to the defendant-provider should be included in a
peer group comparison, 37 8 and typically, only data regarding a few
procedures performed by the providers is included. 37 9 A peer group
comparison selects some of the data among all available and reorgan-
izes it, thus constituting a summary in the eyes of the Sanders court,
and for that reason, may fail to qualify as a business record under
803(6).38 0 The Sanders court's either/or choice is not necessary. Peer
group comparisons are both summaries and business records. As long
as the data is put into the computer, the process of inputting and the
use made of such data qualifies the data as a business record, and it
should not matter whether the computer printout reproduces all data
in the computer or selectively reproduces some of it. In either case,
the printout is a business record.
c. Public Records and Reports
In only one reported health care fraud prosecution did the propo-
nent of computer-generated evidence attempt to admit such evidence
as a public record exception to hearsay.38' Such minimal reliance on
this hearsay exception is consistent with the overall trend in com-
States v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228, 1234-37 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1157
1974); State v. American Medical Ctrs., Ltd., 324 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Mich. Ct. App.
1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1009 (1983); State v. Venman, 564 A.2d 574, 576 (Vt.
1989). Proponents of computer-generated evidence for use as peer group compari-
sons were successful in obtaining admission of such evidence in all cases except Seelig,
622 F.2d at 214-15.
378. The court in Seelig discussed this need for similarity when it reversed the con-
viction of a pharmacist:
Appellants object to the admission of exhibit 213, which purportedly is a
sales comparison chart ... comparing the sales of [controlled substances]
with eight other pharmacies allegedly comparable in size, location, and
volume .....
The admission of the sales comparison chart was error .... There was no
attempt to compare the stores in terms of total sales .... [The authenticat-
ing witness] did not know if [the] allegedly comparable stores operated the
same hours .... The record does not show these other stores were the same
size, covered the same marketing area, were open the same hours, had phar-
macist's on duty at all times, had the same access to the public, or, more
importantly, charged the same prices-all of which could have significantly
affected the volume of sales. Thus, the sales comparison chart is simply irrel-
evant for failure to establish the comparability of the other stores.
622 F.2d at 214-15.
379. See, e.g., Russo, 480 F.2d at 1236 (showing that testimony of witness concerned
only five medical procedures out of the total number identified in the prosecution).
380. See United States v. Sanders, 749 F.2d 195, 199 (5th Cir. 1984) (implying that if
the computer-generated evidence had been a "selective compilation" rather than a
"complete listing of all information," it may not have qualified as a summary admissi-
ble under FRE 1006).
381. State v. Vogelsong, 612 N.E.2d 462 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
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puter-generated evidence.3  Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) pro-
vides a hearsay exception for data compilations that set forth:
- the activities of the office or agency;
- matters observed pursuant to a duty imposed by law (excluding
matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement
personnel); or
- factual findings, in civil actions and proceedings and against the
Government in criminal cases, resulting from an investigation
made pursuant to authority generated by law.383
Each of the above are admissible "unless the sources of information
or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. 384
In State v. Vogelsong,3 85 where a pharmacy and pharmacist were
convicted of Medicaid fraud, computer-generated evidence showing
the total monetary loss caused by the defendants' activity was admit-
ted by the trial court.3 86 The appellate court reversed the conviction
in part, because the government as proponent of this evidence failed
to lay sufficient foundation to qualify the computer evidence as public
records under 803(8).387 Despite the testimony from the custodian of
record that this information was "authorized by law to be recorded or
filed" by the Ohio Department of Human Services, the court found
that "there is no contention that [this exhibit] is ... a report ... re-
quired to be made by law. ' 38 8 Given such testimony, it would appear
that these records were public records and that the court's ruling is
unsubstantiated.
Nevertheless, qualifying computer-generated evidence as a public
record in health care fraud prosecutions may be problematic.
Although many records regarding Medicare and Medicaid are re-
quired to be kept by law, the two types of computer-generated evi-
dence used thus far in health care fraud prosecutions (calculation of
monetary loss occasioned by defendant's conduct and peer group
comparisons) may not be specifically required.389 In addition, if the
prosecution involves fraud upon private insurers, the Medicare and
Medicaid mandates regarding record keeping would not apply. Also,
the hybrid nature of white collar crimes in general and health care
fraud in particular may render Rule 803(8) difficult to apply. Many, if
not most, criminal investigations into health care fraud are initiated or
assisted by regulatory agencies. The employees of these agencies are
not "law enforcement personnel" yet are engaged in "criminal cases."
382. Johnson, supra note 324, at 462 ("Far fewer published cases discuss computer-
generated public records than discuss computer-generated business records.").
383. Fed. R. Evid. 803(8).
384. See supra note 354 for the full text of Fed. R. Evid. 803(8).
385. Vogelsong, 612 N.E.2d at 462.
386. Id. at 464.
387. Id. at 464-65.
388. Id. at 465.
389. See infra text and accompanying note 513.
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The drafters of Rule 803(8) apparently did not anticipate this blending
of civil and criminal government resources because Rule 803(8) ex-
cludes from records eligible for admission pursuant to its provisions
"matters observed by... law enforcement personnel.., in criminal
cases." 39° Thus, the question arises: Are data compilations designed
and prepared by non-law enforcement personnel within this exclusion
if generated for a criminal case?
D. Conclusion
Patient medical files, provider manuals, and claim and billing data,
often computer-generated, are the three major types of documents
used in health care fraud prosecutions. Each presents unique eviden-
tiary problems, in part because each is more commonly used in civil
cases than in criminal. Patient medical charts, containing hearsay
from numerous sources, routinely overcome a hearsay objection as a
non-hearsay statement by the defendant or as records of a regularly
conducted activity. In some prosecutions of health care fraud, how-
ever, admission of patient charts has been problematic, sometimes
even leading to reversals. Patient charts are unreliable for proving
health care fraud for two reasons. The relevant information (listing of
each service or procedure performed) may not be accurately re-
corded, even in legitimate clinics, if it is not relevant to diagnosis and
treatment. Second, the fraud itself may create the incentive to falsify
medical records. Provider manuals also present problems because of
the haphazard way these manuals are created, updated and communi-
cated to providers. Claims and billing data, especially when generated
by computers, are susceptible to human and mechanical error. Rigor-
ous compliance with authentication rules should be required before
such evidence is admitted. Because claims for payment originate with
defendants and are processed by insurers in their course of regular
business activity, claims data should easily overcome any hearsay
objection.
Adjustments in criminal rules of procedure are necessary, however,
if health care fraud prosecutions are to be litigated fairly. For exam-
ple, depositions or interrogatories should be permitted of witnesses
who will authenticate computer-generated evidence at trial. Only in
this way are opponents of such evidence ensured of their right of con-
frontation through cross examination. Expanding pretrial discovery in
this limited manner may also streamline in-court presentation of evi-
dence and facilitate stipulations by the parties.
VI. SEARCHES
No type of evidence better demonstrates the hybrid criminallcivil
nature of white collar crime than evidence obtained by search war-
390. Fed. R. Evid. 803(8).
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rants. Issued by a neutral and detached magistrate upon a finding of
probable cause,391 and executed by law enforcement personnel to
search and seize evidence and instruments of a crime, search warrants
are a prototypical criminal investigative tool. As the reported health
care fraud prosecutions show, however, the courts have struggled with
establishing search and seizure doctrines when confronted with search
warrants in the nontypical white collar criminal case.
In thirteen percent (forty-eight) of the reported health care fraud
prosecutions, evidence was obtained by searches. 3" This is a surpris-
ingly high percentage given the fact that evidence can be obtained
more easily through grand jury subpoenas 393 or civil investigative de-
mands ("CIDs"),394 both of which may be issued without a showing of
probable cause and without prior presentation to a court.3 5 There
391. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) ("The point of the
Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it de-
nies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw
from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.").
392. See supra chart 4 & infra appendix IV.
393. Sara S. Beale & William C. Bryson, Grand Jury Law and Practice § 6:09 (1986)
("Most evidence that is presented to the grand jury is obtained by use of the subpoena
power.").
394. See Anthony J. McFarland, The Civil Investigative Demand: A Constitutional
Analysis and Model Proposal, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 1451, 1451 (1980) (describing a civil
investigative demand as a mandatory process used by both state and federal prosecu-
tors in the precomplaint stage of litigation). McFarland also notes that prosecutors
use civil investigative demands (CIDs) to determine if a violation of law has occurred
and whether additional investigation is necessary. Id. A CID may require either the
production of documentary material for inspection, copying, or reproduction; comple-
tion of interrogatories; or the giving oral testimony. Id. at 1452.
A CID may be issued only if (1) the CID complies with the requirements of the
statute which provides for the CID; (2) the scope of the demand is limited; (3) the
demand is for material deemed relevant; (4) the material is adequately described, and
(5) there is judicial review of the CID. Id. at 1466.
There are a number of federal statutes that provide for civil investigative demands.
See, e.g., False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3733 (1994) (giving the Attorney General the
power to make civil investigative demands in investigating false claims); Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1968 (1984) (giving the Attor-
ney General the power to make CIDs in investigating RICO offenses); 15 U.S.C.
§ 1312 (1984) (giving the Attorney General or Assistant Attorney General in charge
of the Antitrust Division the power to issue CIDs in Antitrust investigations); see also
Richard L. Perry & William Simon, The Civil Investigative Demand: New Fact-Find-
ing Powers For The Antitrust Division, 58 Mich. L. Rev. 855, 856-57 (1960) (describing
the presentation to Congress of two bills authorizing the Attorney General to obtain
documents by means of CIDs and to maintain a permanent library of such documents,
administered by a "Documents Custodian").
395. See United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991) (describing
the broad powers of the grand jury). As the court noted:
[T]he grand jury "can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being
violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not . . . ." The
function of the grand jury is to inquire into all information that might possi-
bly bear on its investigation until it has identified an offense or has satisfied
itself that none has occurred ....
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may be several reasons for the popularity of search warrants: concern
by investigators that records or other evidence will be destroyed or
altered if a defendant or target of an investigation is forewarned by a
subpoena or CID; the unavailability of a sitting grand jury in some
jurisdictions;396 or the desire by investigators to avoid the disclosure
prohibitions that attach to grand jury material.397 This latter reason
may be of increasing concern as law enforcement agencies work more
with civil auditors or other investigators who may not be eligible for
grand jury disclosure.398 Case law has also evolved, making search
warrants more useful in complex criminal cases. Until the last few
decades, search warrants were not available for seizure of "mere evi-
dence;" they could be used only to seize "contraband and instrumen-
talities of a crime. '399 Since the Supreme Court decisions in Warden
v. Hayden4° and Andresen v. Maryland,"1 however, search warrants
may be employed to seize "mere evidence," such as the documents
needed to investigate white collar crimes.40 2
A grand jury subpoena is thus much different from a subpoena issued in
the context of a prospective criminal trial, where a specific offense has been
identified and a particular defendant charged .... [T]he Government can-
not be required to justify the issuance of a grand jury subpoena by present-
ing evidence sufficient to establish probable cause because the very purpose
of requesting the information is to ascertain whether probable cause exists.
Id. (citations omitted).
396. See Beale & Bryson, supra note 393, §§ 1.05-.06 (discussing availability of
grand juries in state and federal systems).
397. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6 (e)(2) provides that: "A grand juror, an interpreter, a ste-
nographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testi-
mony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made [in
the grand jury proceedings] ... shall not disclose matters occurring before the grand
jury ...... See Larouche v. United States Dep't of Justice, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9412, at *9 (D.D.C June 25, 1993); In re Grand Jury Matter, 516 F. Supp. 27, 27-28
(E.D. Pa. 1981).
Although Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) allows disclosure to government attorneys
and personnel "as are deemed necessary ... to assist an attorney for the government,"
this disclosure may not be broad enough to include all persons the government attor-
ney deems necessary to fully assist the attorney. See LaRouche, 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9412, at *11-12; see also In re Grand Jury Matter, 516 F. Supp. at 28 (finding
that a county official is not within the disclosure rule because she is not an "attorney
for the government").
398. Health care fraud task forces, coordinated through United States Attorneys
and comprised of agents from multiple federal and state agencies are being formed
throughout the United States to better investigate, deter and prosecute health care
fraud. See Rhonda L. Rundle & Amy Stevens, Investigators Intensify Crackdown on
Fraud in the Health Industry, Wall St. J., Aug. 16, 1993, at Al; cf Nationvide Hospital
Investigation Seeks Data on Non-FDA Approved Devices, 3 Health L Rep. (BNA), at
836-37 (June 23, 1994) (discussing HHS's investigation, by administrative subpoenas,
of hospitals nationwide).
399. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 557 (1978) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P.
41).
400. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
401. 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
402. United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue, 113 S. Ct. 1126, 1133 (1993).
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Almost every search in the reported health care fraud prosecutions
was of a health care provider's office and almost every seizure was of
patient and billing records. As chart 7 reveals, the searches were chal-
lenged on a number of grounds. This section will discuss the following
three grounds: particularity and overbreadth;40 3 improper use of ad-
ministrative search warrants in criminal investigations;4 " and, use of
private individuals to conduct searches for the government. 40 5
403. See infra part VI.A.
404. See infra part VI.B.
405. See infra part VI.C.
A variety of other search and seizure issues were raised in the reported health care
prosecutions. See, e.g., United States v. Hooshmand, 931 F.2d 725, 735 (11th Cir.
1991) (raising issue of staleness); United States v. Dino, 919 F.2d 72, 75-76 (8th Cir.
1990) (raising issue of consent), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 50 (1991); United States v.
Kaplan, 895 F.2d 618, 622-23 (9th Cir. 1990) (raising issue of consent); United States
v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847, 856-57 (1st Cir. 1982) (discussing privilege against self-
incrimination); United States v. Cella, 568 F.2d 1266, 1278-84 (9th Cir. 1990) (raising
issue of standing); United States v. Warren, 453 F.2d 738, 742-43 (2d Cir.) (analyzing
issue of probable cause and discussing privilege against self-incrimination), cert. de-
nied, 406 U.S. 944 (1972); United States v. Lindenfeld, 142 F.2d 829, 831-32 (2d Cir.)
(discussing scope of search incident to arrest), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 761 (1944);
United States v. Colletta, 602 F. Supp. 1322, 1327 (E.D. Pa.) (discussing the patient-
physician privilege), aff'd, 770 F.2d 1076 (3d Cir. 1985); People v. Slocum, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 442, 447-48 (Ct. App.) (discussing the securing of premises while awaiting a
warrant), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 924 (1976); People v. Ekong, 582 N.E.2d 233, 234-36
(Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (discussing patient-physician privilege); Commonwealth v. Slaton,
608 A.2d 5, 6-10 (Pa. 1992) (raising issue of consent); Commonwealth v. West, 396
A.2d 380, 383 (Pa. 1978) (raising issue of consent); Sorce v. State, 736 S.W.2d 851, 858
(Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (analyzing the sufficiency of probable cause); State v. Dorn, 496
A.2d 451, 458 (Vt. 1985) (analyzing the sufficiency of probable cause).
Although this Article does not discuss the issue of staleness, the Hooshmand deci-
sion suggests that it is not an impediment to finding probable cause in health care
prosecutions. The court held that although the information was 11 months old, prob-
able cause was shown. 931 F.2d at 735. According to the court, "When the alleged
criminal activity is ongoing ... it is unlikely that the passage of time will dissipate
probable cause." Id.
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CHART 7: GROUNDS FOR CHALLENGING SEARCHES MADE IN
HEALTH CARE FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS
Total Cases in %Vhirh
Number Dcfendant Was
Grounds of Cases Successful
Lack of Particularity 4 0 6  10 1
Sufficiency of Probable Cause4 0 7  9 0
Governmental v. Private Party Search4 0 8  7 0
Improper Use of Administrative Warrant4 0 9  5 0
Lack of Voluntary Consent 4 1 0  4 1
Violation of Fifth Amendment Privilege4 1 1  3 0
Violation of Patient-Provider Privilege 4 12  2 0
Staleness of Probable Cause4 13  2 0
Improper Scope of Search Incident to Arrest4 14  1 0
Improper Securing of Premises 4 15  1 0
406. See Hooshmand, 931 F.2d at 735-36; United States v. Lamport, 787 F.2d 474,
476 (10th Cir.), cerL denied, 479 U.S. 846 (1986); Hershenow, 680 F.2d at 850-52;
United States v. Abrams, 615 F.2d 541, 543 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Hughes,
823 F. Supp. 593, 604 (N.D. Ind. 1993); State v. Hughes, 433 So. 2d 88, 93 (La. 1983);
State v. Ruud, 259 N.W.2d 567, 572 (Minn. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978);
State v. Burnett, 556 A.2d 1251, 1253 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989); Dorn, 496
A.2d at 458; State v. DeSmidt, 454 N.W.2d 780, 789 (Wis. 1990).
407. See United States v. Leichtling, 684 F.2d 553, 555-56 (8th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1201 (1983); Warren, 453 F.2d at 742; Hughes, 823 F. Supp. at 598-
600; Slocum, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 448-49; Ruud, 259 N.W.2d at 572; Burnett, 556 A.2d at
1253; Sorce, 736 S.W.2d at 858; Dorn, 496 A.2d at 459; DeSinidt, 454 N.W.2d at 785-
86.
408. See United States v. Miller, 800 F.2d 129, 133-35 (7th Cir. 1986); United States
v. Lamport, 787 F.2d 474, 475-76 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 846 (1986);
Hershenow, 680 F.2d at 854-55; United States v. Ziperstein, 601 F.2d 281, 288-90 (7th
Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1031 (1980); Celia, 568 F.2d at 1282-84; United States
v. Mekjian, 505 F.2d 1320, 1326-28 (5th Cir. 1975); cf. Slocum, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 446-47
(officer's probable cause derived mostly from information supplied by his nurse, a
private party).
409. See United States v. Nechy, 827 F.2d 1161, 1164 (7th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Brown, 763 F.2d 984, 986-87 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 905 (1985); Leichding,
684 F.2d at 555; United States v. Voorhies, 663 F.2d 30, 31 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 929 (1982); Commonwealth v. Slaton, 608 A.2d 5, 6 (Pa. 1992).
410. See United States v. Dino, 919 F.2d 72, 75-76 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 50 (1991); United States v. Kaplan, 895 F.2d 618, 622 (9th Cir. 1990); Slaton, 608
A.2d at 7; Commonwealth v. \Vest, 396 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978).
411. See United States v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847, 855 (1st Cir. 1982); United
States v. Warren, 453 F.2d 738, 742 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 944 (1972); United
States v. Colletta, 602 F. Supp. 1322, 1326 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 770 F.2d 1076 (3d Cir.
1985).
412. See Colletta, 602 F. Supp. at 1326; People v. Ekong, 582 N.E.2d 233, 234 (II1.
App. Ct. 1991).
413. See United States v. Hooshmand, 931 F.2d 725, 735 (11th Cir. 1991): State v.
Burnett, 556 A.2d 1251, 1253 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).
414. See United States v. Lindenfeld, 142 F.2d 829, 832 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 761 (1944).
415. See People v. Slocum, 125 Cal. Rptr. 442, 448 (Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 924 (1976).
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The defendants did not enjoy much success in challenging the
searches and seizures. Suppression of seized evidence was obtained in
only four percent (two) of the cases where evidence was obtained
through a search.416 Undoubtedly, this sample of health care fraud
cases does not accurately reflect defendants' true rate of success in
suppressing evidence obtained by searches because the government
often dismisses a case after its evidence has been suppressed 417 and
thus such a case would not be included in the sample of cases studied
herein. While recognizing this probable sample bias, it is still helpful
to examine the search and seizure issues raised in the reported health
care fraud prosecutions and how the courts resolved them.
A. Particularity and Overbreadth in Search Warrants
A common challenge made by defendants to evidence seized during
the health care fraud investigations was that the search warrant's de-
scription of evidence to be seized was not sufficiently particular. 418
The Fourth Amendment provides that "no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause ... and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. ' 419 According to the
Supreme Court, "[N]othing is left to the discretion of the officer exe-
cuting the warrant."4 ' If probable cause truly exists for a search, par-
ticularly describing the items to be seized should not be difficult. In a
drug investigation, for example, the government should be able to list,
in the search warrant, the types of drugs its agents expect to find.
Similarly, in an investigation for receipt of a shipment of stolen prop-
erty, if probable cause truly exists, the government should be able to
specify the property its agents expect to find. In each of these cases,
as in most criminal cases, the particularity requirement flows naturally
from the probable cause. In white collar criminal cases, however,
where voluminous documents of a complex fraud are to be seized, it is
not always possible to describe particularly the items to be seized even
when clear and strong probable cause exists to believe evidence of a
crime will be found. As noted by Judge Campbell of the First Circuit:
416. See United States v. Abrams, 615 F.2d 541,550 (lst Cir. 1980); Commonwealth
v. Slaton, 608 A.2d 5, 10 (Pa. 1992).
417. Cf. U.S. Dep't of Justice, The Dep't of Justice Manual 2 § 1.000 (1994) (provid-
ing Solicitor General with power to determine which cases will be appealed).
418. The defendants challenged search warrants on grounds of particularity in the
following cases: United States v. Hooshmand, 931 F.2d 725, 735-36 (11th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847, 850-51 (1st Cir. 1982); Abrams, 615 F.2d at
543; United States v. Hughes, 823 F. Supp. 593, 602-03 (N.D. Ind. 1993); State v.
Hughes, 433 So. 2d 88, 91-92 (La. 1983); State v. Burnett, 556 A.2d 1251, 1253-54 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989); State v. Dorn, 496 A.2d 451, 458-59 (Vt. 1985); State v.
DeSmidt, 454 N.W.2d 780, 783-84 (Wis. 1990). The courts rejected the defendants'
challenges in every case except Abrams, 615 F.2d at 543.
419. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
420. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927).
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[N]eed for particularization gives rise to a dilemma in fraud investi-
gations. The investigators usually do not, and often cannot, know in
advance precisely what they will find when they search through files
pursuant to a warrant.4 2 '
The discussions by several of the courts confronting the particular-
ity issue in health care fraud prosecutions are illustrative. United
States v. Abrams42 2 is one of the few reported health care fraud prose-
cutions where evidence was suppressed because of the government's
failure to particularly describe the items to be seized. The First Cir-
cuit affirmed the trial court's suppression of Medicaid records that had
been seized pursuant to a search warrant executed at the defendant's
medical office.42 The warrant authorized seizure of "certain business
and billing and medical records of patients... which show actual med-
ical services performed and fraudulent services claimed to have been
performed. 42 4 The First Circuit held that this description was insuffi-
ciently particular.4'
The Abrams court offered two alternatives to relaxing the particu-
larity requirement in complex fraud cases, neither of which appears
feasible. First, the court suggested that officers be instructed to seize
only the files in which the billing records revealed fraud.426 Presuma-
bly in this way the officers could comply with the search warrant's
description of records. This suggestion is not workable in most fraud
cases because, as noted, the fraud rarely will be apparent from a sim-
ple or quick on-site examination. Generally, a comparison of multiple
documents is necessary to determine whether fraud has occurred.
Such an examination can be extremely time consuming, and may need
to be conducted by experts in a location of privacy.427 Creating these
conditions at a target's place of business during the execution of a
search warrant would be disruptive, if even possible. The second sug-
gestion by the Abrams court, more implicit than the first, is that the
government should use subpoenas rather than search warrants.42
This suggestion ignores the fact that there are advantages to both par-
421. Abrams, 615 F.2d at 548 (Campbell J., concurring). In Andresen v. Maryland,
427 U.S. 463 (1976), the Supreme Court noted that:
The complexity of an illegal scheme may not be used as a shield to avoid
detection when the State has demonstrated probable cause to believe that a
crime has been committed and probable cause to believe that evidence of
this crime is in the suspect's possession.
Id. at 481 n.10.
422. 615 F.2d 541.
423. Id. at 542.
424. Id. at 546-47.
425. Id. at 547.
426. Id. at 545-46.
427. See United States v. Hughes, 823 F. Supp. 593, 602-05 (N.D. Ind. 1993).
428. 615 F.2d at 547 ("In a case involving the detailed examination of voluminous
business records of a person being investigated for possible criminal activity, the usual
method for obtaining such records is by subpoena.").
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ties when evidence is obtained with a search warrant. A defendant is
guaranteed a showing of probable cause before a neutral and de-
tached magistrate with a search warrant.4 29 The government is guar-
anteed security from destruction or alteration of documents as well as
flexibility from the grand jury disclosure prohibitions. 30
In contrast to Abrams are decisions in health care fraud cases from
eight other federal and state courts.431 State v. Hughes432 typifies the
approach taken by these courts. The defendants, dentists, were in-
dicted on fraud charges arising from inflated bills they submitted to
insurers for services rendered to patients. During the investigation
that preceded the filing of charges, the government executed a search
warrant at the defendants' dental office, seizing patient treatment
records, insurance claim forms, laboratory work orders, daily ledger
sheets, and fee schedules.433 The defendants challenged this search on
the ground that the description of the items to be seized was insuffi-
ciently particular. The Supreme Court of Louisiana began its analysis
by noting that "the particularity requirement must be applied with a
practical margin of flexibility. '4 34 After discussing the difficulties of
investigating complex white collar crimes, the court noted that "a
careful balance must be struck between the need for particularity and
the need for the known documents in business record seizure situa-
tions. ' 435 Finding that the "facts... in the... affidavit clearly indicate
a pervasive scheme to defraud at the dental clinic, ' 436 the court held
that the warrant met the Fourth Amendment's particularity
requirement.437
The approach of the Hughes court is more appropriate than that of
the Abrams court. By requiring the government to show probable
cause that a crime was committed, that the defendant's business was
permeated with fraud, and that the records generically described in
the warrant were relevant to the suspected fraud, the Hughes court
relaxed Fourth Amendment particularity requirements in an appropri-
429. See supra note 390 and accompanying text.
430. In its comments on use of subpoenas vis A vis search warrants, the Abrams
court acknowledged that "the issue of a subpoena always entails the risk that the
records will be tampered with or even destroyed before they are delivered." 615 F.2d
at 547.
431. See United States v. Hooshmand, 931 F.2d 725,735-36 (11th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Lamport, 787 F.2d 475, 476 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 846 (1986);
United States v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847, 852 (1st Cir. 1982); United States v.
Hughes, 823 F. Supp. 593, 602-04 (N.D. Ind. 1993); State v. Hughes, 433 So. 2d 88, 92(La. 1983); State v. Ruud, 259 N.W.2d 567, 573-74 (Minn. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
996 (1978); State v. Dorn, 496 A.2d 451,458 (Vt. 1985); State v. DeSmidt, 454 N.W.2d
780, 789 (Wis. 1990).
432. Hughes, 433 So. 2d at 88.
433. Id. at 90.
434. Id. at 92.
435. Id.
436. Id. at 91.
437. Id. at 93.
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ate balance between the unique problems encountered in investiga-
tions of white collar crime and the Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness and particularity requirements.
Several of the reported health care fraud prosecutions also ad-
dressed the related issue of overbreadth, which pertains to whether
records not described in the warrant may also be seized. Each of the
courts addressing the issue upheld the seizure of all records taken.4'
State v. DeSmidtI39 exemplifies one approach taken by these courts.
DeSmidt, a dentist charged with medical assistance and insurance
fraud,"' won a pretrial motion to suppress the seizure of business
records and patient files taken from his dental offices pursuant to a
search warrant. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed."' The war-
rant authorized the search and seizure of the following items: "Pa-
tient charts and dental records, recording, among other things,
services actually performed... [and] business records .... ." Pursu-
ant to the warrant, the investigators seized twenty-two boxes of mater-
ials including all of the defendant's business records and patient files
for the six years preceding the search." 3
DeSmidt argued that this seizure should have been limited to
records associated with the specific instances of alleged fraud detailed
in the affidavit.4 " Noting that "in cases involving a complex scheme
to defraud, a criminal investigation may require piecing together, like
a jigsaw puzzle, a number of bits of evidence,""' 5 the court upheld the
seizure.' 4 Key to the court's analysis was the fact that "there was
probable cause to believe [that] Dr. DeSmidt's dental practice was
'permeated with fraud.' "I4 When the fraud is so pervasive, "all the
records of a business may be seized."" 8 Some of the key facts demon-
strating the pervasiveness of DeSmidt's scheme to defraud were: (1)
specific allegations by a credible former employee that the filing of
false claims was a "common practice" performed "routinely"; (2) the
defendant's practice of filing false claims extended to private insur-
438. See, e.g., United States v. Hooshmand, 931 F.2d 725, 736 n.12 (11th Cir. 1991)
(finding appropriate the seizure of patient's files not covered by search warrant be-
cause case involved a "pervasive scheme to defraud"); State v. Dorn, 496 A.2d 451,
459-60 (Vt. 1985) (finding that under the circumstances, the phrase "drug price list-
ings" as defined in the affidavit was sufficiently specific and the evidence was properly
seized); State v. DeSmidt, 454 N.W.2d 780,784-89 (Wis. 1990) (holding that seizure of
all business records may be constitutional even if business is legitimate if all of a
business' records are relevant to a particular crime).
439. DeSmidt, 454 N.W.2d at 780.
440. Id at 783.
441. Id. at 782.
442. Id at 783.
443. Id.
444. Id. at 787.
445. Id. at 786.
446. Id. at 788-89.
447. Id. at 784.
448. Id. at 786.
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ance as well as Medicaid claims; and (3) the defendant was "training"
his employees how to submit false claims. 49
The Vermont Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion, but with
different reasoning in State v. Dorn.45° Dorn, a pharmacist convicted
of Medicaid fraud,451 sought suppression of non-Medicaid prescrip-
tions seized pursuant to a search warrant authorizing the search and
seizure of "prescriptions and prescription records for Medicaid recipi-
ents. '45 2 Acknowledging that the officers exceeded the scope of the
items listed in the warrant, the court nevertheless held that the non-
Medicaid prescriptions were properly seized as a "plain view" excep-
tion to the warrant requirement. In collecting the Medicaid prescrip-
tions authorized in the warrant, the seizing officers noticed that
Medicaid and non-Medicaid patients had been charged different
prices for the same item. According to the court, the officers then had
probable cause to believe that another fraud upon private insurers
had been committed. Because the non-Medicaid records were evi-
dence of this crime, they were properly seized.453
Few searches in white collar cases will meet Dorn's standard. Two
facts were present in Dorn that may not occur in many white collar
criminal investigations. First, and less significant, the agents in Dorn
gained access to the documents not described in the warrant while
searching for the documents that were described.454 Such commin-
gling of documents may occur in health care fraud prosecutions, as
when all patient charts are jointly filed, but such commingling is not
likely in all white collar cases or even in all health care fraud prosecu-
tions. The second fact is more significant. In Dorn, the agents were
able to determine, from a cursory look at records not listed in the
search warrant, that the records were evidence of a fraud additional to
the one they were investigating.455 The ability to determine that addi-
tional frauds are being committed from such a cursory examination is
unusual and will not occur in many white collar criminal cases.45 6
Thus, the more common rationale for sanctioning the seizure of addi-
449. Id. at 788.
450. 496 A.2d 451 (Vt. 1985).
451. Id. at 453
452. Id. at 457.
453. Id. at 459.
454. Id. at 459 ("In order to carry out the search, the officers had to look at the
various documents within each box in which the records were kept. 'In searches for
papers, it is certain that some innocuous documents will be examined, at least curso-
rily, in order to determine whether they are, in fact, among those papers authorized to
be seized.'" (quoting Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976))).
455. Id. at 459 ("The [trial] court ... found that the officers realized, in sorting the
prescriptions, that Medicaid and non-Medicaid customers had been charged different
prices for identical items. At that time, the court held, the officers had probable cause
to believe a crime had been committed, of which the non-Medicaid records consti-
tuted evidence.").
456. See, e.g., United States v. Hughes, 823 F. Supp. 593, 604 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (rul-
ing that seizure of all records and pacemakers from defendant's office was proper,
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tional records to those listed in a search warrant is that offered by the
court in DeSmidt: in complex cases where there is probable cause to
believe a business is "permeated with fraud," 45 the Fourth Amend-
ment permits seizure of more records than those listed in a warrant.
In conclusion, the reported health care fraud prosecutions reveal
the courts' struggle to fit sophisticated crimes into established Fourth
Amendment doctrine. Most of these courts, as shown in the Hughes,
DeSmidt and Dorn cases, have relaxed Fourth Amendment particular-
ity requirements to accommodate the realities of investigations of so-
phisticated crimes. They have done so appropriately and consistently
with constitutional requirements. The Fourth Amendment requires
only reasonable searches." In complex fraud cases, however, it is not
reasonable to require the government to fully describe a crime until
far into an investigation. It is reasonable to expect the government to
describe generally the records that are relevant to a suspected crime
and to permit seizure of more records than those described in the war-
rant only upon a showing of pervasive fraud. Relaxing the particular-
ity requirement is not abandoning Fourth Amendment protection; the
government must still demonstrate probable cause to believe that a
crime has been committed and that documents which are evidence of
this crime will be found in the place to be searched. Further, if the
government seizes more documents than are described in the warrant,
even though not all such documents and items would be evidence of fraud). The
court also noted:
The business records and documentation in the alleged criminal scheme also
militates against specificity insofar as it would not be readily apparent to the
investigating officers which documents were legitimate and which were those
used to effectuate the alleged crimes .... [I]f those executing the search
were to conduct the search of the entire premises, taking the time to ascer-
tain which pacemakers and accompanying documents and business records
were part of the alleged criminal activity, and which were not, the search
could have lasted several days. The underlying supposition is that a whole-
sale seizure of all property of a certain ilk for subsequent filtering and classi-
fication elsewhere is less intrusive and more feasible than an extended police
presence for a substantial period of time upon the premises searched.
Id.
457. 454 N.W.2d 780, 784 (Wis. 1990).
458. U.S. Const. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated .... "). In an excellent article, Professor Tracey Maclin discusses the evolu-
tion of the "reasonableness" standard in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Tracey
Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 197.
201-02. (1993). In particular, Professor Maclin suggests that the Supreme Court's cur-
rent view of "reasonableness," that it simply means that police officers shall not act
irrationally, fails to take into account the history, and current need, to protect citizens
from improper uses of police power. Id. at 201-02. Professor Maclin's review of the
reasonableness standard is helpful here. As the author points out, "Whether a partic-
ular search or seizure is reasonable is generally determined by balancing the compet-
ing interests at stake-the government's interest in effective law enforcement versus
the individual's interest in privacy and personal security." Id. at 199.
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it must show probable cause to believe that there exists a pervasive
scheme to defraud.
B. Administrative Warrants in Criminal Investigations
In traditional criminal law cases, it is well settled that an administra-
tive warrant, with its reduced requirements of probable cause and par-
ticularity, may be used for administrative searches.459 Once an
investigation focuses on criminal liability, however, the full Fourth
Amendment warrant requirements must be met.460 This principle of
law presumes that an investigation is either administrative or criminal
and that it is possible to know which it is. In regulated industries,
however, use of administrative warrants to collect evidence of crimi-
nal conduct is permissible. New York v. BurgerA61 demonstrates this
point. Upholding an administrative search of an automobile junkyard
that yielded evidence of criminal activity, the Supreme Court noted:
"Because the owner or operator of commercial premises in a 'closely
regulated' industry has a reduced expectation of privacy, the warrant
and probable-cause requirements, which fulfill the traditional Fourth
Amendment standard of reasonableness for a government search...
have lessened application in this context." '462 Most white collar crime
occurs in "closely regulated industries." The heavy use of administra-
tive warrants in health care fraud prosecutions exemplifies this.
For example, in United States v. Leichtling,46 3 DEA agents applied
to a federal magistrate to search and seize evidence of suspected drug
offenses from Leichtling's home. The agents executed this warrant
and found incriminating evidence.464 Thereafter, but on the same day,
agents went to Leichtling's dental office with an administrative search
459. Camara v. Municipal Ct. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 537-39 (1967).
460. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 507-08 (1978) (holding that an administrative
warrant is sufficient for fire fighters to obtain if entering premises to perform a rou-
tine investigation of a fire). The court noted, however, that "if the investigating offi-
cials find probable cause to believe that arson has occurred and require further access
to gather evidence for a possible prosecution they may obtain a warrant only upon a
traditional showing of probable cause applicable to searches for evidence of crime."
Id. at 512 (citing United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106-07(1965)).
Subsequent Supreme Court opinions have cast doubt on the firmness of this hold-
ing although none have directly overruled it. In another fire investigation case, for
instance, a majority of the Justices found that no warrant was needed for any investi-
gation that occurs within a reasonable time after the fire. Michigan v. Clifford, 464
U.S. 287, 293 (1984); see also O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725-26 (1987) (con-
sidering the reasonable expectation of privacy and the burdens of requiring a
warrant).
461. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
462. Id. at 702 (citation omitted).
463. 684 F.2d 553, 554 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1201 (1983).
464. Id. at 555 (involving agents who seized two bottles of cocaine from the defend-
ant's bedroom dresser, as well as a scale and one bottle of "cocaine hydrochloride"
from the defendant's automobile which was parked outside his house).
[Vol. 63
HEALTH CARE FRAUD
warrant for dental records, which they seized.465 The records were
used by the government to convict Leichtling of drug offenses. Simi-
larly, in United States v. Voorhies, 6 DEA compliance agents seized
patient medical charts from the defendant's office pursuant to an ad-
ministrative warrant, and later used these records to convict Voorhies
of controlled substance offenses.4 67 Finally, in United States v.
Brown," criminal investigators accompanied auditors who reviewed
Brown's prescription books and records from his pharmacy. Evidence
from this review was used to convict Brown, a pharmacist, of Medi-
caid fraud." 9
In only one of the reported health care fraud prosecutions was the
defendant successful in suppressing evidence on the ground that an
administrative warrant was impermissibly used to gather evidence of a
crime. In Commonwealth v. Slaton,4 70 narcotics agents inspected Sla-
ton's pharmacy three times pursuant to standard administrative in-
spection procedures. They then obtained a search warrant for the
pharmacy.47' During these initial inspections, which were conducted
to investigate one of Slaton's customers, the agents began to suspect
Slaton of illegally distributing controlled substances through forged
prescriptions.472 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that as
soon as they began suspecting Slaton of criminal wrongdoing, the
agents should have obtained either Slaton's consent or a search war-
rants upon a full showing of probable cause and particularity.473 Be-
cause they did not, these improper inspections tainted the search
warrant later properly obtained and necessitated suppression of the
evidence.474 The Slaton court distinguished Burger on the ground that
the agents in Burger were conducting a routine inspection and coinci-
dentally discovered evidence of criminal activity whereas the only pur-
pose of the agents in Slaton was to investigate alleged criminal
activity.475
The presumption in the Slaton opinion is a commendable effort to
sift through Fourth Amendment issues. Its presumption that there is a
clear line dividing civil and criminal investigations, however, is too
rigid for white collar criminal cases. Other cases recognize this. For
example, in United States v. Nechy,476 the United States Court of Ap-
465. Id. at 555 (agents seizing records and samples of the defendant's mouthwash
solutions at the defendant's dental office).
466. 663 F.2d 30 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 929 (1982).
467. Id at 31.
468. 763 F.2d 984, 986 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 905 (1985).
469. Id. at 987.
470. 608 A.2d 5 (Pa. 1992).
471. Id at 6.
472. Id.
473. Id. at 10.
474. Id.
475. Id. at 8.
476. 827 F.2d 1166 (7th Cir. 1987).
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peals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the constitutionality of an admin-
istrative search conducted to gather evidence of criminal wrongdoing
because the defendant's conduct was subject to both criminal and civil
liability. Nechy, also a pharmacist, was convicted of possession with
intent to distribute and distributing controlled substances.477 Evi-
dence used against Nechy in his criminal trial was obtained during a
search conducted by a civil investigator with an administrative search
warrant.478 Nechy argued that the "administrative search had been
merely a subterfuge for obtaining evidence of criminal guilt. '479 Rec-
ognizing that the "ulterior purpose [of the administrative search] was
to obtain evidence of a criminal violation, 480 the court nevertheless
held that the search was proper because of "the elaborate regulatory
system" that permits the government to use both civil and criminal
tools to investigate pharmacies, regardless of which liability ultimately
is attached.48'
Some courts have upheld the use of administrative searches and in-
spections to collect evidence to prove criminal liability on a "consent"
theory.482 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
held in United States v. Brown483 that it is constitutionally permissible
to require a health care provider to agree to reasonable warrantless
inspections of the pharmacy records in exchange for obtaining the
benefits of the Medicaid program.4 4
In conclusion, courts have struggled with the hybrid civil/criminal
nature of white collar crime in ruling on the use of administrative
search warrants to gather evidence of criminal liability. Some courts,
as demonstrated by Slaton,4 85 strive to maintain a bright line between
criminal and civil liability, suppressing evidence in criminal cases ob-
tained through civilly obtained warrants. Other courts, typified by
Nechy,486 recognize the hybrid nature of white collar crime and hold
that it does not matter if civil or criminal investigative methods are
employed when investigating conduct subject to both types of regula-
tion, as long as applicable procedures for the avenue used are met.
An optional analysis is that typified by Brown,487 which does not delve
into the nature of the conduct or investigative method but simply finds
477. Id. at 1163.
478. Id. at 1163-64.
479. Id. at 1164.
480. Id. at 1166.
481. Id.
482. See United States v. Brown, 763 F.2d 984 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 905
(1985); United States v. Griffin, 555 F.2d 1323 (5th Cir. 1977).
483. Brown, 763 F.2d at 984.
484. Id. at 987-88.
485. Commonwealth v. Slaton, 608 A.2d 5 (Pa. 1992).
486. United States v. Nechy, 827 F.2d 1161 (7th Cir. 1987).
487. United States v. Brown, 763 F.2d 984 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 905
(1985).
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consent to searches, both civil and criminal, upon enrolling in govern-
ment programs.
Of the three analyses, the optimal approach is that of the Seventh
Circuit in Nechy because it acknowledges the hybrid character of
white collar crime. At a minimum, the diverse treatment of this issue
suggests that the use of administrative warrants in internal investiga-
tions is an area of law ripe for stronger arguments by the litigants,
especially by the defense, as well as sharper clarification by the courts.
C. Private Party Searches
As the Supreme Court has noted, the Fourth Amendment's prohibi-
tion against unreasonable searches and seizures "proscribes only gov-
ernmental action, and does not apply to a search or seizure, even an
unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an
agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of
any governmental official."'
Six of the health care fraud cases where searches were executed
concern searches conducted by an employee or associate of the de-
fendant." 9 In each case the court found that the search was con-
ducted by a private party and outside the purview of the Fourth
Amendment. The courts did so on two different grounds. United
States v. Celia49 demonstrates one approach. Cella and administra-
tors of hospitals were convicted for submitting false cost reports to
Medicare.49' Some of the government's evidence at trial came from
documents removed by an employee from one of the involved hospi-
tals. At the time this employee removed the records, he had agreed to
supply the government with information about hospital activity but he
had also been told not to remove any documents without being in-
structed to do so.49 Within a week of receiving these directions the
employee removed print shop negatives and paste-ups on his own ac-
488. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(citing Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 467 (1921)).
489. See United States v. Lamport, 787 F.2d 474, 475-76 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 846 (1986); United States v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847,854-56 (1st Cir. 1982);
United States v. Ziperstein, 601 F.2d 281, 288-90 (7th Cir. 1979), cer. denied, 444 U.S.
1031 (1980); United States v. Cella, 568 F.2d 1266, 1271-77 (9th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Mekjian, 505 F.2d 1320, 1323, 1326-28 (5th Cir. 1975); cf People v. Slocum,
125 Cal. Rptr. 442, 447 (Ct. App. 1975) (failing to distinguish private from govern-
mental parties where a private party contributed information to give probable cause
to search the defendant's residence), cerL denied, 426 U.S. 924 (1976).
United States v. Miller, 800 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1986), presents a private party's ac-
cess-to-records issue in another context. The defendant's employee produced the de-
fendant's records pursuant to a subpoena. Id at 132-33. The court considered
whether the employee had sufficient authority over the records to serve as "custo-
dian" for purposes of complying with the subpoena, ultimately finding that he was a
sufficient custodian. Id at 135.
490. 568 F.2d 1266.
491. Id. at 1270.
492. Id. at 1273.
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cord and without instructions to do so.4 93 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit bypassed the question of whether this
employee was acting as a government agent when he took these docu-
ments. Instead, the court found no Fourth Amendment violation on
the ground that the documents were abandoned by the defendant at
the time they were taken because the defendant earlier had instructed
this employee to destroy the records.4 94
In United States v. Ziperstein,4 95 United States v. Mekjian,4 96 and
United States v. Lamport,49 the courts employed a different analysis
of the searches by employees. In each of these cases, employees of
the defendants became suspicious, conducted their own investigations,
including taking possession of records, then contacted law enforce-
ment authorities and turned documents over to the government. In
each of these cases, the crucial question was whether the respective
employees came into possession of the documents through "legitimate
means" and decided to give them to law enforcement officials "on
[their] own volition. ''498 Answering both questions in the affirmative,
the courts in all three cases held that the searches were conducted by
private parties without intervention from the government and thus
were not subject to exclusion under the Fourth Amendment.499
Unlike the issues of particularity and use of administrative war-
rants, the issue of private party searches does not appear to be af-
fected by the fact that a criminal case concerns a white collar crime.
The only unique aspect of private party searches in white collar crimi-
nal cases may be that this issue arises relatively often because insiders
are an essential and frequent source of evidence in fraud cases.5°°
D. Conclusion
Searches, usually of a health care provider's office or home, were
employed in the reported health care fraud prosecutions surprisingly
often, given other available avenues for obtaining evidence. A com-
mon, but unsuccessful, challenge made by defendants against the
searches was that the search warrant did not particularly describe the
items to be seized as required by the Fourth Amendment. The courts
493. Id. at 1273-74.
494. Id. at 1283-84.
495. 601 F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1031 (1980).
496. 505 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1975).
497. 787 F.2d 474 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 846 (1986).
498. Ziperstein, 601 F.2d at 289; cf. Lamport, 787 F.2d at 475-76 (questioning
whether employee acted unilaterally without encouragement by officers); Mekjian,
505 F.2d at 1326-27 (stating that question of admissibility arises only when govern-
ment becomes aware of employee's search and seizure activities).
499. See Lamport, 787 F.2d at 476; Ziperstein, 601 F.2d at 290; Mekjian, 505 F.2d at
1328.
500. See Bucy, Fraud By Fright, supra note 5, at 901, 929-30, 932 (commenting that
insiders are frequent witnesses in proving health care fraud).
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almost uniformly rejected this challenge, holding that particularity re-
quirements should be relaxed in complex cases where investigators
often cannot know in advance exactly what they are searching for. A
potential challenge not raised regularly by defendants, although the
facts would have supported it, is that the use of administrative search
warrants to investigate criminal liability is improper. Three ap-
proaches were taken by the courts where the defendants did raise this
issue: (1) suppression was granted on the ground that civil search war-
rants should not be employed in criminal cases; (2) suppression was
denied on the ground that it is unimportant whether criminal or civil
liability is at stake as long as all requirements for the search are met;
and (3) suppression was denied on the ground that participants in gov-
ernment programs consent to searches as a condition of participation.
A third challenge raised by defendants to searches conducted in the
reported health care fraud prosecutions arose where the search was
conducted by a private party. Although defendants attempted to con-
vince the courts that the search was at the direction of government
agents, they were never successful with this argument.
Thus, examination of defense challenges to searches reveals that
such challenges were almost uniformly unsuccessful. On two issues
especially, interpretation of the particularity requirement and assess-
ing the use of administrative warrants, the courts seemed especially
willing to grant the government flexibility and deference. These
courts cited the unusual nature of white collar crime when doing so.
VII. PRIVILEGE ISSUES
Privilege issues are another common problem encountered in pros-
ecuting health care fraud. In particular, the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination and the existence of the patient-
physician privilege impact both evidentiary issues and prosecutorial
tactics in these cases.
A. Fifth Amendment
The major Fifth Amendment issues arising in health care fraud
prosecutions concern the self-incrimination rights of fictional entities
and the subsequent impact of statements given in parallel or adminis-
trative proceedings. Although a limited Fifth Amendment privilege
may be available in some white collar criminal cases for business
records of some fictional entities, even this limited privilege probably
is not available in health care fraud cases.
Individual health care providers, like other individuals, are entitled
to a Fifth Amendment privilege not to incriminate themselves through
oral statements or testimony.501 Although not entitled to a Fifth
501. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87 (1974) ("It has long been estab-
lished, of course, that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimi-
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Amendment privilege for business records, individual providers are
entitled to a Fifth Amendment privilege for personal records.50 Cor-
porate providers, by comparison, hold no Fifth Amendment privilege
for any records or even any oral statements or testimony by corporate
representatives.5 0 3 In recent years the Supreme Court has carved out
a limited Fifth Amendment privilege applicable in some white collar
criminal cases.5 04 In United States v. Doe50 5 and Braswell v. United
States,5°6 the Supreme Court held that business records of individuals
and sole proprietorships are entitled to a Fifth Amendment privilege
as to the act of producing subpoenaed records.5 7 In some cases, in-
criminating information may be conveyed simply by the act of produc-
ing the required records. The person producing such records testifies
that the records exist, that they are in his or her possession, and that
the records produced are those requested. 8
Realistically, a Fifth Amendment privilege as to the act of produc-
tion may not amount to much, even for individuals or sole proprietors.
The government can easily circumvent the privilege, for instance,
when it issues a subpoena duces tecum to a custodian other than the
sole proprietor,50 9 or when it grants immunity for the act of produc-
tion.510 Nevertheless, whatever protection is otherwise available to in-
dividuals and sole proprietorships for the act of producing
subpoenaed records, the privilege is probably inapplicable to most
health care fraud providers. As noted in United States v. Rosenberg,-"'
in which the court rejected the defendant-physician's assertion of a
Fifth Amendment privilege as to the medical files of his patients:
nation protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and
effects as well as compelled oral testimony.").
502. In both Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409-10 (1976) and Bellis, 417
U.S. at 87, the Supreme Court held that business papers are not entitled to Fifth
Amendment protection, whether in the possession of an individual, Fisher, 425 U.S. at
409-10 & n.11, or a partnership, Bellis, 417 U.S. at 87. In reaching these decisions, the
Supreme Court stressed several factors, including the fact that the records were stored
at the place of business, Bellis, 417 U.S. at 99; that there was no "pre-existing relation-
ship of confidentiality" regarding the records, id. at 101; and that the records were
prepared voluntarily, Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409-10.
503. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 104 (1988); United States v. Doe,
465 U.S. 605, 612-14 (1984); Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409-10.
504. See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 103-04; Bellis, 417 U.S. at 88-90.
505. 465 U.S. 605.
506. 487 U.S. 99.
507. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612-14 (1984); cf. Braswell, 487 U.S. at 104
(stating that while corporations are not protected, individuals are).
508. Doe, 465 U.S. at 613 & n.11.
509. United States v. Radetsky, 535 F.2d 556, 568-69 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 820 (1976), overruled by 921 F.2d 994 (10th Cir. 1990). For an excellent discus-
sion of the act of production privilege, see Peter J. Henning, Testing the Limits of
Investigating and Prosecuting White Collar Crime: How Far Will the Courts Allow
Prosecutors To Go? 54 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 405, 415-39 (1993).
510. Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 116-17 (1988).
511. 515 F.2d 190, 199 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1031 (1975).
[Vol. 63
1994] HEALTH CARE FRAUD 467
"[T]he privilege which exists as to private papers cannot be main-
tained in relation to 'records required by law to be kept. ' ",12 This
holding is particularly important to health care providers seeking the
privilege because both Medicare and Medicaid programs require
providers to maintain certain records and to make them available for
inspections by federal or state investigators.51 3 As such, virtually all
records needed in Medicare or Medicaid fraud investigations will fall
within the required-records exception to the Fifth Amendment.514
The Fifth Amendment privilege may possibly still apply in health care
fraud investigations when non-Medicare or Medicaid records are
sought from an individual or sole proprietor.515 This too is an unlikely
scenario, however, because the private insurers can require access to
records of all registered providers and because the government can
512. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 33 (1948).
513. Medicare providers follow regulations set forth in 42 C.F.R. § 413.20(c) (1993)
(provider of services must "make available ... its fiscal and other records .... "). The
following statute and regulations pertain to Medicaid providers: 42 C.F.R § 431.1
(1993) (establishing state plan requirements for administration of Medicaid by state
agencies); 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(q) (1989) (providing for the creation of a state Medicaid
fraud control unit to protect the program from fraudulent practices); see also 42
U.S.C. § 1396a (a)(27) (1989) (expressing intention that patient records held by Medi-
caid providers be subject to disclosure during a fraud investigation); 42 C.F.R.
§§ 430.88(b)(1), 431.301-.302 (1993) (same).
For example, as noted in In re Rozas Gibson Pharmacy, 382 So. 2d 929 (La. 1980),
pharmacists participating in the Louisiana Medicaid program must sign the following
statement on each claim for Medicaid reimbursement they submit:
I agree to adhere to the published regulations concerning pharmaceutical
payments. I hereby agree to keep such records as are necessary to disclose
fully the extent of services provided to individuals under the state's title XIX
plan and to furnish information regarding any payments claimed for provid-
ing such services as the state agency may request for three years from the
date of service.
Id at 932 (emphasis omitted).
514. Shapiro, 335 U.S. at 33 ("[T]he privilege which exists as to private papers can-
not be maintained in relation to 'records required by law to be kept in order that
there may be suitable information of transactions which are the appropriate subjects
of governmental regulation and the enforcement of restrictions validly estab-
lished.' "); see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Spano), 21 F.3d 226, 228 (8th Cir.
1994) (finding that an individual who keeps records required by law waives Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).
Related to the required records exception to privileges otherwise applicable, there
is the "pervasively regulated industry" exception which allows access to and seizure of
records when a "valid public interest" requires such access. This rationale has over-
come defendant's claims of privilege or privacy interest in records. See, e.g., United
States v. Nechy, 827 F.2d 1161, 1165 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding that defendant's Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was not in-
fringed where government established that the pharmacy handled controlled sub-
stances); United States v. Schiffman, 572 F.2d 1137, 1141 (5th Cir. 1978) (finding that
this exception does not infringe on defendant-pharmacists' Fourth Amendment right
to be free from "unreasonable" searches of his pharmacy); State v. Welch, 624 A.2d
1105, 1110-11 (Vt. 1992) (creating exception overcoming defendant-nurse's assertion
of privacy interest over her own prescription records).
515. See supra text accompanying notes 502-09.
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circumvent the act of production privilege through its designation of
custodian or grants of immunity. 16
Although health care providers are not likely to benefit from the act
of production privilege available in other white collar criminal cases,
providers should be cognizant of their Fifth Amendment rights in both
the civil and administrative arenas because statements made during
these investigations or proceedings could be used against the provid-
ers in subsequent criminal cases. Although no privilege against self-
incrimination exists as to civil or administrative liability, the Fifth
Amendment privilege may be asserted in civil and administrative pro-
ceedings if the information given might incriminate the speaker in fu-
ture criminal proceedings.5 17  Health care providers are subject to
more civil and administrative actions than are most white collar crimi-
nal defendants518 because of close supervision by insurers and civil
lawsuits by private citizens. Because most providers do not see them-
selves as future criminal defendants, they may not have the "street
smarts" of many criminal defendants who recognize the hazard of
speaking to any official about their activities. 19 Weighing against in-
voking the Fifth Amendment privilege in civil or administrative pro-
ceedings is the fact that it is permissible in these proceedings to draw
an adverse inference from the assertion of this privilege. This leaves
the health care provider with a dilemma: invoke the privilege at civil
proceedings and suffer an inference of guilt, or defend by testifying at
the civil proceeding but risk incrimination in possible subsequent
criminal proceedings.
The reported cases reveal that most providers opted in favor of de-
fending themselves at the civil proceeding. In Commonwealth v.
Wu, 52° the decision to speak up at the civil proceeding proved to be
the wrong decision. Wu, a dentist, was convicted for billing the Penn-
sylvania Medicaid program for services he did not perform. The sole
issue on appeal was whether incriminating statements made by the
516. Commonwealth v. Wu, 494 A.2d 7, 9 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (referring to "hap-
less" dentist who made incriminating statements during a civil investigation of his
billing).
517. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973) ("The [Fifth] Amendment ... not
only protects the individual against being involuntarily called as a witness against him-
self in a criminal prosecution but also privileges him not to answer official questions
put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the
answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.").
518. Bucy, Fraud By Fright, supra note 5, at 873-74.
519. The defendant made this argument in Wu, 494 A.2d at 9, where the court ad-
mitted incriminating statements made by the defendant in a prior administrative hear-
ing in the defendant's criminal prosecution for Medicaid fraud: "[T]he argument in
the instant case seems to be that the Commonwealth, under the guise of a 'good faith'
civil investigation, procured incriminating statements from the hapless doctor." Id.
Acknowledging that "[s]o viewed, [the defendant's] failure to assert his rights is un-
derstandable," the court nevertheless found the statements to be voluntarily given
during a good faith civil investigation, and thus admissible. Id.
520. 494 A.2d 7.
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defendant during an administrative investigation could be used
against him at his criminal trial.52' The Superior Court of Penn-
sylvania held that the statements could be used against the defendant
because they were "obtained in the course of a 'good faith' investiga-
tion by a strictly civil state agency. '52 Noting that there was a high
degree of correlation between the state's civil investigative agency and
the criminal investigative unit, such as cross-referrals and sharing of
information, the court nevertheless found that this cooperative rela-
tionship did not negate the "good faith" nature of the civil
investigation. 523
In United States v. Vecchiarello,2 4 the experience of two defendants
convicted on a variety of federal fraud charges for falsely holding
themselves out as physicians also demonstrates the perils of parallel
proceedings. At their criminal trial, highly incriminating depositions
taken of the defendants in a prior civil proceeding were admitted.52 5
Neither defendant could recall the names of professors, courses, text-
books, classmates or roommates from their days in medical school.
One defendant was unable to translate his alleged medical school di-
ploma from Spanish to English even though all courses at this alleged
medical school were taught in Spanish.526 The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia rejected the defendants' claim that their Fifth
Amendment rights were violated by the introduction of these deposi-
tions, noting that had the defendants wanted to claim their Fifth
Amendment privilege in the civil trial, they should have done so. 52
Similarly, in State v. Carr,52 8 a pharmacist admitted during a civil audit
that he had billed for prescriptions that had not been prescribed be-
cause some of his low-income customers needed more monthly pre-
scriptions than Medicaid would pay for.529 These statements were
used by the government against the pharmacist in a subsequent crimi-
nal prosecution.530
Because business records will be sought in health care fraud investi-
gations and because these records are not protected by the privilege
against self-incrimination, the Fifth Amendment privilege will not ap-
ply to records sought in health care fraud investigations, with one pos-
521. Id. at 8. The statements made by the defendant during the civil investigation
included the defendant's acknowledgement that he prepared or reviewed all billings
generated from his dental office. Additionally, the defendant wrote a letter which
accompanied and explained certain records he was supplying to the civil investigator.
Id
522. Id. at 9.
523. Id at 9 n.3.
524. United States v. Vecchiarello, 569 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
525. Id. at 664.
526. Id.
527. Id
528. 861 S.W.2d 850 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).
529. Id. at 853.
530. Id.
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sible exception. The privilege against self-incrimination is available to
individuals and sole proprietors for the act of producing subpoenaed
records. Health care providers practicing as individuals or sole propri-
etors, however, should not take comfort in this limited application of
the Fifth Amendment privilege. Medicare and Medicaid and most
private insurers require providers billing them to waive all privileges
and permit access to records. In addition, the government can circum-
vent the act of production privilege through its selection of a custo-
dian of record or by granting immunity to the custodian.
Because of the potential overlap in criminal, civil and administra-
tive actions facing health care providers, non-corporate health care
providers who retain their personal privilege not to incriminate them-
selves through their own testimony should consider invoking this priv-
ilege in civil or administrative proceedings where they may be called
to testify. Although inviting an adverse inference from invocation of
this privilege in the civil or administrative matter, doing so may pre-
vent statements made from being used against the provider in subse-
quent criminal proceedings.
B. Patient-Physician Privilege
Often in health care fraud cases, medical information about patients
is needed to prove the fraud. Such information is relevant to showing
that services were not performed, that different services were per-
formed than were billed, that reported costs have been inflated, that
unnecessary services were rendered, or that necessary services were
not rendered. In addition, to determine whether patterns of fraud ex-
ist, it is often necessary to review files of a provider's patients where
fraud is not suspected. 3' Once patient medical files are sought, issues
of patient-physician privilege arise.
The status of this privilege is in flux. 5 32 The Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, passed in 1975, provide that "the privilege of a ... person...
shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason
and experience. 533 Most federal courts do not recognize a physician-
patient privilege,534 although some are willing to do so in limited cir-
cumstances. Forty-one states have adopted a general physician-pa-
531. See, e.g., State v. Dorn, 496 A.2d 451, 459-60 (Vt. 1985) (upholding seizure of
pharmacy's prescription log and non-Medicaid prescriptions even though investiga-
tion focused on fraud to the Medicaid program); State v. DeSmidt, 454 N.W.2d 780,
784-87 (Wis. 1990) (upholding seizure of all of dentist's patient dental and billing
records even though investigation focused on fraud to the Medicaid program).
532. Cf. Developments in the Law: Privileged Communications, 98 Harv. L. Rev.
1450, 1530 (1985) (tracing the development of physician-patient privileges) [hereinaf-
ter Privileged Communications].
533. Fed. R. Evid. 501.
534. Privileged Communications, supra note 532, at 1533.
[Vol. 63
HEALTH CARE FRAUD
tient privilege . 35  Both the federal courts, the state courts, and
legislatures, however, are more willing to recognize a related privi-
lege, that of patient-psychotherapist. All fifty states have enacted
some version of this privilege 536 and two of the federal circuits clearly
recognize it.537 Although disagreeing on the specific rationale for
these privileges 5 38 the courts in the reported health care fraud prose-
cutions unanimously agreed that neither of these privileges apply in
criminal investigations of health care fraud.53 9 Courts are split as to
535. Laural C. Alexander, Commentary, Should Alabama Adopt a Physician-Pa-
tient Evidence Privilege?, 45 Ala. L. Rev. 261, 261 n.2 (1993).
536. See Privileged Communications, supra note 532, at 1539 (noting that 45 states
had enacted psychotherapist-patient privileges as of 1985); see e.g., Alaska Stat.
§ 08.86.200 (1993) (recognizing psychologist-patient privilege); Iowa Code § 622.10
(1994) (recognizing mental health professional privilege); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-504
(1989) (describing mental health counselor-client relationship as falling within physi-
cian-patient privilege); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-22-90 (Law. Co-op. 1993) (recognizing
psychologist-patient privilege); W. Va. Code § 27-3-1 (1993) (allowing a psychothera-
pist-patient privilege).
537. See In re Doe, 964 F.2d 1325, 1328 (2d Cir. 1992) (recognizing a qualified psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege); In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 636-37 (6th Cir.) (recogniz-
ing a psychotherapist-patient privilege), cert denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983).
Additionally, some circuits are undecided on the issue, with cases going both ways.
See, e.g., Dixon v. City of Lawton, 898 F.2d 1443, 1450 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating that it
was "[a]ssuming, without deciding, that such a privilege does exist," but finding that
the privilege did not apply to the circumstances at bar); Flora v. Hamilton, 81 F.R.D.
576, 578 (M.D. N.C. 1978) (finding that a psychotherapist-patient privilege did exist).
But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 867 F.2d 562, 565 (9th Cir.) (finding no psycho-
therapist-patient privilege in the context of grand jury investigations), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 906 (1989); United States v. Corona, 849 F.2d 562, 566-67 (11th Cir. 1988) (find-
ing no psychotherapist-patient privilege in federal criminal trials), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1084 (1989); United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 752, 753 (5th Cir.) (finding no
psychotherapist privilege exists in federal criminal trials), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 853
(1976); United States v. Brown, 479 F. Supp. 1247, 1253 (D. Md. 1979) (finding no
psychiatrist-patient privilege as to the production of records in the Fourth Circuit).
538. For example, there is the "utilitarian" rationale, under which patients will be
more willing to communicate with their physician if they know their communications
will remain confidential. Robert M. Fisher, The Psychotherapeutic Professions and
the Law of Privileged Communications, 10 Wayne L. Rev. 609, 610 (1964). This ra-
tionale has been criticized by those who argue that the motive to get well is sufficient
inducement for patients to disclose confidences to physicians. See Privileged Commu-
nications, supra note 532, at 1472.
There is also the "privacy" rationale. Here, the relationship between a patient and
her physician or counselor is an intimate one in which personal information is re-
vealed. Recognizing this privilege protects this privacy interest. Stephen A.
Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals: Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 66 Va. L Rev. 597,
618-20 (1980).
539. See, e.g., United States v. Colletta, 602 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D. Pa.) (holding that
the government's access to private medical records is not absolute, and as such is
subject to patient's constitutional right to privacy), aff'd, 770 F.2d 1076 (3d Cir. 1985);
People v. Ekong, 582 N.E.2d 233 (Il1. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that under the
Supremacy Clause, federal Medicaid fraud legislation prevails over state physician-
patient privileges, such that medical records are obtainable by the grand jury). These
cases are consistent with existing authority. See Daniel W. Shuman & Myron F. Wei-
ner, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege 57 (1987); Privileged Communications,
supra note 532, at 1536.
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whether these privileges apply in civil investigations of health care
fraud.54°
People v. Ekong541 typifies the approach taken by a number of the
reported health care fraud prosecutions when patient records are
sought in criminal cases. Ekong, a physician targeted in a Medicaid
investigation, moved to quash a grand jury subpoena duces tecum re-
quiring him to produce certain medical records.5 42 Ekong argued that
the records were protected by Illinois patient-physician privilege.5 43
The court disagreed, finding that Illinois law regarding privilege con-
flicted with federal Medicaid laws requiring Medicaid providers to dis-
close patient records during fraud investigations. 44 Holding that the
state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,- 545 the court ruled
that "under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,
Article VI, the privilege fell, '5 46 and Ekong had to comply with the
subpoena.
United States v. Colletta547 typifies another similar approach. Col-
letta, an osteopathic physician, was convicted of mail fraud for billing
for more services than he rendered.5 48 He sought a reversal on the
ground that seizure of patient medical files from his office violated the
patient-physician privilege. Rejecting his argument, the court held
that the "strong public policy... in deterring fraud" outweighed any
interest served by recognizing such a privilege. 4 9 The court also
noted that the government introduced only enough information from
the files as was necessary to prove the fraud.550
540. See infra text accompanying notes 554-60.
541. 582 N.E.2d 233 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
542. The subpoena sought all patient files, records and sign-in sheets of Medicaid
patients treated at the medical clinic during the period of January 1, 1986 through
January 15, 1991. Id. at 233-34.
543. Id. at 234.
544. Id. at 234-35. For the text of these statutes and regulations see supra note 512.
545. Id. at 235 (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 540-41 (1977)).
546. Id. at 234. This approach was also followed in Pedroso v. State, 450 So. 2d
902, 903 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 441 A.2d 525, 528-
31 (R.I. 1982); State v. Washington, 266 N.W.2d 597, 615-17 (Wis. 1978). These cases
are not included in the statistical analysis discussed in this Article because they have
not yet resulted in filing of formal charges.
547. 602 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 770 F.2d 1076 (3d Cir. 1985).
548. Id. at 1324.
549. Id. at 1327. Although the court held that there was no general federal com-
mon law physician-patient privilege, it recognized a privacy right in medical records.
Id. It was this privacy right that the court held must give way to the public interest
served by release of the records. Id.
550. Id. at 1327. The "public interest" approach in Colletta was also employed in
several other cases. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977); In re Search War-
rant (Sealed), 810 F.2d 67, 70-73 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1007 (1987);
Chidester v. Needles, 353 N.W.2d 849, 853-54 (Iowa 1984); Doe v. Hynes, 428
N.Y.S.2d 810, 814 (Sup. Ct. 1980); State v. Mark, 597 P.2d 406, 408 (Wash. Ct. App.
1979).
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Thus, either by finding that specific federal law supersedes state law
recognition of the patient-physician privilege or by finding that the
general public interest outweighs the privacy interest of patients, most
courts find that the patient-physician privilege does not apply in crimi-
nal investigations. The one exception to this rule pertains to records
of treatment for substance abuse 551 In these instances, the govern-
ment must obtain a court order before such records may be re-
leased,552 even when the records are needed to investigate possible
violations of criminal laws. To obtain such a court order, the govern-
ment must show that the need for disclosure outweighs the injury to
the patient caused by the disclosure.55 3
Disagreement among courts in the reported health care fraud pros-
ecutions occurs when the health care investigation is a civil rather than
a criminal investigation. Some courts hold that the interests served by
preserving the patient-physician (or patient-psychotherapist) privilege
are not outweighed by society's interest in deterring fraud when the
investigation is only civil. In Hawaii Psychiatric Society v. Arisy-
oshi,554 for example, the court enjoined the state from seizing patient
records from a psychologist's office through administrative inspections
even though the inspections were "to determine whether a provider is
genuinely entitled to reimbursement and to protect the [M]edicaid
program against fraud and abuse."' 5 Ruling that the use of adminis-
trative search warrants, with their relaxed requirements of probable
cause and particularity, infringe too greatly on the interests served by
the patient-psychotherapist privilege, 56 the court held that the gov-
ernment could overcome this privilege if it was able to obtain a crimi-
nal search warrant meeting full probable cause and particularity
requirements. 557
551. See 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2(c) (Supp. 1993).
552. 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2(b)(2)(C) (Supp. 1993).
553. Id.
554. 481 F. Supp. 1028 (D. Haw. 1979).
555. Id. at 1041 (quoting 1978 Haw. Sess. Laws § 6(a), Act 105).
556. See id. at 1046-1050.
557. Id. at 1052. Other courts may go even further. In Board of Medical Quality
Assurance v. Gherardini, 156 Cal. Rptr. 55 (Ct. App. 1979), for example, the Court
held that the patient-physician privilege barred the State Board of Medical Quality
Assurance from obtaining patient records with its administrative subpoena. Id. at 61-
62. The court held that "good cause" or "probable cause" showing" 'a factual exposi-
tion of a reasonable ground for the sought order' " was necessary before the privilege
was overcome. Id. at 62 (quoting Waters v. Superior Court, 377 P.2d 265 (Cal. 1962)).
Because a showing of probable cause is necessary for agents to obtain a search war-
rant in a criminal investigation, under Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960),
overruled by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980), this court presumably
would hold that the privilege would give way if a search warrant was utilized in a
criminal investigation.
In dicta, the court opined that if a grand jury subpoena was used in a criminal
investigation, the patient-physician privilege would give way only if probable cause
was shown:
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Other courts hold that the patient-physician privilege gives way
whenever a health care provider is investigated for fraud, regardless of
the civil or criminal character of the investigation.558 In Camperlengo
v. Blum,559 for example, the New York State Department of Social
Services sought patient records through a subpoena issued as part of
an administrative investigation of billing practices. The court was not
concerned with the civil or criminal nature of the investigation. Find-
ing that " 'the public must be assured that the funds which have been
set aside for [the Medicaid program] will not be fraudulently diverted
into the hands of an untrustworthy provider of services,'" the court
held that the patient-physician privilege was abrogated "to the extent
necessary to satisfy the important public interest in seeing that Medi-
caid funds are properly applied."56
The view of the Camperlengo court, rather than that of the Hawaii
Psychiatric Society, better suits investigations of health care fraud, or
any white collar crime. As noted in the context of administrative
search warrants,56' tying procedural consequences to the distinction
between civil and criminal investigations of white collar crimes is inap-
propriate. Almost every white collar crime, certainly health care
fraud, is subject to both arenas of liability and often is co-investigated
by civil investigators and criminal law enforcement agents. With such
cases, it is not clear until the conclusion of the investigation which way
a case will proceed. The concurrent jurisdiction of regulatory and law
We do not question the right of a grand jury to so investigate within its law-
ful sphere, yet it cannot invade the individual's zone of financial privacy ex-
cept on a showing of due diligence in an attempt at service upon the
individual ... and upon a "written showing" of the equivalent of probable
or good cause made to the superior court judge.
Id. (citations omitted). Thus, this court would appear to require more of a showing
for a grand jury subpoena than is required in criminal cases. As the Supreme Court
noted in United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292 (1991), no showing of
probable cause or even relevancy is necessary for a grand jury to issue a subpoena.
The Court stated that "the grand jury 'can investigate merely on suspicion that the
law is being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not.'" Id. at
297 (quoting United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950)).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit implied that the patient-
psychotherapist privilege may apply in civil investigations. In In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d
632 (6th Cir. 1983), the Sixth Circuit ruled that the patient-psychotherapist privilege
did not apply when records were sought in a grand jury proceeding. Id. at 642. By
narrowly limiting its holding to criminal investigations, the court implied that it may
find the privilege applicable in proceedings other than criminal. "In sum, weighing
the slight intrusion on the patients' privacy interest against the need for the grand jury
to conduct an effective and comprehensive investigation into alleged violation of the
law, the Court concludes that enforcement of the subpoenas does not unconstitution-
ally infringe on the rights of the patients." Id.
558. United States v. Prendergast, 585 F.2d 69, 70-71 (3d Cir. 1978); United States
v. Goldfine, 538 F.2d 815, 818-19 (9th Cir. 1976); Camperlengo v. Blum, 436 N.E.2d
1299, 1300 (N.Y. 1982).
559. Camperlengo, 436 N.E.2d at 1299.
560. Id. at 1300 (quoting Schaubman v. Blum, 402 N.E.2d 1133 (N.Y. 1980)).
561. See supra text accompanying notes 459-68.
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enforcement agencies, the expertise needed to conduct the investiga-
tion, and the difficult questions concerning intent necessitate this dual
character of white collar crime investigations.
Thus, although recognized in all states and even in some federal
courts, the patient-physician (or patient-psychotherapist) privilege is
not recognized in criminal health care fraud cases. The reported pros-
ecutions have rejected the privilege on two grounds: the superceding
of the privilege by specific federal law, or the outweighing of a pa-
tient's privacy interest by the general public interest in preventing and
detecting health care fraud. The courts are divided over the applica-
bility of the patient-physician (or patient-psychotherapist) privilege
when the investigation concerns only civil liability. Some courts hold
that the privilege exists; others employ the same analysis as in criminal
cases and decline to recognize the privilege. Because of the hybrid
civil/criminal nature of white collar crime the latter view, which does
not distinguish between criminal and civil investigations, is more
appropriate.
C. Conclusion
Privilege issues arise routinely in health care fraud prosecutions, but
the reported cases reveal that they are almost uniformly decided
against the defendants. Because corporations retain no Fifth Amend-
ment privilege and individuals retain no Fifth Amendment privilege
for business records, very little of this privilege is available in most
white collar cases. The limited "act of production" privilege carved
out for individuals and sole proprietors that is available in some white
collar cases is not likely to be available in health care fraud prosecu-
tions because of the "required record" exception to the Fifth Amend-
ment. Virtually every insurer, public and private, requires that health
care providers retain and make available billing and treatment
records.
The patient-physician (or patient-psychotherapist) privilege simi-
larly enjoys little recognition in health care fraud prosecutions. The
reported cases unanimously rejected application of this privilege in
criminal investigations. Although some courts recognize this privilege
in civil fraud investigations, this Article suggests the better view recog-
nizes the hybrid civil/criminal nature of white collar crime and rejects
the assertion of the privilege in either a civil or criminal investigation.
CONCLUSION
The litigation of a white collar crime is unlike that of most criminal
cases. As this Article has discussed, it more often resembles the trial
of a civil matter than of a criminal matter. Evidence in a white collar
criminal case consists of evidence typically seen in civil cases: docu-
ments, financial or legal expert witnesses, summary witnesses and
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charts, computer-generated data, and explanations of complex finan-
cial transactions. 62 This blurring of criminal and civil law is signifi-
cant for it raises the question of whether the distinction between the
two arenas of justice truly exists or is a creation of convenience that
needs rethinking. 63 There is little time to debate this question, how-
ever, because white collar crime is a growing phenomenon.5 4
This Article has explored the impact of white collar crime's hybrid
nature by examining litigation issues in one type of white collar crime:
health care fraud. From this study, two observations can be made.
First, with the increasing complexity of cases the evidentiary issues
have become more intricate. The earliest health care fraud prosecu-
tions involved simple charges: physicians alleged to be selling medi-
cally unnecessary prescriptions for controlled substances to make a
profit.5 65 The evidentiary issues raised were few, and were straightfor-
ward: introduction of a few documents (prescriptions),566 testimony
by medical experts,567 and perhaps, testimony from an undercover in-
vestigation. 568 The current prosecutions of health care providers are
complex financial frauds prosecuted with complex statutes.569 The ev-
identiary and procedural issues raised are varied and difficult: the
scope of legal expert testimony;570 the propriety of government agents
testifying as expert witnesses;571 the use of influential litigation tools
562. There are other unique features of white collar crime. Because the conduct at
issue in most white collar cases is memorialized in a paper trail, there is rarely a
controversy over what took place or who did it. Accordingly, defenses in white collar
cases focus on knowledge and intent to violate the law. There is no place in most
white collar criminal cases for many of the defenses typically seen in the trial of street
crimes such as alibi, duress, and mistaken identity. Also, there is a growing trend in
white collar criminal cases, not seen with traditional street crimes, to dilute the mens
rea requirement. This is seen in the increasing prosecution of regulatory offenses
where strict or absolute liability suffices for criminal liability, in the willingness of
courts to define "intentionally" as "reckless disregard," and in the prosecution of cor-
porations, where current standards of criminal liability contain no mens rea require-
ment. Lastly, the fact that parallel civil and administrative proceedings often track
the white collar criminal case affects the white collar criminal case in a variety of
subtle ways: how the scope of investigative searches may be defined; whether and to
what extent privileges exist; the availability of extrinsic act evidence; the impact on
plea bargaining; and the availability of insiders and co-conspirators as government
witnesses.
563. Coffee, surpa, note 1, at 193-94.
564. White collar crime's cousin, punitive civil sanctions, is also a growing phenom-
enon that blurs the lines between civil and criminal law. See Kenneth Mann, Punitive
Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 Yale L. J.
1795 (1992).
565. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
566. See Bucy, Fraud By Fright, supra note 5, at 889-93.
567. Id. at 891-93.
568. Id. at 890-91.
569. Bucy, Fraud By Fright, supra note 5, at 883; see supra text accompanying notes
68-75.
570. See supra part II.A.
571. See supra part II.B.
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such as summaries and summary witnesses;5" and computer-gener-
ated evidence.573
The second observation is that courts are blending procedural and
evidentiary doctrines usually kept separate in criminal and civil cases.
Summaries, extrinsic act evidence, searches, and privileges exemplify
this blending. Despite admonitions to keep "FRE 1006" summaries
and "pedagogical" summaries separate, courts have blended the two
in white collar criminal cases. Despite the limits placed on extrinsic
act evidence in most cases, courts have allowed unusual flexibility in
presenting such evidence in white collar criminal cases. Despite
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence cautioning the use of administra-
tive search warrants in criminal investigations, some courts are sanc-
tioning such use. Despite recognition of Fifth Amendment and
patient-physician (or patient-psychotherapist) privileges in other con-
texts, most courts reject these privileges when asserted in some white
collar cases, especially in health care fraud prosecutions. 74
Further blending is needed if the investigation and trial of white
collar criminal cases is to be fair to both parties. Because of the
problems presented by some of the evidence used in white collar crim-
inal cases, such as billing experts and computer-generated evidence,
defendants should be accorded greater discovery than is permitted by
the rules of criminal procedure. Defendants should be allowed to is-
sue interrogatories or depose trial witnesses who will authenticate
complex evidence such as computer-generated evidence, and to voir
dire, out of the hearing of jurors, witnesses who testify as billing ex-
perts, legal experts or experts who have also been part of the investi-
gation or prosecution team. Defendants also should be given access
to the comparative data regarding practices of the defendant and her
peers. Because of complications in generating such data, access to it
may be gained only through depositions or interrogatories.
Our criminal justice system originated with simple crimes provable
with simple evidence. As crimes, criminals and technology have
evolved, our criminal justice system must continue to evolve. White
collar crime, with its hybrid criminal/civil nature is fueling part of this
evolution. Experience with white collar crime suggests that a system
of justice that blends civil and criminal law in some respects may bet-
ter meet the goal of the civil law to provide a forum for resolution of
disputes and of the criminal law to punish, deter, and isolate those
individuals who violate society's most important rules.
572. See supra part III.
573. See supra part V.C.
574. See supra part VII.
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APPENDIX I
FREQUENCY OF FRAUD THEORIES
I. Cases Prosecuted for Rx by Fraud
United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975)
Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703 (1943)
Boyd v. United States, 271 U.S. 104 (1926)
Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5 (1925)
United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 (1922)
Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189 (1920), overruled by Funk v.
United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933)
Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 96 (1919)
United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919)
United States v. Costanzo, 4 F.3d 658 (8th Cir. 1993)
United States v. Romano, 970 F.2d 164 (6th Cir. 1992)
United States v. Hughes, 895 F.2d 1135 (6th Cir. 1990)
United States v. Kaplan, 895 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1990)
United States v. Sblendorio, 830 F.2d 1362 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. de-
nied, 484 U.S. 1068 (1988)
United States v. Nechy, 827 F.2d 1161 (7th Cir. 1987)
United States v. Mahar, 801 F.2d 1477 (6th Cir. 1986)
United States v. Vamos, 797 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1036 (1987)
United States v. Krebs, 788 F.2d 1166 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
930 (1986)
United States v. Norris, 780 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1986)
United States v. Jackson, 761 F.2d 1541 (11th Cir. 1985)
United States v. Sanders, 749 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1984)
United States v. Blanton, 730 F.2d 1425 (11th Cir. 1984)
United States v. Behrens, 689 F.2d 154 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1088 (1982)
United States v. Dumas, 688 F.2d 84 (10th Cir. 1982)
United States v. Leichtling, 684 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1201 (1983)
United States v. Voorhies, 633 F.2d 30 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 929 (1982)
United States v. Goldstein, 695 F.2d 1228 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. de-
nied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983)
United States v. Seelig, 622 F.2d 207 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
869 (1980)
United States v. Rogers, 609 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1980)
United States v. Smurthwaite, 590 F.2d 889 (10th Cir. 1979)
United States v. Hill, 589 F.2d 1344 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
919 (1979)
United States v. Kirk, 584 F.2d 773 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1048 (1978)
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United States v. Roya, 574 F.2d 386 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1048 (1978)
United States v. Schiffman, 572 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1978)
United States v. Pastor, 557 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1977)
United States v. Griffin, 555 F.2d 1323 (5th Cir. 1977)
United States v. Fellman, 549 F.2d 181 (10th Cir. 1977)
United States v. Elizey, 527 F.2d 1306 (6th Cir. 1975)
United States v. Carroll, 518 F.2d 187 (6th Cir. 1975)
United States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1031 (1975)
United States v. Black, 512 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1975)
United States v. Green, 511 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1031 (1975)
United States v. Larson, 507 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1974)
United States v. Badia, 490 F.2d 296 (1st Cir. 1973)
United States v. Jobe, 487 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 955 (1974)
United States v. Bartee, 479 F.2d 484 (10th Cir. 1973)
United States v. Collier, 478 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1973)
United States v. Warren, 453 F.2d 738 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
944 (1972)
White v. United States, 399 F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1968)
Brown v. United States, 250 F.2d 745 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
833 (1956)
Neill v. United States, 225 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1955)
McBride v. United States, 225 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 934 (1956)
Wesson v. United States, 164 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1947)
United States v. Tommasello, 160 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1947)
United States v. Brandenburg, 155 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1946)
United States v. Abdallah, 149 F.2d 219 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326
U.S. 724 (1945)
Mitchell v. United States, 143 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1944)
United States v. Lindenfeld, 142 F.2d 829 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 761 (1944)
Nigro v. United States, 117 F.2d 624 (8th Cir. 1941)
Heller v. United States, 104 F.2d 446 (4th Cir. 1939)
Lambert v. United States, 101 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1939)
Towbin v. United States, 93 F.2d 861 (10th Cir. 1938)
DuVall v. United States, 82 F.2d 382 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S.
667 (1936)
MacLafferty v. United States, 77 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1935)
Strader v. United States, 72 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1934)
Manning v. United States, 31 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1929)
Bush v. United States, 16 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1927)
Aiton v. United States, 3 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1925)
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Manning v. United States, 287 F. 800 (8th Cir. 1923)
Barbot v. United States, 273 F. 919 (4th Cir. 1921)
Harris v. United States, 273 F. 785 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 646
(1921)
Hoyt v. United States, 273 F. 792 (2d Cir. 1921)
Oliver v. United States, 267 F. 544 (4th Cir. 1920)
Rothman v. United States, 270 F. 31 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 254 U.S.
652 (1920)
Trader v. United States, 260 F. 923 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 251 U.S. 555
(1919)
Thompson v. United States, 258 F. 196 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 251 U.S.
553 (1919)
Melanson v. United States, 256 F. 783 (5th Cir. 1919)
Thurston v. United States, 241 F. 335 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 245 U.S.
646 (1917)
United States v. Milicia, 769 F. Supp. 877 (E.D. Pa. 1991)
United States v. Perez-Reyes, 754 F. Supp. 637 (N.D. Ill. 1991)
United States v. Anthony, 15 F. Supp. 553 (S.D. Cal. 1936)
United States v. Fleming, 251 F. 932 (D. Pa. 1918)
State v. Jacobs, 503 P.2d 826 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972)
People v. Nunn, 296 P.2d 813 (Cal.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956)
People v. Braddock, 264 P.2d 521 (Cal. 1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
837 (1954)
People v. Gandotra, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 896 (Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 309 (1993)
People v. Lonergan, 267 Cal. Rptr. 887 (Ct. App. 1990)
People v. Kurland, 117 Cal. Rptr. 216 (Ct. App. 1973)
People v. Meyer, 31 Cal. Rptr. 285 (Ct. App. 1963)
People v. Lawrence, 18 Cal. Rptr. 196 (Ct. App. 1961)
People v. Bowman, 320 P.2d 70 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958)
Williams v. United States, 571 A.2d 212 (D.C. 1990)
Gaines v. State, 406 So. 2d 523 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
State v. Vinson, 298 So. 2d 505 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974), aff'd, 345
So. 2d 711 (Fla. 1977)
People v. Guaglita, 200 N.E. 169 (Ill.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 667
(1936)
Smith v. State, 13 N.E.2d 562 (Ind. 1938)
State v. Webb, 156 N.W.2d 299 (Iowa 1968)
State v. Klingenstein, 608 A.2d 792 (Md. 1992), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 624 A.2d 532 (Md. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 312 (1993)
People v. Downes, 228 N.W.2d 212 (Mich. 1975)
People v. Alford, 251 N.W.2d 314 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977), aff'd, 274
N.W.2d 484 (Mich. 1979)
State v. Bridges, 398 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1966)
State v. Vaccaro, 361 A.2d 47 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied,
366 A.2d 674 (N.J. 1976)
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State v. Carr, 626 P.2d 292 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 625 P.2d 1186
(N.M.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 853 (1981)
People v. Greenwood, 139 N.Y.S.2d 654 (County Ct.), aff'd, 132
N.E.2d 308 (1955)
State v. Best, 233 S.E.2d 544 (N.C. 1977)
State v. McCarthy, 605 N.E.2d 911 (Ohio 1992)
State v. Sway, 472 N.E.2d 1065 (Ohio 1984)
State v. Williams, 603 N.E.2d 383 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992)
Commonwealth v. Slaton, 608 A.2d 5 (Pa. 1992)
Commonwealth v. West, 396 A.2d 380 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978)
Commonwealth v. Shelhorse, 381 A.2d 1305 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977)
State v. Lawrence, 212 S.E.2d 52 (S.C. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S.
1025 (1975)
McLean v. State, 527 S.W.2d 76 (Tenn. 1975)
Haney v. State, 544 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)
DeVine v. State, 206 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 1947)
State v. Welch, 624 A.2d 1105 (Vt. 1992)
State v. Gilmore, 456 P.2d 344 (Wash. 1969)
State v. Young, 406 S.E.2d 758 (W. Va. 1991)
II. Cases Prosecuted for Services Not Performed
United States v. Siddiqi, 959 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1992)
United States v. Casey, 951 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 2284 (1992)
United States v. Lennartz, 948 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1991)
United States v. Nazon, 940 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1991)
United States v. Hooshmand, 931 F.2d 725 (11th Cir. 1991)
United States v. Kline, 922 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1990)
United States v. Campbell, 845 F.2d 1374 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 908 (1988)
United States v. Larm, 824 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 1078 (1988)
United States v. Lamport, 787 F.2d 474 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 846 (1986)
United States v. Hilliard, 752 F.2d 578 (11th Cir. 1985)
United States v. Alexander, 748 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
472 U.S. 1027 (1985)
United States v. Varoz, 740 F.2d 772 (10th Cir. 1984)
Worthington v. United States, 726 F.2d 1089 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 827 (1984)
United States v. Abadi, 706 F.2d 178 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
821 (1983)
United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154 (11th Cir. 1983)
United States v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847 (1st Cir. 1982)
United States v. Sherer, 653 F.2d 334 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1034 (1981)
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United States v. Abrams, 615 F.2d 541 (1st Cir. 1980)
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United States v. Evans, 559 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
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United States v. Berdick, 555 F.2d 1329 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1010 (1977)
United States v. Beasley, 550 F.2d 261 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
938 (1977)
United States v. Gordon, 548 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1977)
United States v. Radetsky, 535 F.2d 556 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 820 (1976), overruled by 921 F.2d 994 (10th Cir. 1990)
United States v. Holt, 529 F.2d 981 (4th Cir. 1975)
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United States v. Mekjian, 505 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1975)
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United States v. Cegelka, 853 F.2d 627 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
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aff'd in part, 574 So. 2d 330 (La. 1990)
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U.S. 907 (1988)
United States v. Krowen, 809 F.2d 144 (1st Cir. 1986)
United States v. Jackson, 761 F.2d 1541 (11th Cir. 1985)
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United States v. Witschner, 624 F.2d 840 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
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393 U.S. 1082 (1969)
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United States v. Maturo, 536 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
United States v. Vecchiarello, 536 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
United States v. Taller, 394 F.2d 435 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
839 (1968)
United States v. Andreadis, 366 F.2d 423 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1001 (1967)
United States v. DeWelles, 345 F.2d 387 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 833 (1965)
United States v. Kaadt, 171 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1948)
Baker v. United States, 115 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312
U.S. 692 (1941)
United States v. Lee, 107 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309
U.S. 659 (1940)
Barnhill v. United States, 96 F.2d 116 (10th Cir. 1938)
West v. United States, 68 F.2d 96 (10th Cir. 1933)
Stunz v. United States, 27 F.2d 575 (8th Cir. 1928)
Kar-Ru Chem. Co. v. United States, 264 F. 921 (9th Cir. 1920)
Hughes v. United States, 231 F. 50 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 242 U.S. 640
(1916)
Moses v. United States, 221 F. 863 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 238 U.S. 629
(1915)
Bruce v. United States, 202 F. 98 (8th Cir. 1912)
Dyar v. United States, 186 F. 614 (5th Cir. 1911)
Hibbard v. United States, 172 F. 66 (7th Cir. 1909)
United States v. Sugar, 606 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
People v. Burroughs, 678 P.2d 894 (Cal. 1984)
People v. Marsh, 376 P.2d 300 (Cal. 1962)
People v. Brych, 250 Cal. Rptr. 402 (Ct. App. 1988)
United States v. Privitera, 141 Cal. Rptr. 764 (Ct. App. 1977), vacated,
591 P.2d 919 (Cal.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949 (1979)
People v. Eckley, 108 Cal. Rptr. 52 (Ct. App. 1973)
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People v. Chatfield, 77 Cal. Rptr. 118 (Ct. App. 1969), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 951 (1971)
People v. Chapman, 24 Cal. Rptr. 568 (Ct. App. 1962)
People v. Bowman, 320 P.2d 70 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958)
People v. Schmitt, 317 P.2d 673 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957)
People v. Schroeder, 281 P.2d 297 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955)
People v. Gelb, 565 N.E.2d 474 (N.Y. 1990)
People v. Varas, 487 N.Y.S.2d 577 (App. Div. 1985)
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 167 A. 344 (Pa. 1933)
Sorce v. State, 736 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)
State v. Hoffman, 558 P.2d 602 (Utah 1976)
VI. Cases Prosecuted for Taking Kickbacks
United States v. Levin, 973 F.2d 463 (6th Cir. 1992)
United States v. Bay State Ambulance & Hosp. Rental Serv., 874 F.2d
20 (1st Cir. 1989)
United States v. Kats, 871 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1989)
United States v. Lipkis, 770 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1985)
United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
998 (1985)
United States v. Universal Trade & Indus., Inc., 695 F.2d 1151 (9th
Cir. 1983)
United States v. Stewart Clinical Lab., Inc., 652 F.2d 804 (9th Cir.
1981)
United States v. Duz-Mor, 650 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1981)
United States v. Perlstein, 632 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1084 (1981)
United States v. Ruttenberg, 625 F.2d 173 (7th Cir. 1980)
United States v. Hancock, 604 F.2d 999 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 991 (1979)
United States v. Porter, 591 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1979)
United States v. Winkle, 587 F.2d 705 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
827 (1979)
United States v. Zacher, 586 F.2d 912 (2d Cir. 1978)
United States v. Hughes, 823 F. Supp. 593 (N.D. Ind. 1993)
United States v. Sadlier, 649 F. Supp. 1560 (D. Mass. 1986)
United States v. Weingarden, 468 F. Supp. 410 (E.D. Mich. 1979),
aff'd sub nom. United States v. Tapert 625 F.2d 111 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 952, and cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1034 (1980)
People v. Bynum, 557 N.E.2d 238 (II1. App. Ct. 1990)
State v. Burnett, 556 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989)
People v. Warden, 529 N.Y.S.2d 230 (App. Div. 1988)
People v. Forhman, 443 N.Y.S.2d 881 (App. Div. 1981)
People v. Lieberman, 405 N.Y.S.2d 559 (Sup. Ct. 1978)
1994]
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VII. Cases Prosecuted for False Cost Reports
United States v. Morris, 957 F.2d 1391 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 380 (1992)
United States v. Alemany Rivera, 781 F.2d 229 (1st Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1086 (1986)
United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 927 (1980)
United States v. Collins, 596 F.2d 166 (6th Cir. 1979)
United States v. Jones, 587 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1979)
United States v. Celia, 568 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1977)
United States v. Nemes, 555 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1977)
United States v. Smith, 523 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 817 (1976)
United States v. Simon, 510 F. Supp. 232 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
United States v. Braunstein, 474 F. Supp. 1 (D.N.J. 1979)
McKennie v. State, 439 So. 2d 706 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982), rev'd, 439
So. 2d 713 (Ala. 1983)
Frye v. State, 369 So. 2d 892 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979)
Greco v. State, 515 A.2d 220 (Md. 1986)
Commonwealth v. Cerveny, 367 N.E.2d 802 (Mass. 1977), overruled by
Commonwealth v. Crocker, 424 N.E.2d 524 (Mass. 1981)
Commonwealth v. Minkin, 436 N.E.2d 955 (Mass. App. Ct.), review
denied, 438 N.E.2d 75 (Mass. 1982)
State v. Ruud, 259 N.W.2d 567 (Minn. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996
(1978)
State v. Hoffman, 412 A.2d 120 (N.J. 1980)
State v. Loughrey, 373 A.2d 703 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977)
People v. Notey, 423 N.Y.S.2d 947 (App. Div. 1980)
People v. Severino, 406 N.Y.S.2d 105 (App. Div. 1978)
People v. Wolf, 397 N.Y.S.2d 131 (App. Div. 1977)
People v. Christiano, 386 N.Y.S.2d 620 (County Ct. 1976)
VIII. Cases Prosecuted for Unnecessary Services Provided
United States v. Hughes, 895 F.2d 1135 (6th Cir. 1990)
United States v. Goldberg, 862 F.2d 101 (6th Cir. 1988)
United States v. Campbell, 845 F.2d 1374 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 908 (1988)
United States v. Sblendorio, 830 F.2d 1362 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. de-
nied, 484 U.S. 1068 (1988)
United States v. Azad, 809 F.2d 291 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1004 (1987)
United States v. Mahar, 801 F.2d 1477 (6th Cir. 1986)
United States v. Alexander, 748 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
472 U.S. 1027 (1985)
United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154 (11th Cir. 1983)
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United States v. Ziperstein, 601 F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
44 U.S. 1031 (1980)
United States v. Halper, 590 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1978)
Hughes v. United States, 231 F. 50 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 242 U.S. 640
(1916)
United States v. Furman, 507 F. Supp. 848 (D. Md. 1981), rev'd, 672
F.2d 914 (4th Cir. 1981)
United States v. Talbott, 460 F. Supp. 253 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd, 590 F.2d
192 (6th Cir. 1978)
United States v. Smith, 222 F. 165 (E.D. Pa. 1915)
People v. Rehman, 61 Cal. Rptr. 65 (Ct. App. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 947 (1968)
People v. Bowman, 320 P.2d 70 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958)
People v. Freedland, 444 N.W.2d 250 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989), cert. de-
nied, 498 U.S. 853 (1990)
In re Wayne County Prosecutor, 329 N.W.2d 510 (Mich. Ct. App.
1982)
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
APPENDIX II
CHRONOLOGICAL DISTRIBUTION OF PROSECUTIONS OF HEALTH
CARE PROVIDERS
5 7 5
I. Cases Prosecuted in the 1900s
Hibbard v. United States, 172 F. 66 (7th Cir. 1909)
II. Cases Prosecuted in the 1910s
Dyar v. United States, 186 F. 614 (5th Cir. 1911)
Bruce v. United States, 202 F. 98 (8th Cir. 1912)
United States v. Smith, 222 F. 165 (E.D. Pa. 1915)
Moses v. United States, 221 F. 863 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 238 U.S. 629
(1915)
Hughes v. United States, 231 F. 50 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 242 U.S. 640
(1916)
Thurston v. United States, 241 F. 335 (5th Cir), cert. denied, 245 U.S.
646 (1917)
United States v. Fleming, 251 F. 932 (W.D. Pa. 1918)
United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919)
Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 96 (1919)
Melanson v. United States, 256 F. 783 (5th Cir. 1919)
Trader v. United States, 260 F. 923 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 251 U.S. 555
(1919)
Thompson v. United States, 258 F. 196 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 251 U.S.
553 (1919)
III. Cases Prosecuted in the 1920s
Rothman v. United States, 270 F. 31 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 254 U.S.
652 (1920)
Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189 (1920), overruled by Funk v.
United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1993)
Kar-Ru Chem. Co. v. United States, 264 F. 921 (9th Cir. 1920)
Oliver v. United States, 267 F. 544 (4th Cir. 1920)
Hoyt v. United States, 273 F. 792 (2d Cir. 1921)
Harris v. United States, 273 F. 785 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 646
(1921)
Barbot v. United States, 273 F. 919 (4th Cir. 1921)
United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 (1922)
Manning v. United States, 287 F. 800 (8th Cir. 1923)
Aiton v. United States, 3 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1925)
Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5 (1925)
Boyd v. United States, 271 U.S. 104 (1926)
Bush v. United States, 16 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1927)
Stunz v. United States, 27 F.2d 575 (8th Cir. 1928)
575. All case names are listed in ascending chronological order.
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Manning v. United States, 31 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1929)
IV. Cases Prosecuted in the 1930s
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 167 A. 344 (Pa. 1933)
West v. United States, 68 F.2d 96 (10th Cir. 1933)
People v. Kayne, 255 N.W. 758 (Mich. 1934)
Strader v. United States, 72 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1934)
MacLafferty v. United States, 77 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1935)
People v. Guaglita, 200 N.E. 169 (Ill.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 667
(1936)
DuVall v. United States, 82 F.2d 382 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S.
667 (1936)
United States v. Anthony, 15 F. Supp. 553 (S.D. Cal. 1936)
Towbin v. United States, 93 F.2d 861 (10th Cir. 1938)
Smith v. State, 13 N.E.2d 562 (Ind. 1938)
Barnhill v. United States, 96 F.2d 116 (10th Cir. 1938)
Lambert v. United States, 101 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1939)
Heller v. United States, 104 F.2d 446 (4th Cir. 1939)
United States v. Lee, 107 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309
U.S. 659 (1940)
V. Cases Prosecuted in the 1940s
Baker v. United States, 115 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312
U.S. 692 (1941)
Nigro v. United States, 117 F.2d 624 (8th Cir. 1941)
Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703 (1943)
United States v. Lindenfeld, 142 F.2d 829 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 761 (1944)
Mitchell v. United States, 143 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1944)
United States v. Abdallah, 149 F.2d 219 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326
U.S. 724 (1945)
United States v. Brandenburg, 155 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1946)
United States v. Tommasello, 160 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1947)
Wesson v. United States, 164 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1947)
DeVine v. State, 206 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 1947)
United States v. Kaadt, 171 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1948)
VI. Cases Prosecuted in the 1950s
People v. Braddock, 264 P.2d 521 (Cal. 1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
837 (1954)
People v. Greenwood, 139 N.Y.S.2d 654 (County Ct.), aff'd, 132
N.E.2d 308 (N.Y. 1955)
People v. Schroeder, 281 P.2d 297 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955)
McBride v. United States, 225 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 934 (1956)
Neil v. United States, 225 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1955)
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People v. Nunn, 296 P.2d 813 (Cal.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956)
People v. Schmitt, 317 P.2d 673 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957)
Brown v. United States, 250 F.2d 745 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
938 (1958)
People v. Bowman, 320 P.2d 70 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958)
Commonwealth v. Litman, 144 A.2d 592 (Pa. 1958)
State v. Greco, 148 A.2d 164 (N.J. 1959)
VII. Cases Prosecuted in the 1960s
People v. Lawrence, 18 Cal. Rptr. 196 (Ct. App. 1961)
People v. Rossi, 230 N.Y.S.2d 7 (App. Div. 1962)
Everitt v. United States, 306 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 920 (1963)
People v. Benson, 23 Cal. Rptr. 908 (Ct. App. 1962), cert. denied, 374
U.S. 806 (1963), overruled by People v. Perez, 401 P.2d 934 (Cal.
1965)
People v. Chapman, 24 Cal. Rptr. 568 (Ct. App. 1962)
People v. Marsh, 376 P.2d 300 (Cal. 1962)
People v. Meyer, 31 Cal. Rptr. 285 (Ct. App. 1963)
United States v. DeWelles, 345 F.2d 387 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 833 (1965)
People v. Thayer, 47 Cal. Rptr. 780 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 908
(1966)
State v. Bridges, 398 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1966)
United States v. Andreadis, 366 F.2d 423 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied
385 U.S. 1001 (1967)
People v. Rehman, 61 Cal. Rptr. 65 (Ct. App. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 947 (1968)
State v. Webb, 156 N.W.2d 299 (Iowa 1968)
United States v. Taller, 394 F.2d 435 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
839 (1968)
White v. United States, 399 F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1968)
United States v. Sternback, 402 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1082 (1969)
State v. Gilmore, 456 P.2d 344 (Wash. 1969)
People v. Chatfield, 77 Cal. Rptr. 118 (Ct. App. 1969), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 951 (1971)
VIII. Cases Prosecuted in the 1970s
Smith v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. Rptr. 208 (Ct. App. 1970)
People v. Scofield, 95 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Ct. App. 1971)
United States v. Chakmakis, 449 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1971)
United States v. Shuford, 454 F.2d 772 (4th Cir. 1971)
United States v. Warren, 453 F.2d 738 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
944 (1972)
State v. Fellman, 193 N.W.2d 775 (Neb. 1972)
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United States v. Katz, 455 F.2d 496 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S.
923 (1972)
United States v. Thomas, 463 F.2d 1061 (7th Cir. 1972)
United States v. Blazewicz, 459 F.2d 442 (6th Cir. 1972)
United States v. Kraude, 467 F.2d 37 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1076 (1972)
United States v. Kaplan, 470 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 966 (1973)
State v. Jacobs, 503 P.2d 826 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972)
United States v. Silvem, 494 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1973)
United States v. Leigh, 487 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1973))
United States v. Carey, 475 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1973)
United States v. Collier, 478 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1973)
United States v. Bartee, 479 F.2d 484 (10th Cir. 1973)
People v. Eckley, 108 Cal. Rptr. 52 (Ct. App. 1973)
People v. Kurland, 117 Cal. Rptr. 216 (Ct. App. 1973)
United States v. Matanky, 482 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1039 (1973)
United States v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1157 (1974)
United States v. Medansky, 486 F.2d 807 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 989 (1974)
United States v. Perez, 489 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 945 (1974)
United States v. Jobe, 487 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 955 (1974)
United States v. Parkman, 488 F.2d 1392 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 983 (1974)
United States v. Badia, 490 F.2d 296 (1st Cir. 1973)
United States v. Peterson, 488 F.2d 645 (5th Cir. 1974)
United States v. Larson, 507 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1974)
United States v. Reicin, 497 F.2d 563 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
996 (1974)
State v. Vimson, 298 So. 2d 505 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974), aff'd, 345
So. 2d 711 (Fla. 1977)
United States v. Catena, 500 F.2d 1319 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1047 (1974)
United States v. Britton, 500 F.2d 1257 (8th Cir. 1974)
State v. Lawrence, 212 S.E.2d 52 (S.C. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S.
1025 (1975)
United States v. Mekjian, 505 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1975)
United States v. Green, 511 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1031 (1975)
People v. Downes, 228 N.W.2d 212 (Mich. 1975)
United States v. Black, 512 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1975)
United States v. Cacioppo, 517 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1975)
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United States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1031 (1975)
United States v. Carroll, 518 F.2d 187 (6th Cir. 1975)
McLean v. State, 527 S.W.2d 76 (Tenn. 1975)
People v. Slocum, 125 Cal. Rptr. 442 (Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 924 (1976)
United States v. Smith, 523 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 817 (1976)
People v. Cobbs, 126 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Ct. App. 1975)
United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975)
United States v. Holt, 529 F.2d 981 (4th Cir. 1975)
United States v. Ellzey, 527 F.2d 1306 (6th Cir. 1976)
United States v. Perkal, 530 F.2d 604 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
821 (1976)
People v. Lieberman, 405 N.Y.S.2d 559 (Sup. Ct. 1976)
United States v. Radetsky, 535 F.2d 556 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 820 (1976), overruled by 921 F.2d 994 (10th Cir. 1990)
State v. Vaccaro, 361 A.2d 47 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied,
366 A.2d 674 (N.J. 1976)
United States v. Maturo, 536 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
United States v. Vecchiarello, 536 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
United States v. Rousseau, 534 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1976)
Haney v. State, 544 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)
People v. Christiano, 386 N.Y.S.2d 620 (County Ct. 1976)
People v. Brown, 132 Cal. Rptr. 217 (Ct. App. 1976)
State v. Hoffman, 558 P.2d 602 (Utah 1976)
United States v. Bernstein, 546 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1977)
People v. Alford, 251 N.W.2d 314 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977), aff'd, 275
N.W.2d 484 (Mich. 1979)
United States v. Fellman, 549 F.2d 181 (10th Cir. 1977)
State v. Page, 232 S.E.2d 460 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977)
People v. Lerner, 394 N.Y.S.2d 514 (Sup. Ct. 1977)
State v. Best, 233 S.E.2d 544 (N.C. 1977)
State v. Loughrey, 373 A.2d 703 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977)
United States v. Nemes, 555 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1977)
United States v. Pastor, 557 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1977)
United States v. Beasley, 550 F.2d 261 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
938 (1977)
State v. Toscano, 378 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1977)
United States v. Berdick, 555 F.2d 1329 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1010 (1977)
People v. Wolf, 397 N.Y.S.2d 131 (App. Div. 1977)
State v. Poganski, 257 N.W.2d 578 (Minn. 1977)
Commonwealth v. Cerveny, 367 N.E.2d 802 (Mass. 1977), overruled by
Commonwealth v. Crocker, 424 N.E.2d 524 (Mass. 1981)
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United States v. Cady, 567 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 944 (1978)
United States v. Celia, 568 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1977)
Commonwealth v. Shelhorse, 381 A.2d 1305 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977)
United States v. Gordon, 548 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1977)
United States v. Griffin, 555 F.2d 1323 (5th Cir. 1977)
United States v. Evans, 559 F.2d 244 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1015, and cert denied, 435 U.S. 945 (1977)
State v. Ruud, 259 N.W.2d 567 (Minn. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996
(1978)
United States v. Privitera, 141 Cal. Rptr. 764 (Ct. App. 1977), vacated,
591 P.2d 919 (Cal.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949 (1979)
United States v. Talbott, 460 F. Supp. 253 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd, 590 F.2d
192 (6th Cir. 1978)
United States v. Boscia, 573 F.2d 827 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
911, and cert. denied, 439 U.S. 854 (1978)
United States v. Roya, 574 F.2d 386 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1048 (1978)
United States v. Schiffman, 572 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1978)
People v. Severino, 406 N.Y.S.2d 105 (App. Div. 1978)
United States v. Braunstein, 474 F. Supp. 1 (D.N.J. 1978)
United States v. Kirk, 584 F.2d 773 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1048 (1978)
United States v. Zacher, 586 F.2d 912 (2d Cir. 1978)
People v. Weinfeld, 410 N.Y.S.2d 472 (App. Div. 1978)
United States v. Herberman, 583 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1978)
United States v. Halper, 590 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1978)
United States v. Precision Medical Lab., Inc., 593 F.2d 434 (2d Cir.
1978)
United States v. Reamer, 589 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 980 (1979)
Commonwealth v. West, 396 A.2d 380 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978)
United States v. Hill, 589 F.2d 1344 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
919 (1979)
United States v. Del Valle, 587 F.2d 699 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 909 (1979)
United States v. Winkle, 587 F.2d 705 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
827 (1979)
United States v. Jones, 587 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1979)
United States v. Smurthwaite, 590 F.2d 889 (10th Cir. 1979)
United States v. Porter, 591 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1979)
United States v. Collins, 596 F.2d 166 (6th Cir. 1979)
United States v. Weingarden, 468 F. Supp. 410 (E.D. Mich. 1979),
aff'd sub nom. United States v. Tapert, 625 F.2d 111 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 952, and cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1034 (1980)
Frye v. State, 369 So. 2d 892 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979)
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United States v. Ziperstein, 601 F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1031 (1980)
United States v. Hancock, 604 F.2d 999 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 991 (1979)
United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 927 (1980)
United States v. Schaffer, 600 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir. 1979)
People v. Bovee, 285 N.W.2d 53 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979)
United States v. Edgewood Health Care Ctr., Inc., 608 F.2d 13 (1st
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1046 (1980)
United States v. Zicree, 605 F.2d 1381 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 966 (1980)
Glassman v. State, 377 So. 2d 208 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)
IX. Cases Prosecuted in the 1980s
United States v. Wilson, 490 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Mich. 1980), aff'd, 639
F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1981)
United States v. Rogers, 609 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1980)
People v. Notey, 423 N.Y.S.2d 947 (App. Div. 1980)
United States v. Abrams, 615 F.2d 541 (1st Cir. 1980)
State v. Marshall, 606 P.2d 278 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980)
State v. Hoffman, 412 A.2d 120 (N.J. 1980)
United States v. Seelig, 622 F.2d 207 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
869 (1980)
United States v. Tapert, 625 F.2d 111 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
952 (1980)
United States v. Adler, 623 F.2d 1287 (8th Cir. 1980)
United States v. Witschner, 624 F.2d 840 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 994 (1980)
United States v. Ruttenberg, 625 F.2d 173 (7th Cir. 1980)
State v. Karwacki, 616 P.2d 226 (Haw. Ct. App. 1980)
State v. Olkon, 299 N.W.2d 89 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1132 (1981)
United States v. Perlstein, 632 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1084 (1981)
State v. Mark, 618 P.2d 73 (Wash. 1980)
United States v. Tager, 638 F.2d 167 (10th Cir. 1980)
United States v. Johnson, 634 F.2d 735 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 907 (1981)
United States v. Furman, 507 F. Supp. 848 (D. Md.), rev'd, 672 F.2d
914 (4th Cir. 1981)
State v. Carr, 626 P.2d 292 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 625 P.2d 1186
(N.M.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 853 (1981)
United States v. Simon, 510 F. Supp. 232 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
United States v. Goldstein, 695 F.2d 1228 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. de-
nied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983)
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United States v. Stewart Clinical Lab., Inc., 652 F.2d 804 (9th Cir.
1981)
United States v. Sherer, 653 F.2d 334 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1034 (1981)
United States v. Duz-Mor, 650 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1981)
United States v. Voorhies, 663 F.2d 30 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 929 (1982)
Gaines v. State, 406 So. 2d 523 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
State v. Dean, 314 N.W.2d 151 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981)
People v. Forhman, 443 N.Y.S.2d 881 (App. Div. 1981)
State v. McDermitt, 406 So. 2d 195 (La. 1981)
State v. Kennedy, 314 N.W.2d 884 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981)
People v. Montesano, 446 N.Y.S.2d 813 (App. Div. 1982)
People v. Einstein, 435 N.E.2d 1257 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)
Commonwealth v. Minkin, 436 N.E.2d 955 (Mass. App. Ct.), review
denied, 438 N.E.2d 75 (Mass. 1982)
United States v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847 (1st Cir. 1982)
People v. Alizadeh, 452 N.Y.S.2d 425 (App. Div. 1982)
United States v. Leichtling, 684 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1201 (1983)
United States v. Dumas, 688 F.2d 84 (10th Cir. 1982)
United States v. Drury, 687 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 943 (1983)
United States v. Behrens, 689 F.2d 154 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1088 (1982)
Commonwealth v. Askin, 452 A.2d'851 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982), modi-
fied, 467 A.2d 820 (Pa. 1983)
In re Wayne County Prosecutor, 329 N.W.2d 510 (Mich. Ct. App.
1982)
United States v. Huckaby, 698 F.2d 915 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1070 (1983)
United States v. Nichols, 695 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1982)
People v. American Medical Ctrs., Ltd., 324 N.W.2d 782 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1009 (1983)
McKennie v. State, 439 So. 2d 706 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982), rev'd, 439
So. 2d 713 (Ala. 1983)
United States v. Universal Trade & Indus., Inc., 695 F.2d 1151 (9th
Cir. 1983)
United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154 (11th Cir. 1983)
United States v. Mitlo, 557 F. Supp. 520 (W.D. Pa.), rev'd, 714 F.2d
294 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983)
Romani v. State, 429 So. 2d 332 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
United States v. Strong, 702 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1983)
People v. Chaitin, 462 N.Y.S.2d 61 (App. Div. 1983), aff'd, 460 N.E.2d
1082 (N.Y. 1984)
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United States v. Abadi, 706 F.2d 178 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
821 (1983)
State v. Hughes, 433 So. 2d 88 (La. 1983)
Ex parte Hunte, 436 So. 2d 806 (Ala. 1983)
State v. Beatty, 308 S.E.2d 65 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983)
Worthington v. United States, 726 F.2d 1089 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 827 (1984)
State v. Griffon, 448 So. 2d 1287 (La. 1984)
United States v. Lebovitz, 586 F. Supp. 265 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 746 F.2d
1468 (3d Cir. 1984)
People v. Burroughs, 678 P.2d 894 (Cal. 1984)
United States v. Blanton, 730 F.2d 1425 (11th Cir. 1984)
People v. Lee, 351 N.W.2d 294 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984)
People v. Louie, 205 Cal. Rptr. 247 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1984)
United States v. Gamble, 737 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1984)
People v. Kendzia, 478 N.Y.S.2d 209 (App. Div. 1984)
United States v. Varoz, 740 F.2d 772 (10th Cir. 1984)
United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1217 (1985)
United States v. Alexander, 748 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
472 U.S. 1027 (1985)
United States v. Warren, 747 F.2d 1339 (10th Cir. 1984)
United States v. Sanders, 749 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1984)
State v. Sway, 472 N.E.2d 1065 (Ohio 1984)
United States v. Hilliard, 752 F.2d 578 (11th Cir. 1985)
United States v. Colletta, 602 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 770 F.2d
1076 (3d Cir. 1985)
People v. Blasquez, 211 Cal. Rptr. 335 (Ct. App. 1985)
People v. Varas, 487 N.Y.S.2d 577 (App. Div. 1985)
United States v. Sugar, 606 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
998 (1985)
State v. Dorn, 496 A.2d 451 (Vt. 1985)
Commonwealth v. Wu, 494 A.2d 7 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)
United States v. Jackson, 761 F.2d 1541 (11th Cir. 1985)
People v. Reitman, 492 N.Y.S.2d 324 (County Ct. 1985)
United States v. Brown, 763 F.2d 984 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
905 (1985)
United States v. Lipkis, 770 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1985)
Sherriff v. Spagnola, 706 P.2d 840 (Nev. 1985)
United States v. Alemany Rivera, 781 F.2d 229 (1st Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U. S. 1086 (1986)
State v. Quinn, 719 P.2d 936 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986)
United States v. Norris, 780 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1986)
United States v. Lott, 630 F. Supp. 611 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 795 F.2d 82
(4th Cir. 1986)
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State v. Sword, 713 P.2d 432 (Haw. 1986)
United States v. Lamport, 787 F.2d 474 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 846 (1986)
United States v. Keller, 784 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1986)
United States v. Krebs, 788 F.2d 1166 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
930 (1986)
State v. Lizzi, 508 A.2d 16 (Conn. 1986)
United States v. Vamos, 797 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1036 (1987)
United States v. Miller, 800 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1986)
Greco v. State, 515 A.2d 220 (Md. 1986)
United States v. Azad, 809 F.2d 291 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1004 (1987)
United States v. Mahar, 801 F.2d 1477 (6th Cir. 1986)
United States v. Sadlier, 649 F. Supp 1560 (D. Mass. 1986)
United States v. Krowen, 809 F.2d 144 (1st Cir. 1987)
State v. Cargille, 507 So. 2d 1254 (La. Ct. App. 1987)
Sorce v. State, 736 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)
United States v. Larm, 824 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 1078 (1988)
United States v. Nechy, 827 F.2d 1161 (7th Cir. 1987)
United States v. Sblendorio, 830 F.2d 1382 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. de-
nied, 484 U.S. 1068 (1988)
State v. Heath, 513 So. 2d 493 (La. Ct. App. 1987)
United States v. Kaplan, 832 F.2d 676 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 907 (1988)
People v. Asar, 523 N.Y.S.2d 910 (App. Div. 1988)
United States v. Campbell, 845 F.2d 1374 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 908 (1988)
People v. Warden, 529 N.Y.S.2d 230 (App. Div. 1988)
State v. Fiorilla, 543 A.2d 958 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988)
United States v. Cegelka, 853 F.2d 627 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 1011 (1989)
Commonwealth v. Stein, 546 A.2d 36 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988), cert. de-
nied, 490 U.S. 1046 (1989)
People v. Brych, 250 Cal. Rptr. 402 (Ct. App. 1988)
State v. Romero, 533 So. 2d 1264 (La. Ct. App. 1988), rev'd in part,
aff'd in part, 574 So. 2d 330 (La. 1990)
United States v. Goldberg, 862 F.2d 101 (6th Cir. 1988)
State v. Chenette, 560 A.2d 365 (Vt. 1989)
United States v. Kats, 871 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1989)
State v. Burnett, 556 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989)
State v. Venman, 564 A.2d 574 (Vt. 1989)
United States v. Bay State Ambulance & Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 874
F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1989)
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People v. Freedland, 444 N.W.2d 250 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989), cert. de-
nied, 498 U.S. 853 (1990)
State v. MacGillivray, 785 P.2d 59 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989)
State v. Amato, 561 N.E.2d 1058 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989)
People v. Fiedler, 547 N.Y.S.2d 668 (App. Div. 1989), appeal denied,
552 N.E.2d 878 (N.Y. 1990)
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APPENDIX III
CHANGES IN TYPES OF HEA.TH CARE PROVIDERS PROSECUTED
SINCE 1970
I. Prosecutions of Medical Doctors
United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975)
Boyd v. United States, 271 U.S. 104 (1926)
Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5 (1925)
United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 (1922)
Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189 (1920), overruled by Funk v.
United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933)
Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 96 (1919)
United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919)
United States v. Neely, 980 F.2d 1074 (7th Cir. 1992)
United States v. Giannattasio, 979 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1992)
United States v. Levin, 973 F.2d 463 (6th Cir. 1992)
United States v. Siddiqi, 959 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1992)
United States v. Casey, 951 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 2284 (1992)
United States v. Nazon, 940 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1991)
United States v. Hooshmand, 931 F.2d 725 (11th 1991)
United States v. Kaplan, 895 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1990)
United States v. Hughes, 895 F.2d 1135 (6th Cir. 1990)
United States v. Goldberg, 862 F.2d 101 (6th Cir. 1988)
United States v. Campbell, 845 F.2d 1374 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 908 (1988)
United States v. Kaplan, 832 F.2d 676 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 907 (1988)
United States v. Sblendorio, 830 F.2d 1362 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. de-
nied, 484 U.S. 1068 (1988)
United States v. Larm, 824 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 1078 (1988)
United States v. Krowen, 809 F.2d 144 (1st Cir. 1986)
United States v. Azad, 809 F.2d 291 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1004 (1987)
United States v. Krebs, 788 F.2d 1166 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
930 (1986)
United States v. Lamport, 787 F.2d 474 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 846 (1986)
United States v. Alemany Rivera, 781 F.2d 229 (1st Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1086 (1986)
United States v. Norris, 780 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1986)
United States v. Lipkis, 770 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1985)
United States v. Jackson, 761 F.2d 1541 (11th Cir. 1985)
United States v. Hilliard, 752 F.2d 578 (11th Cir. 1985)
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United States v. Alexander, 748 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
472 U.S. 1027 (1985)
United States v. Gamble, 737 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1984)
United States v. Blanton, 730 F.2d 1425 (11th Cir. 1984)
Worthington v. United States, 726 F.2d 1089 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. 827 (1984)
United States v. Strong, 702 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1983)
United States v. Nichols, 695 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1982)
United States v. Behrens, 689 F.2d 154 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1088 (1982)
United States v. Drury, 687 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 943 (1983)
United States v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847 (1st Cir. 1982)
United States v. Sherer, 653 F.2d 334 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1034 (1981)
United States v. Voorhies, 633 F.2d 30 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 929 (1982)
United States v. Johnson, 634 F.2d 735 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 907 (1981)
United States v. Abrams, 615 F.2d 541 (1st Cir. 1980)
United States v. Rogers, 609 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1980)
United States v. Zicree, 605 F.2d 1381 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 966 (1980)
United States v. Schaffer, 600 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir. 1979)
United States v. Porter, 591 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1979)
United States v. Smurthwaite, 590 F.2d 889 (10th Cir. 1979)
United States v. Del Valle, 587 F.2d 699 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 909 (1979)
United States v. Winkle, 587 F.2d 705 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
827 (1979)
United States v. Kirk, 584 F.2d 773 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1048 (1978)
United States v. Herberman, 583 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1978)
United States v. Roya, 574 F.2d 386 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1048 (1978)
United States v. Boscia, 573 F.2d 827 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
911, and cert. denied, 439 U.S. 854 (1978)
United States v. Celia, 568 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1977)
United States v. Cady, 567 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 944 (1978)
United States v. Berdick, 555 F.2d 1329 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1010 (1977)
United States v. Bernstein, 546 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1977)
United States v. Perkal, 530 F.2d 604 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
821 (1976)
United States v. Elizey, 527 F.2d 1306 (6th Cir. 1975)
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United States v. Carroll, 518 F.2d 187 (6th Cir. 1975)
United States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1031 (1975)
United States v. Black, 512 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1975)
United States v. Green, 511 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1031 (1975)
United States v. Larson, 507 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1974)
United States v. Catena, 500 F.2d 1319 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1047 (1974)
United States v. Silvern, 494 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1973)
United States v. Badia, 490 F.2d 296 (1st Cir. 1973)
United States v. Perez, 489 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 945 (1974)
United States v. Parkman, 488 F.2d 1392 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 983 (1974)
United States v. Jobe, 487 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 955 (1974)
United States v. Matanky, 482 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1039 (1973)
United States v. Bartee, 479 F.2d 484 (10th Cir. 1973)
United States v. Collier, 478 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1973)
United States v. Kaplan, 470 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 966 (1973)
United States v. Kraude, 467 F.2d 37 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1076 (1972)
United States v. Thomas, 463 F.2d 1061 (7th Cir. 1972)
United States v. Blazewicz, 459 F.2d 442 (6th Cir. 1972)
United States v. Katz, 455 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972)
United States v. Warren, 453 F.2d 738 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
944 (1972)
United States v. Chakmakis, 449 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1971)
United States v. Sternback, 402 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1082 (1969)
White v. United States, 399 F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1968)
United States v. Taller, 394 F.2d 435 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
839 (1968)
Brown v. United States, 250 F.2d 745 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
833 (1956)
Neill v. United States, 225 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1955)
United States v. Kaadt, 171 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1948)
Wesson v. United States, 164 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1947)
United States v. Tommasello, 160 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1947)
United States v. Brandenburg, 155 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1946)
United States v. Abdallah, 149 F.2d 219 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326
U.S. 724 (1945)
Mitchell v. United States, 143 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1944)
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United States v. Lindenfeld, 142 F.2d 829 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 761 (1944)
Nigro v. United States, 117 F.2d 624 (8th Cir. 1941)
Baker v. United States, 115 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312
U.S. 692 (1941)
Heller v. United States, 104 F.2d 446 (4th Cir. 1939)
Lambert v. United States, 101 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1939)
Barnhill v. United States, 96 F.2d 116 (10th Cir. 1938)
Towbin v. United States, 93 F.2d 861 (10th Cir. 1938)
DuVall v. United States, 82 F.2d 382 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S.
667 (1936)
MacLafferty v. United States, 77 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1935)
Strader v. United States, 72 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1934)
Manning v. United States, 31 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1929)
Bush v. United States, 16 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1927)
Aiton v. United States, 3 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1925)
Manning v. United States, 287 F. 800 (8th Cir. 1923)
Harris v. United States, 273 F. 785 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 646
(1921)
Barbot v. United States, 273 F. 919 (4th Cir. 1921)
Hoyt v. United States, 273 F. 792 (2d Cir. 1921)
Rothman v. United States, 270 F. 31 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 254 U.S.
652 (1920)
Trader v. United States, 260 F. 923 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 251 U.S. 555
(1919)
Thompson v. United States, 258 F. 196 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 251 U.S.
553 (1919)
Melanson v. United States, 256 F. 783 (5th Cir. 1919)
Thurston v. United States, 241 F. 335 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 245 U.S.
646 (1917)
Hughes v. United States, 231 F. 50 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 242 U.S. 640
(1916)
Dyar v. United States, 186 F. 614 (5th Cir. 1911)
United States v. Perez-Reyes, 754 F. Supp. 637 (N.D. Ill. 1991)
United States v. Sugar, 606 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
United States v. Anthony, 15 F. Supp. 553 (S.D. Cal. 1936)
United States v. Smith, 222 F. 165 (E.D. Pa. 1915)
Ex parte Hunte, 436 So. 2d 806 (Ala. 1983)
State v. Jacobs, 503 P.2d 826 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972)
People v. Thayer, 408 P.2d 108 (Cal. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 908
(1966)
People v. Klvana, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 512 (Ct. App. 1992)
People v. Gandotra, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 896 (Ct. App. 1992)
People v. Lonergan, 267 Cal. Rptr. 887 (Ct. App. 1990)
People v. Brych, 250 Cal. Rptr. 402 (Ct. App. 1988)
People v. Blasquez, 211 Cal. Rptr. 335 (Ct. App. 1985)
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United States v. Privitera, 141 Cal. Rptr. 764 (Ct. App. 1977), vacated,
591 P.2d 919 (Cal.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949 (1979)
People v. Brown, 132 Cal. Rptr. 217 (Ct. App. 1976)
People v. Slocum, 125 Cal. Rptr. 442 (Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 924 (1976)
People v. Cobbs, 126 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Ct. App. 1975)
People v. Kurland, 117 Cal. Rptr. 216 (Ct. App. 1974)
People v. Scofield, 95 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Ct. App. 1971)
People v. Meyer, 31 Cal. Rptr. 285 (Ct. App. 1963)
People v. Chapman, 24 Cal. Rptr. 568 (Ct. App. 1962)
People v. Benson, 23 Cal. Rptr. 908 (Ct. App. 1962), cert. denied, 374
U.S. 806 (1963), overruled by People v. Perez, 401 P.2d 934 (Cal.
1965)
People v. Lawrence, 18 Cal. Rptr. 196 (Ct. App. 1961)
People v. Bowman, 320 P.2d 70 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958)
People v. Louie, 205 Cal. Rptr. 247 (App. Dep't. Super. Ct. 1984)
Romani v. State, 429 So. 2d 332 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
Gaines v. State, 406 So. 2d 523 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
Glassman v. State, 377 So. 2d 208 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)
State v. Vinson, 298 So. 2d 505 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974), aff'd, 345
So. 2d 711 (Fla. 1977)
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United States v. Andreadis, 366 F.2d 423 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
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U.S. 924 (1976)
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United States v. Kaplan, 895 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1990)
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553 (1919)
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Commonwealth v. Wu, 494 A.2d 7 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)
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United States v. Jobe, 487 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
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Sorce v. State, 736 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)
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State v. Romero, 533 So. 2d 1264 (La. Ct. App. 1988), rev'd in part,
aff'd in part, 574 So. 2d 330 (La. 1990)
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1468 (3d Cir. 1984)
United States v. Talbott, 460 F. Supp. 253 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd, 590 F.2d
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State v. Bridges, 398 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1966)
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U.S. 907 (1988)
United States v. Krowen, 809 F.2d 144 (1st Cir. 1987)
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U.S. 1217 (1985)
United States v. Sanders, 749 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1984)
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United States v. Wilson, 490 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Mich. 1980), aff'd, 639
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United States v. Collins, 596 F.2d 166 (6th Cir. 1979)
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United States v. Fellman, 549 F.2d 181 (10th Cir. 1977)
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996 (1974)
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United States v. Duncan, 919 F.2d 981 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500
U.S. 926 (1991)
United States v. Campbell, 845 F.2d 1374 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 908 (1988)
United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1217 (1985)
United States v. Behrens, 689 F.2d 154 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1088 (1982)
United States v. Seelig, 622 F.2d 207 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
869 (1980)
Moses v. United States, 221 F. 863 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 238 U.S. 629
(1915)
United States v. Mitlo, 557 F. Supp. 520 (W.D. Pa.), rev'd, 714 F.2d
294 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983)
Commonwealth v. Minkin, 436 N.E.2d 955 (Mass. App. Ct.), review
denied, 438 N.E.2d 75 (Mass. 1982)
Sorce v. State, 736 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)
State v. Marshall, 606 P.2d 278 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980)
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APPENDIX V
CASES RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS ON PROCEDURAL
AND EVIDENTIARY GROUNDS
I. Health Care Prosecutions Resolved in Favor of the Defendant
at the Pretrial Stage
United States v. Levin, 973 F.2d 463 (6th Cir. 1992)
United States v. Tager, 638 F.2d 167 (10th Cir. 1980)
United States v. Abrams, 615 F.2d 541 (1st Cir. 1980)
Aiton v. United States, 3 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1925)
United States v. Lott, 630 F. Supp. 611 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 795 F.2d 82
(4th Cir. 1986)
United States v. Colletta, 604 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 770 F.2d
1076 (3d Cir. 1985)
United States v. Mitlo, 557 F. Supp. 520 (W.D. Pa.), rev'd, 714 F.2d
294 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983)
Ex parte Hunte, 436 So. 2d 806 (Ala. 1983)
State v. Barber, 388 S.E.2d 350 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989)
Sherriff v. Spagnola, 706 P.2d 840 (Nev. 1985)
People v. Lieberman, 405 N.Y.S.2d 559 (Sup. Ct. 1976)
People v. Reitman, 492 N.Y.S.2d 324 (County Ct. 1985)
State v. Fiorilla, 543 A.2d 958 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988)
Commonwealth v. Slaton, 608 A.2d 5 (Pa. 1992)
Commonwealth v. Litman, 144 A.2d 592 (Pa. 1958)
II. Health Care Prosecutions Resolved in the Defendant's Favor
by Post-Trial Resolutions
Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5 (1925)
United States v. Romano, 970 F.2d 164 (6th Cir. 1992)
United States v. Mayers, 957 F.2d 858 (11th Cir. 1992)
United States v. Allard, 926 F.2d 1237 (1st Cir. 1991)
United States v. Kline, 922 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1990)
United States v. Goldberg, 862 F.2d 101 (6th Cir. 1988)
United States v. Mahar, 801 F.2d 1477 (6th Cir. 1986)
United States v. Brown, 763 F.2d 984 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
905 (1985)
United States v. Hilliard, 752 F.2d 578 (11th Cir. 1985)
United States v. Varoz, 740 F.2d 772 (10th Cir. 1984)
United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154 (11th Cir. 1983)
United States v. Dumas, 688 F.2d 84 (10th Cir. 1982)
United States v. Goldstein, 695 F.2d 1228 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. de-
nied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983)
United States v. Stewart Clinical Lab., Inc., 652 F.2d 804 (9th Cir.
1981)
United States v. Seelig, 622 F.2d 207 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
869 (1980)
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United States v. Porter, 591 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1979)
United States v. Halper, 590 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1978)
United States v. Zacher, 586 F.2d 912 (2d Cir. 1978)
United States v. Herberman, 583 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1978)
United States v. Nemes, 555 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1977)
United States v. Radetsky, 535 F.2d 556 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 820 (1976), overruled by 921 F.2d 994 (10th Cir. 1990)
United States v. Perkal, 530 F.2d 604 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
821 (1976)
United States v. Carroll, 518 F.2d 187 (6th Cir. 1975)
United States v. Black, 512 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1975)
United States v. Mekjian, 505 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1975)
United States v. Larson, 507 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1974)
United States v. Peterson, 488 F.2d 645 (5th Cir. 1974)
United States v. Kaplan, 470 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 966 (1973)
United States v. Thomas, 463 F.2d 1061 (7th Cir. 1972)
United States v. Shuford, 454 F.2d 772 (4th Cir. 1971)
Neill v. United States, 225 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1955)
Wesson v. United States, 164 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1947)
United States v. Brandenburg, 155 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1946)
Nigro v. United States, 117 F.2d 624 (8th Cir. 1941)
Lambert v. United States, 101 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1939)
Towbin v. United States, 93 F.2d 861 (10th Cir. 1938)
MacLafferty v. United States, 77 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1935)
Strader v. United States, 72 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1934)
West v. United States, 68 F.2d 96 (10th Cir. 1933)
Manning v. United States, 287 F. 800 (8th Cir. 1923)
Oliver v. United States, 267 F. 544 (4th Cir. 1920)
Hughes v. United States, 231 F. 50 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 242 U.S. 640
(1916)
Dyar v. United States, 186 F. 614 (5th Cir. 1911)
Hibbard v. United States, 172 F. 66 (7th Cir. 1909)
United States v. Anthony, 15 F. Supp. 553 (S.D. Cal. 1936)
United States v. Fleming, 251 F. 932 (W.D. Pa. 1918)
State v. MacGillivray, 785 P.2d 59 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989)
State v. Jacobs, 503 P.2d 826 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972)
People v. Burroughs, 678 P.2d 894 (Cal. 1984)
People v. Marsh, 376 P.2d 300 (Cal. 1962)
People v. Lonergan, 267 Cal. Rptr. 887 (Ct. App. 1990)
United States v. Privitera, 141 Cal. Rptr. 764 (Ct. App. 1977), vacated,
591 P.2d 919 (Cal.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949 (1979)
People v. Brown, 132 Cal. Rptr. 217 (Ct. App. 1976)
People v. Bowman, 320 P.2d 70 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958)
People v. Schroeder, 281 P.2d 297 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955)
People v. Louie, 205 Cal. Rptr. 247 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1984)
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Glassman v. State, 377 So. 2d 208 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)
State v. Sword, 713 P.2d 432 (Haw. 1986)
People v. Guaglita, 200 N.E. 169 (Ill.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 667
(1936)
People v. Einstein, 435 N.E.2d 1257 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)
State v. Webb, 156 N.W.2d 299 (Iowa 1968)
State v. Brown, 616 So. 2d 792 (La. Ct. App. 1993)
State v. Heath, 513 So. 2d 493 (La. Ct. App. 1987)
State v. Romero, 533 So. 2d 1264 (La. Ct. App. 1988), rev'd in part,
aff'd in part, 574 So. 2d 330 (La. 1990)
Commonwealth v. Cerveny, 367 N.E.2d 802 (Mass. 1977), overruled by
Commonwealth v. Crocker, 424 N.E.2d 524 (Mass. 1981)
Commonwealth v. Minkin, 436 N.E.2d 955 (Mass. App. Ct.), review
denied, 438 N.E.2d 75 (Mass. 1982)
People v. Downes, 228 N.W.2d 212 (Mich. 1975)
People v. Kayne, 255 N.W. 758 (Mich. 1934)
People v. Bovee, 285 N.W.2d 53 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979)
State v. Toscano, 378 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1977)
State v. Greco, 148 A.2d 164 (N.J. 1959)
State v. Vaccaro, 361 A.2d 47 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied,
366 A.2d 674 (N.J. 1976)
People v. Weinberg, 586 N.Y.S.2d 132 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed,
605 N.E.2d 883 (N.Y. 1992)
People v. Asar, 523 N.Y.S.2d 910 (App. Div. 1988)
People v. Varas, 487 N.Y.S.2d 577 (App. Div. 1985)
People v. Chaitin, 462 N.Y.S.2d 61 (App. Div. 1983), aff'd, 460 N.E.2d
1082 (N.Y. 1984)
People v. Alizadeh, 452 N.Y.S.2d 425 (App. Div. 1982)
People v. Montesano, 446 N.Y.S.2d 813 (App. Div. 1982)
People v Greenwood, 139 N.Y.S.2d 654 (County Ct.), aff'd, 132
N.E.2d 308 (N.Y. 1955)
State v. Best, 233 S.E.2d 544 (N.C. 1977)
State v. Vogelsong, 612 N.E.2d 462 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992)
State v. Williams, 603 N.E.2d 383 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992)
Commonwealth v. Litman, 144 A.2d 592 (Pa. 1958)
Commonwealth v. West, 396 A.2d 380 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978)
Commonwealth v. Shelhorse, 381 A.2d 1305 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977)
McLean v. State, 527 S.W.2d 76 (Tenn. 1975)
Haney v. State, 544 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)
DeVine v. State, 206 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 1947)
State v. Mark, 618 P.2d 73 (Wash. 1980)
State v. Marshall, 606 P.2d 278 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980)
State v. Young, 406 S.E.2d 758 (W. Va. 1991)
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III. Health Care Prosecutions Resolved in Favor of the Defendant
by Obtaining Suppression of Evidence, Dismissal of
Charges or Reversal of the Conviction
United States v. Levin, 973 F.2d 463 (6th Cir. 1992)
United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154 (11th Cir. 1983)
United States v. Tager, 638 F.2d 167 (10th Cir. 1980)
United States v. Seelig, 622 F.2d 207 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
869 (1980)
United States v. Abrams, 615 F.2d 541 (1st Cir. 1980)
Neill v. United States, 225 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1955)
Wesson v. United States, 164 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1947)
United States v. Brandenburg, 155 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1946)
Lambert v. United States, 101 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1939)
Towbin v. United States, 93 F.2d 861 (10th Cir. 1938)
MacLafferty v. United States, 77 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1935)
Strader v. United States, 72 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1934)
Aiton v. United States, 3 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1925)
Manning v. United States, 287 F. 800 (8th Cir. 1923)
Dyar v. United States, 186 F. 614 (5th Cir. 1911)
United States v. Lott, 630 F. Supp. 611 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 795 F.2d 82
(4th Cir. 1986)
United States v. Mitlo, 557 F. Supp. 520 (W.D. Pa.), rev'd, 714 F.2d
294 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 108 (1983)
State v. Jacobs, 503 P.2d 826 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972)
People v. Marsh, 376 P.2d 300 (Cal. 1962)
People v. Bowman, 320 P.2d 70 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958)
People v. Louie, 205 Cal. Rptr. 247 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1984)
State v. Barber, 388 S.E.2d 350 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989), writ vacated, 394
S.E.2d 353 (Ga. 1990)
State v. Romero, 533 So. 2d 1264 (La. Ct. App. 1988), rev'd in part,
aff'd in part, 574 So. 2d 330 (La. 1990)
Sherriff v. Spagnola, 706 P.2d 840 (Nev. 1985)
State v. Vaccaro, 361 A.2d 47 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied,
366 A.2d 674 (N.J. 1976)
People v. Alizadeh, 452 N.Y.S.2d 425 (App. Div. 1982)
People v. Montesano, 446 N.Y.S.2d 813 (App. Div. 1982)
People v. Lieberman, 405 N.Y.S.2d 599 (Sup. Ct. 1976)
People v. Reitman, 492 N.Y.S.2d 324 (County Ct. 1985)
State v. Vogelsong, 612 N.E.2d 462 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992)
Commonwealth v. Litman, 144 A.2d 592 (Pa. 1958)
Commonwealth v. Slaton, 608 A.2d 5 (Pa. 1992)
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APPENDIX VI
GROUNDS FOR UNFAVORABLE EVIDENTIARY RULINGS BY
APPELLATE COURTS
I. Improper Admission of Extrinsic Acts
United States v. Fellman, 549 F.2d 181 (10th Cir. 1977)
Neill v. United States, 225 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1955)
Lambert v. United States, 101 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1939)
MacLafferty v. United States, 77 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1935)
Manning v. United States, 287 F. 800 (8th Cir. 1923)
Dyar v. United States, 196 F. 614 (5th Cir. 1911)
State v. Jacobs, 503 P.2d 826 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972)
People v. Alizadeh, 452 N.Y.S.2d 425 (App. Div. 1982)
II. Improper Admission of Documents
United States v. Brandenburg, 155 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1966)
State v. Vogelsong, 612 N.E.2d 462 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992)
State v. Romero, 533 So. 2d 1264 (La. Ct. App. 1988), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 574 So. 2d 330 (La. 1990)
III. Improper Ruling on Expert Testimony
Strader v. United States, 72 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1934)
People v. Montesano, 466 N.Y.S.2d 813 (App. Div. 1982)
IV. Improper Admission of Peer Group Comparison
United States v. Seelig, 622 F.2d 207 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 449 U.S.
869 (1980)
People v. Louie, 205 Cal. Rptr. 247 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1984)
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